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Why do some ex-combatants mobilise to make financial and material gains and 
others do not? This thesis examines the political engagement activities of ex-
combatants in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. The activities examined include 
opposition party politics, mutiny, protest, forming associations, and writing 
letters. This research demonstrates that the choice of activity varies across 
groups, with the primary determinant being their own perceptions of whether 
they are the political ‘victors’ or the politically ‘defeated’ in the post-conflict 
period. The main argument advanced is that both political loyalties and 
proximity to political power impact collective and individual choices of 
engagement strategy, and, at least partially, determine the degrees of success. 
Whether ex-combatants perceive claims-making opportunities to exist is 
shaped by their experiences and expectations of clientelistic exchanges with 
political elites continuing into the post-conflict period. 
Drawing from 12 months of fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire, from July 2016 – July 
2017, this research reveals that ex-combatants with political loyalties to the 
victorious rebellion of the Forces Nouvelles, were highly engaged in claims-
making for material and financial gain. Moreover, it reveals that within the 
groups of Forces Nouvelles affiliated ex-combatants, those with closer 
proximity to influential political actors experienced greater success in claims-
making than those at a distance. Contrary to this, ex-combatants with 
sentiments of defeat restricted their political engagement to opposition party 
politics, and in other cases, chose to disengage altogether. Situating the 
fieldwork in this time period allows for inquiries into the nature of political 
engagement in a relatively open and transitional space, as the post-conflict 
Ivoirian government consolidates its exclusive hold on political and economic 
power. The case of post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire shows that the greatest risk to 
peace and stability comes from ex-combatants with the closest ties to political 
power, rather than from those who feel disgruntled and side-lined. It shows that 
ex-combatants who are closer to political power engage in highly destabilising 
forms of political engagement, while those farther away, or out of favour, have 
restricted their actions.  
This thesis explores Ivoirian history and politics to understand how ex-
combatants perceive political opportunities and constraints in the post-conflict 
period. In doing so, it contributes to academic discussions about post-conflict 
compensation for wartime experience, ex-combatant political behaviour, and 
finally, the transformative effects of violent conflict in reconfiguring social orders 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
We, the ex-combatants, idle and having only received 
8,000,000.00 frs, poorly disbursed, are the forgotten ones.  
 
-President, Association of Demobilised of Côte d’Ivoire, 
September 14th, 2015 
 
We have taken up arms this morning to claim a number of things 
the State owes us. […] The beneficiaries are all ex-combatants 
who did the rebellion and who have been integrated into the 
army. 
 
-Interview Mutineer, Le Mandat newspaper,  
January 7th - 8th, 2017 
 
From mid-2015 onwards, a number of public claims-making activities 
began to fill the post-conflict landscape in Côte d’Ivoire. These claims were put 
forth by ex-combatants from the 11-year Ivoirian political crisis, which occurred 
between December 1999 to April 2011,1 and effectively split the country in two 
down a deep political divide. The crisis, tied to questions of citizenship, land, 
and belonging, pitted those who supported the government under Laurent 
Gbagbo, against the Forces Nouvelles (FN) northern rebellion, who pledged 
support to Alassane Ouattara. For more than a decade, the crisis was 
characterised by sporadic episodes of intercommunal violence between 
Ivoirians of southern and northern descent.2 On the 11th of April 2011, Laurent 
Gbagbo was captured after seeking to retain power in the wake of a disputed 
election. This event marked a new period where FN soldiers claimed victory 
                                                          
1 Many researchers of Côte d’Ivoire refer to the political crisis from 2002-2011. I include the events from 1999 
onwards as they mark the beginning of armed revolt, with the same set of founding actors who led to the 2002 
rebellion. This is discussed in Chapter 2. 
2 Ruth Marshall-Fratani, “The War of ‘Who Is Who’: Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis,” 
African Studies Review 49, no. 2 (2006): 15. 
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and Alassane Ouattara took control of the government. This new period has far 
reaching implications for post-conflict stability in Côte d’Ivoire, which is 
exemplified by the claims-making behaviours of multiple groups of self-
identifying ex-combatants across the political divide. 
At first glance, the quotations above suggest that ex-combatants in post-
conflict Côte d’Ivoire have been politically active and uninhibited in staking their 
claims to the government. If taken as such, they run in accordance with early 
understandings of disgruntled ex-combatants who, it was widely held, would 
disturb lasting peace should their grievances go unaddressed.3 This was most 
recently observed in 2013-14 Mozambique, when former Resistência Nacional 
Moçambicano (RENAMO) fighters remobilised to pursue a low-intensity violent 
revolt against growing socioeconomic disparities in the country. They also 
denounced what they saw as a crisis of patronage amongst the RENAMO 
political party leadership.4 Upon closer examination of the above quotations, 
however, the ex-combatants quoted represent only a segment of the Ivoirian 
ex-combatant population, specifically, those derived from the victorious rebel 
insurgency, and whose preferred candidate, Alassane Ouattara, won the 
Ivoirian presidency in 2011 and was again re-elected in 2015. Gaining a political 
victory and access to numerous post-conflict benefits such as army integration 
and short-term financial support, the ‘victors’ were hardly amongst the most 
aggrieved of the ex-combatant population. Yet, they remained the most vocal 
in leveraging their wartime experiences to advance their financial and material 
interests in the post-conflict period. In contrast, groups of ex-combatants 
aligned with Laurent Gbagbo and Ibrahim Coulibaly were unwilling to leverage 
their wartime experiences. Despite stressing that one day it would be “their 
time” when their political patrons came into power, they still felt as though the 
political climate was unconducive for their gain. Consequently, they decided not 
to act. Collectively, the comments of the aggrieved suggested that political 
affiliation and loyalty to a handful of influential state officials played an important 
                                                          
3 Lephophotho Mashike, “‘You are a time bomb…’ Ex-combatants in post-conflict South Africa,” Society in Transition 
35, no. 1 (2004): 87. 
4 Nikkie Wiegink, “‘It will be our time to eat’: Former Renamo combatants and big-man dynamics in central 
Mozambique,” Journal of Southern African Studies 41, no. 4 (2015): 2.  
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role in determining who could politically mobilise and disrupt the peace and who 
could not, without facing any consequences. More importantly, it suggested that 
proximity to political power equally determined who was more likely to succeed 
in claims-making in the post-conflict period.  
The first quotation above, from the president of the ex-combatant 
association, Association des Démobilisés de Côte d’Ivoire (ADCI), was 
released in a letter to the prefect of Bouaké, the former headquarters of the 
northern rebellion. It laid claim to what would put them on a par with those that 
were integrated into the national army.5 Observers present at the scene 
recorded the complete list of demands: a payment equivalent to what was 
cumulatively given to those integrated into the rank of Corporal, a meeting with 
the President of the Republic, a “gesture” to make up for the tardy payments of 
their 8,000,000 F CFA (approximately €1,200) each, and home medical visits 
for their peers. According to the President of ADCI, the 8,000,000 F CFA 
reinsertion payment received through participation in the national 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme (DDR) was 
insufficient. Should their conditions not be met, they would start an infinite 
hunger strike at the office of the prefect in Bouaké. In their view, ex-combatants 
of the ADCI (an organisation dominated by those who supported the northern 
rebellion) having only received the benefits of a DDR programme, were the 
forgotten ones. Met largely with deaf ears, the hunger strike did not materialise 
and none of the demands were met. 
The second quotation comes a day after the onset of the first 2017 
mutiny, which took place from the 6th until the 8th of January 2017.  At this time, 
soldiers derived from the northern rebellion took arms and blocked entry and 
exit points to the city. Coordinating their actions across cities and military 
barracks in Côte d’Ivoire, the mutineers made demands including the payment 
of bonuses, increase in salaries, reduced time for promotions within the military 
                                                          
5 “Le Collectif des Leaders des Ex-Combattants Démobilisés de Côte d’Ivoire,” Public letter from the organisation’s 
President Kaba Sory addressed to the Governor of Gbéké, Prefect of Bouaké, 14th of September 2015. 
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ranks, and the payment of a supposed ECOMOG bonus payment.6 The 
demands came approximately one year after similar demands were made in 
November 2015, which were partially met through a non-disclosed deal with the 
regime.7 In 2017, the same segments of the Ivoirian army engaged in mutiny, 
this time with the addition of alleged ‘ECOMOG bonuses’ in their list of 
demands. Of the demands, two were met by the government, including the 
payment of 12,000,000 F CFA (approximately ₤ 16,000) and an amelioration in 
living conditions. In May 2017, the mutiny re-commenced over the slow 
disbursement of the agreed upon payment. Although the claims highlighted 
above come from ex-combatants with different post-conflict trajectories, that is, 
those considered demobilised and those integrated, they share the 
commonalities in that they were put forth by those who supported the victorious 
rebel insurgency. 
Having observed that claims-making was carried out by only a sub-set 
of the Ivoirian ex-combatant population, this thesis embarks on a more thorough 
examination of ex-combatant political engagement and the legacies of post-
independence governance in the post-conflict state. To do so, it examines the 
case of post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. This analysis makes use of data collected 
during 12 months of fieldwork throughout 2016 and 2017, as well as historical 
accounts from the government and the local and international press. This 
research speaks to the broader theme of ex-combatant politics and places 
emphasis on the role of history to understand the political opportunities 
available to ex-combatants in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. This thesis sheds light 
on broader trends in ex-combatant political engagement that go beyond claims 
tied to technicalities of the DDR programme from the immediate post-conflict 
recovery phase (2011-2016). This research identifies larger trends in ex-
                                                          
6 “Communique du Ministre de la Défense Relatif Aux Evénements de Bouake,” Ministry of Defence of Côte d’Ivoire, 
6th of January 2017. 
7 "Mutinerie de FRCI: ‘Ne gaspillez jamais une bonne crise,’ Abidjan.net, November 19, 2014: 
HTTP://NEWS.ABIDJAN.NET/H/516156.HTML. In response to the soldiers’ revolts, government officials reassured 
them that their grievances would be addressed. Since the public declaration, found in the article cited, little was 
revealed as what agreement was made. Speculation from both local populations and international observers 




combatant political behaviour, revealing why some ex-combatants leveraged 
the label of ‘ex-combatant’ to make claims while others did not.  
As observed from 2016 onwards, claims similar to those quoted above, 
where demands are made for army integration or payments made to match 
those integrated into the army, were propagated only by ex-combatants from 
one side of the 11-year political crisis: those considered as the victors. While 
these examples captured national and international attention, claims-making by 
those with wartime experience favourable to the post-conflict regime took many 
forms including personal letter-writing, association-forming, public protesting, 
and mutiny. For the ex-combatants who were politically aligned to the victorious 
insurgency, claims-making was both frequent and effective. Moreover, amongst 
the victors, those who were in closer proximity to influential political officials and 
institutions, experienced more success than those at a distance, the 
demobilised. In other cases, ex-combatants with sentiments of defeat were 
observed to have restricted their political engagement to opposition political 
party politics, and in more extreme cases, chose to disengage altogether.  
The variation of political engagement activities across groups of Ivoirian 
ex-combatants, this analysis argues, is explained through an examination of 
the country’s historical practices of governance, notions of ‘victor’s justice’, and 
finally, for those opportunistic individuals, the enduring secrecy surrounding key 
events of the crisis. Simply put, this thesis demonstrates that the expectation of 
clientelism is a pre-condition for claims-making amongst ex-combatants in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Through an analysis of ex-combatants across political divides, this 
thesis accounts for the variance observed in ex-combatant political behaviour, 
on both individual and collective levels. It also determines what factors most 
significantly influence their choices of political engagement activity. The 
findings of this research add more nuance to discussions on the legacies of 
insurgent victories, post-conflict political opportunities, and continuities in 
political behaviour, by demonstrating how ex-combatant political engagement 
choices are largely influenced by their expectations of continuities in 
governance from the pre- to post-conflict periods. As the claims for material and 
financial compensation are only put forth by one politically-affiliated group of 
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ex-combatants, this thesis recognises the inherent political underpinnings of 





The analysis presented in this thesis is based on the following primary 
research question:  
1. Why do some ex-combatants mobilise to make financial and material 
gains and others do not?  
 
Two complementary questions were also explored, the first being the logical 
point of departure to explore the range of activities undertaken. As this thesis 
argues that the legacies of post-independence governance shaped post-
conflict political behaviours by creating an expectation for continued clientelism, 
it then became interesting to see whether this expectation extended beyond 
communities of ex-combatants. The following two questions are 
complementary to the primary research question above and were used to 
structure the topic. 
 
2.  How do ex-combatants advance their political and material interests in 
post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire? 
3.  Do labels of ‘ex-combatant’ influence political engagement beyond 
communities of ex-combatants?  
 
To answer these questions, I draw on data collected from three groups of 
ex-combatants in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire: those who were in support of 
Laurent Gbagbo’s previous regime (herein referred to as “Gbagbo supporters”); 
those who were in support of the northern rebellion, the Forces Nouvelles (FN) 
and current regime (herein referred to as “FN supporters”); and finally, those 
who fought alongside the northern rebellion in support of the current regime, 
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but broke off mid-way as a result of a leadership dispute within the FN (herein 
referred to as “Commando Invisibles”). This third group, although sharing 
political affinities with the FN supporters, launched a separate, victorious, urban 
insurgency in Abidjan during the 2010-11 post-electoral crisis. Despite their 
common origins in the FN rebellion and their shared political affinities, the 
Commando Invisibles are taken locally as a separate group from the broader 
FN supporters. The findings presented in Chapter 8 demonstrate how the 
political trajectories of the Commando Invisibles8 have stood in stark contrast 
to their FN counterparts, due to their continued loyalty to their fallen leader. 
Clientelism, it will be demonstrated, set the stage for highly personalistic 
identification between fighters and their former armed groups leaders. 
 
Notes on Terminology 
 
As previously elaborated, the term ‘ex-combatant’ is contentious and 
does not have a standardised definition. It is, therefore, important to highlight 
that the term is used in the inclusive sense outlined above throughout this 
thesis. It includes individuals who self-identify as ‘ex-combatants’ regardless of 
whether they gained the official status through a peacebuilding program. Using 
the inclusive sense of the term allows for a greater scope for this study, taking 
into consideration any individual in the post-conflict state and their relation with 
the label of ‘ex-combatant’. Moreover, the research suggests that there is no 
correlation between the DDR-given title of ‘ex-combatant’ and the self-
proclaimed title. Individuals self-identify on their own terms, according to their 
own motivations. Amongst ex-combatants, self-identifying individuals may not 
necessarily be recognised by other ex-combatants in their cohort. This thesis, 
therefore, takes into consideration all ex-combatants. As similarly observed in 
                                                          
8 The spelling of Commando Invisibles varies across French media sources. This thesis will use the 
“Commando Invisibles” spelling most frequently used in articles appearing in Jeune Afrique and Le 
Monde, both prominent French media publications. 
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post-conflict Zimbabwe, a ‘true’ and ‘fake’ veterans discourse developed and 
was linked to a politics of legitimation and de-legitimation.9 
Moreover, this thesis uses the term “regime” to refer to the post-conflict 
government of Alassane Ouattara and his coalition party, the Rassemblement 
des Houphouëtistes pour la Démocratie et la Paix (RHDP). The RHDP is a 
coalition party that came together to topple Gbagbo’s Front Populaire Ivoirien 
(FPI) and consists of Ouattara’s Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) in 
alliance with Henry Konan Bédié’s Partie Démocratique de Côte D’Ivoire 
(PDCI). Much of the FN rebellion’s support base drew from the same 
populations as Alassane Ouattara and his political party did. As a northern-born 
Ivoirian of mixed heritage, Ouattara’s candidacy came to represent the greater 
northern cause, to which the FN had strong and clear political affinities. In 2010, 
Ouattara claimed victory over Laurent Gbagbo in the presidential elections. In 
support of Ouattara during the period of contestation, the FN rebellion 
descended into Abidjan to help Ouattara consolidate his political victory. Again 
in 2015, Ouattara was re-elected as president of the Ivoirian republic, and is 
expected to hold office until the next presidential elections in 2020. While 
Ouattara never held leadership in the FN rebellion, the close political ties 
between the FN elite and the RDR political party make the connection obvious. 
The victory of Ouattara in 2010, as the official head of the RHDP coalition 
between his RDR party and Bédié’s PDCI party falls in line with the FN 
rebellion’s political wishes, and for simplicity’s sake, is broadly referred to as an 
insurgent victory in this thesis. As it formed the government in 2010 and again 
in 2015, the term ‘regime’ places particular emphasis on the RDR component, 
a northern-derived candidate supporting the broader northern causes. 
 
Scope Conditions and Limitations 
 
This thesis argues that political loyalties and proximity to influential 
political actors significantly influences the political behaviours of ex-combatants 
                                                          
9
 Kriger, “Zimbabwe,” 323.  
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in the post-conflict period. In doing so, it links past practices of clientelistic 
governance with post-conflict expectations of who has political opportunities 
and who does not. This thesis, therefore, argues that this theory is more likely 
to apply in clientelistic states. In post-conflict contexts such as Côte d’Ivoire’s, 
the expectation of clientelistic exchanges between ex-combatants and those 
wielding political power, clientelism becomes a pre-condition for claims-making 
and for more disruptive forms of political engagement. 
Beyond the scope conditions of this research, there are a couple of 
limitations. First, this thesis restricts itself to the examination of political 
engagement initiatives utilised by self-identified ex-combatants in the post-
conflict period, with a specific examination of the period in which international 
presence draws down. The primary reason for this is that the period follows a 
time in which a highly technical and programmatic use of the term ‘ex-
combatant’ was widely circulated and was attached to publicised benefit 
schemes available in the national DDR programme. Situating the fieldwork in 
this time period allows for inquiries into the nature of political engagement in a 
relatively open and transitional space, as post-conflict governments consolidate 
their exclusive hold on political and economic power. This time period also 
allows for an analysis of how technocratic uses of the term ‘ex-combatant’ can 
turn into a political category and constituent identity, as post-conflict recovery 
benefits are no longer available. Moreover, the timing of this research marks a 
starting point to assess whether this political engagement was a temporary 
occurrence, or whether, over time, it becomes recurring. Such projections are 
beyond the scope of this research but can be the basis of additional research.  
Of equal importance is that this research does not draw from the claims 
made by ex-combatants participating in the Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Reintegration (DDR) programme of 2012-2015, as they pertained exclusively 
to the technical particularities of the programme itself, such as the rate at which 
financial allotments were dispensed, the mode of dispensation, and increases 
in sums. The nature of claims examined in this thesis are for general financial 
compensation or integration into the army and are carried out by ex-combatants 
with political loyalties to the post-conflict regime. The claims reviewed are, 
10 
 
therefore, political in nature, while those from the DDR programme were 
programmatic in nature. While my analysis recognises that the DDR 
programme may have socialised or habituated ex-combatants to make financial 
and material claims, the data collected make a stronger connection with the 
political alliances they target, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5. The 
episodes of political engagement observed between 2016-2017 placed 
emphasis on the roles played by ex-combatants to obtain a political victory for 
Ouattara, and most commonly used military integration as their benchmarks for 
what was due.   
Third, it considers those armed groups who formed leading into, or in 
response to, the 1999-2011 political conflict. The goal of this research is to see 
how labels of ex-combatant were used in the post-conflict period, with specific 
reference to the 11-year political crisis. It does not take into account pre-existing 
groups of Dozo, Ivoirian traditional hunters, who were used to bolster the FN’s 
security in the north. As the Dozo are a traditional group that pre-dates and 
persists beyond the crisis, their identities are different in nature to those who 
participated in the crisis for ideological and practical reasons. Moreover, the 
details of life under rebel rule provided in Chapter 6 demonstrate that rather 
than the Dozo mutating to suit the conflict, it was rather the FN that adapted to 
better suit the traditional preferences of both the Dozo and the communities 




The remainder of the thesis is outlined as follows: Chapter 2 sets the 
theoretical framework for the analysis. It explores themes of veteran 
compensation, ex-combatant politics, social reconfigurations, and clientelism. 
Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the methodology used for this research. 
Chapter 4 explains the post-independence underpinning clientelism in Côte 
                                                          
10 Till Förster, “Dialogue Direct,” Rebel Governance in Civil War edited by Ana Arjona, Nelson Kasfir, and Zachariah 
Mampilly (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 213. 
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d’Ivoire, setting a basis for understanding the expectations around the post-
conflict redistribution of goods. The chapter also provides a brief analysis of the 
11-year Ivoirian political crisis, highlighting the unconfirmed events that have 
subsequently created opportunities for individuals in the post-conflict period to 
exploit. Chapter 5 examines the political engagement activities of Gbagbo 
supporting ex-combatants and their perspectives on political opportunities in 
the post-conflict state. Chapter 6 examines the mutinies of January and April 
2017 as claims-making strategies for those amongst the FN supporters who 
were integrated into the military and who are in the closest proximity to state 
resources, while Chapter 7 examines the strategies of those FN supporters who 
were demobilised and who are distant from political elites. Chapter 8 focuses 
on the choice of active disengagement by the Commando Invisibles ex-
combatants, while additionally revealing how individuals equally from the 
broader FN supporter groups appropriated the wartime identities of the 
Commando Invisibles as a way of advancing their interests. Finally, Chapter 9 
provides a concluding analysis, placing the empirical evidence in the larger 
regional contexts and opening discussion of how clientelistic exchanges can be 





Chapter 2: Conceptualising Ex-combatant Political 
Mobilisation and Clientelism 
 
 
This chapter explores broad discussions on ex-combatant politics in the 
post-conflict period. The arguments put forth in this thesis build on three 
interrelated academic discussions: post-conflict compensation for wartime 
experience, ex-combatant political behaviour, and finally, the transformative 
effects of violent conflict in reconfiguring social orders in the post-conflict period. 
Through its empirical data, this thesis links notions of clientelism with ex-
combatant political behaviour. This chapter also introduces the concept of 
clientelism as it will be applied in the empirical chapters that follow. 
 
 
Compensation for Wartime Experience 
 
As presented in the Introduction, the aforementioned examples of ex-
combatants attempting to achieve wartime compensation are not an 
unprecedented phenomenon. For at least the past century, the political 
mobilisation of former fighters to stake claims for political and economic benefits 
to their governments has been a common occurrence. There are many salient 
examples from Anglo-American contexts, in which war veterans from World 
War I and II mobilised in order to obtain state benefits for their roles in active 
duty.  
In Canada for instance, following World War I, veterans formed a variety 
of organisations, the largest being the Great War Veterans Association. This 
association sought to represent veteran interests in the areas of pension 
acquisition, employment for the able-bodied, housing, medical care, as well as 
provisions for any dependents of war veterans.11 Following the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, Canadian veterans lobbied for extensive rehabilitation 
                                                          
11 Peter Neary, “‘Without the Stigma of Pauperism’: Canadian Veterans in the 1930s,” British Journal of Canadian 
Studies 22, no.1 (2009): 31. 
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programmes, including a monthly clothing allowance and a war service gratuity. 
Able-bodied veterans within the group benefited from preferential appointment 
to the civil service, an insurance scheme, and a land settlement programme 
that offered favourable financial terms.12 Similar to Canada, US American 
veterans of World War I benefited from a national scheme that provided them 
with bonuses equated by the number of days served. The bonuses, however, 
were not available for 20 years, prompting the veterans to march in protest in 
1932 for a more expedient disbursement. Following World War II, millions of 
US American veterans returned from war, prompting the government to create 
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, commonly known as the G.I. Bill, 
with provisions for education and training, loan guarantees for homes, farms, 
or businesses, as well as for unemployment pay.13 Notably updated twice since 
its inception, the G.I. Bill was amended again in 2008 to provide veterans that 
were both active and enlisted from the 11th of September 2001 with enhanced 
educational benefits including more expenses, living allowances, book 
allowances, and the ability to transfer residual benefits to their spouses and 
children.14 Beyond increasing the number of war veterans into the post-
secondary educational system, these policies had broader social implications, 
supporting new socioeconomic classes of Americans to access the institutions 
that were traditionally reserved for the wealthy and affluent. In both cases, the 
political mobilisation of war veterans following their active service resulted in 
greater political and economic benefits for veterans willing to leverage their 
wartime experiences. These cases shed partial light on the long and global 
history of political claims-making by fighters returning from battle. 
The two cases outlined above are both different and similar to recent 
cases from Sub-Saharan Africa. In the cases of Canada and the United States, 
war was fought along interstate dimensions, with a trained national army 
engaging in decisive battles against a clear opponent. Moreover, they both 
elicited images of sacrifice and heroic actions for a greater collective cause. As 
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13 “Education and Training,” U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed 17 August 2017, 
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14 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, “Education and Training.”  
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such, veterans returning to Canada and the US were considered to be special 
members of society, ones who warranted the support of the state and of the 
larger society to be assisted and compensated for their wartime efforts. The 
wars of post-independence Africa, however, took an intrastate dimension, 
through various independence struggles and internal civil wars. While liberation 
struggles such as Zimbabwe’s or Namibia’s had clear opponents, opponents in 
civil wars such as Sierra Leone and Liberia were more difficult to identify.  
Different from the cases in North America, where wartime experiences could 
be framed around themes of sacrifice and the collective cause, many African 
civil wars were concluded with no clear winner or loser, with citizens fighting on 
opposing or fractioned groups. In such contexts, peace agreements became 
increasingly brokered with the assistance of the international community and 
were accompanied by a series of post-conflict recovery efforts.15 Despite these 
differences, however, claims-making in post-independence Africa remained 
remarkably similar to the North American cases, in which veteran concessions 
often increased following episodes of contentious political engagement with the 
national government.  
Recent examples of political engagement from Sub-Saharan Africa 
demonstrate similar patterns of political mobilisation of former fighters for the 
advancement of their group’s interests. Following the wave of liberation 
struggles and colonial independence, veteran claims for war-related 
compensation were similar to the North American cases above. Norma Kriger’s 
study of post-conflict Zimbabwe, for instance, demonstrates how ex-
combatants who were politically aligned to the post-conflict ruling party, ZANU-
PF, used a discourse of the liberation struggle as both a symbolic resource and 
as a strategy to advance their interests. The relationship between the ruling 
party and the aligned veterans was reciprocal. On the one hand, the ruling party 
sought power and legitimacy by incorporating ZANU-PF-aligned veterans into 
business cooperatives as a way of symbolising economic transformation. This 
                                                          





incorporation gave former fighters, particularly those from the politically 
favoured ZANLA group, privileged access to employment and training in the 
private sector- two areas previously dominated by their former enemies, the 
white ruling elite. The privilege granted to the ZANLA fighters was justified in 
terms of their wartime contributions to the liberation struggle. In areas where 
ZANU-PF held tight control, veterans from opposing sides experienced 
difficulties in forming cooperatives and accessing the same degrees of 
privilege.16  On the other hand, ex-combatants who stood in alignment with the 
political agendas of the ZANU-PF similarly appropriated the ruling regime’s 
liberation discourse, declaring wartime sacrifices as a way of justifying their 
demands for rewards and additional state benefits.17 The use of the liberation 
discourse was key in legitimating veteran access to state resources in the post-
conflict period and also effectively linked veterans with national level politics. 
The close relationship between ZANU-PF and ZANLA veterans resulted in a 
situation where veterans who maintained loyalty to the regime could mediate 
national politics through their suppression of opposition movements. By 
buttressing the regime, they effectively gained and maintained a privileged 
access to state resources, promotions, and other benefits, all the while quelling 
any movements that threatened this exchange.18 The concept of “military 
patrimonialism”, in which the regime is backed by the military, who actively 
opposes political reforms proposed by opposition, has been used to describe 
ZANU-PF’s relationship with the war veterans within the national army. In such 
a relationship, both parties have interest in maintaining the political status quo 
as they both benefit from the exchange of resources for support.19 Beyond 
combat-experienced veterans, Kriger additionally detailed how the discourse of 
                                                          
16 Norma J. Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 141. 
17 Kriger, Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, 1, 10. 
18 Godfrey Maringira, “Politics, Privileges, and Loyalty in the Zimbabwean National Army,” African Studies Review 60, 
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liberation and sacrifice was later appropriated by groups of ex-detainees to 
access the privileged benefits originally reserved for those who engaged in 
armed combat.20 The result of these claims was the eventual extension of 
eligibility criteria for state-provided economic and political benefits beyond 
groups who engaged in battle to those who, more broadly, reinforced political 
agendas of the ruling party. Extending the discourse to groups beyond 
combatants themselves equally allowed for the inclusion of politically-aligned 
individuals who may have been excluded on the basis of age or other restricting 
factors.  
Kriger’s analysis of the political legacies of liberation struggles is highly 
intriguing. Although it is based on examinations of a liberation struggle, it 
applies to other types of conflict as well. The case of Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates 
this. In Côte d’Ivoire, political loyalties and an expectation of clientelist 
exchanges are important pre-conditions for claims-making. As in Zimbabwe, 
former fighter who have ‘their own’ in power have come to expect significant 
concessions for their wartime sacrifices to bring their candidate to power. The 
expectation of favourable concessions for political loyalties falls in line with past 
practices of clientelistic governance- a topic that is closely examined in Chapter 
4. Together, the cases of Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate that the 
legacies of post-independence governance significantly influence ex-
combatant political behaviours in the post-conflict period. Equally similar to 
Zimbabwe was the extension of claims-making practices by groups with loose 
and questionable affiliations to the Ivoirian victors. For these individuals, 
examined in Chapter 7 and 8, the experience of living through the conflict, 
coupled with their political loyalty to the regime, was legitimate grounds to stake 
claims. The chapters that follow demonstrate that the political engagement 
observed in Kriger’s studies of Zimbabwe extend beyond liberation struggles 
and into different cases of intrastate conflict, as demonstrated by the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
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The wartime experiences of North America and Zimbabwe vary across 
time, space, and type of war fought. Nevertheless, commonalities exist. The 
staking of claims for wartime experience in post-conflict Zimbabwe draws 
parallels with the ways in which North American veterans of the World Wars 
successfully increased their concessions by leveraging their wartime 
experiences to secure their livelihoods in the post-conflict state. In the cases 
highlighted above, former fighters were able to uniquely balance conflicting 
actions. Although they often trumpeted loyalty to the post-conflict authorities, 
sometimes invoking sentiments of patriotism and sacrifice, they equally used 
their wartime credentials to push against the state and to legitimate their claims. 
While veterans in North America mobilised and put pressure from outside of the 
state, Zimbabwe’s veterans effectively leveraged the same pressure from 
within, in what appeared to be an extended wing of the ruling political party. The 
examples above describe successful instances of public gatherings, protests, 
and patriotic discourse, all of which ceded relatively successful outcomes, and 
more often than not, increased the benefits and official recognition of their 
wartime experiences. While the case of Côte d’Ivoire is not categorised as a 
liberation struggle, Ivoirian ex-combatants with political loyalties to the regime 
highlighted their distinct contributions to the political conflict, demanding official 
recognition for their services. Moreover, like Zimbabwe, Ivoirian claims-makers 
were exclusively from one political affiliation, thus bringing in an important 
political dimension to the claims-making activities. Trends in claims-making 
such as those visible in North America and Zimbabwe, where a discourse of 
sacrifice is leveraged, were equally observed from groups of Ivoirian ex-
combatants who consider themselves to be politically aligned to the post-
conflict regime. While the examples above refer to inter-state wars and 
liberation struggles, this thesis demonstrates that it is applicable to other types 






Ex-combatants as Political Actors 
 
Despite the considerable attention paid to the political engagement 
initiatives of former fighters from regular state militaries and early liberation 
struggles, relatively little has been said about the claims-making activities of ex-
combatants emerging from civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa. To begin to break 
down the nuances of the post-conflict experiences of ex-combatants from Côte 
d’Ivoire, it is important to highlight that the language used to describe these 
former fighters and their experiences has often been simplified and thus has 
placed significant limitations on analysis.  
The term ‘ex-combatant’ is fluid and multi-faceted, as it appears across 
legal, programmatic, and local contexts. Legally, the definition of ex-combatant 
remains vague. To date, legal scholars and practitioners have drawn on the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols (I & II) of 1977 for 
guidance in how to identify a ‘combatant’. The Prisoner of War (POW) definition 
found in Article 4 of Geneva Convention III says that only combatants can be 
legitimately held as POWs. Additionally, Article 43 of the Additional Protocol I 
provides a definition of armed forces that also outlines who is a combatant.21 
Aligning its definition with that of the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations, 
in its Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration Handbook 
(IDDRS), defines combatant as follows.  
a member of a national army or an irregular military organisation; 
or is actively participating in military activities and hostilities; or is 
involved in recruiting or training military personnel; or holds a 
command or decision-making position within a national army or 
an armed organisation; or arrived in a host country carrying arms 
or in military uniform or as part of a military structure; or having 
arrived in a host country as an ordinary civilian, thereafter 
assumes, or shows determination to assume, any of the above 
attributes.22  
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This definition is most commonly applied to recent African civil wars, in which 
peace settlements were negotiated and internationally-funded programmes 
emerged. However, for programmatic purposes, the IDDRS takes a wider 
definition of combatant, with much hinging on the term ‘member’. The following 
statement, issued in the UN IDDRS Handbook (2006), demonstrates the 
inclusive nature of DDR criteria, taking individuals serving in support roles as 
members of armed groups eligible for inclusion. 
All those who are found to be members of an armed force or 
group, whether they were involved in active combat or in support 
roles (such as cooks, porters, messengers, administrators, sex 
slaves and ‘war wives’), shall be considered part of the armed 
force or group and therefore shall be included in the DDR 
programme.23 
 
Beyond the strict definition of POW, this definition outlines broader criteria for 
inclusion and underscores the importance of how membership is adjudicated in 
local contexts. Members, regardless of their function, are categorised as 
‘combatants’ and subsequently, as ‘ex-combatants’, once undergoing the 
disarmament and demobilisation process. In this sense, within the framework 
of modern peace-building interventions, the term has been used by both local 
and international practitioners as a technical signifier, as a short-hand identity 
marker, and eligibility criterion for access to post-conflict recovery benefits.24  
Although the definition used by IDDRS allows for inclusive membership, 
once an individual obtains the title of ‘combatant’ and ‘ex-combatant’, the 
nuance of the conflict itself, as well as the individual’s type of participation 
becomes reduced and devoid of political inclination. There are pros and cons 
to this. On the one hand, the departure of the term ex-combatant from images 
of sacrifice and political inclinations can be a positive development for civil wars 
in which highly contested political identities were forged. Moreover, the neutral 
                                                          
23 United Nations, “Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration Handbook,” 2:30:2. 
24 Jaremey J. McMullin, “Integration or Separation? The Stigmatisation of ex-combatants after war,” Review of 
International Studies 39, no. 2 (2013): 389. 
20 
 
term ex-combatant demonstrates the impartiality of the programme itself and 
does not privilege any political allegiance or type of experience over others.25 
On the other hand, however, the term ex-combatant, as used in these types of 
programmes, reduces the political nature of both the combatant and their post-
conflict trajectories. While this thesis recognises the indispensable necessity of 
neutral DDR programmes, it shows that the title of ‘ex-combatant’ itself holds 
significant political weight in the post-conflict period as individuals with or 
without official ex-combatant status have leveraged it for political mobilisation 
and claims-making. Depending on how claims are advanced, the neutral 
signifier takes on a political function, revealing much about larger trends of 
governance in the post-conflict state. 
The data presented in Chapters 3,4,5, and 6 of this thesis demonstrate 
how different groups have used their ex-combatant labels and wartime 
experiences in different ways. All groups, however, have come to see the label 
more as a membership granting access to resources and benefits. Drawing 
from multiple interviews with Ivoirian ex-combatants from all sides of the 
political crisis, the label ex-combatant signifies different things for different 
individuals. The label was most commonly evoked amongst groups of ex-
combatants aligned to the Forces Nouvelles (FN) insurgency, with little mention 
or self-identification amongst those who supported rival armed groups. 
Amongst the FN ex-combatants, it was sometimes used as a slur to discredit 
another and to identify who was ‘real’ and who was ‘fake’. In other cases, it was 
used by demobilised FN combatants to portray themselves as victims of official 
neglect from the victorious rebel insurgency that they helped put into power. 
For the Demobilised FN who did not benefit from any post-conflict recovery 
package, it was a mark of pride, signifying their sacrifice and contributions to a 
noble political cause. Above all, and as presented amongst the broader ex-
                                                          
25 This question was also brought up with an international practitioner serving in the Security Sector Reform 
programmes of the United Nations. When questioned why there was a departure from the notion of ‘veteran’ to ‘ex-
combatant’ in UN programmes, the respondent reflected carefully, eventually responding along the same lines as 
Metsola. The neutrality of both the programme and the organisations, both domestic and international, were 
important to assure the broadest participation possible and to signal that the post-conflict period would not belong to 
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combatant populations from the FN rebellion it was a label that could be 
leveraged to obtain goods. Similar to observations made in post-conflict 
Zimbabwe, the label of ‘ex-combatant’ has many meanings and uses for those 
willing to leverage it.26 Consistent with McMullin’s observation, 
Ex-combatants themselves adopt and eschew the label 
simultaneously to blend in, lobby, protest, apply for 
benefits, gain acceptance, and make sense of past and 
present life experiences.27  
 
While there is analytical recognition that wartime experiences are highly 
variable within ex-combatants as a group, there is still a lack of nuance in how 
we understand the lasting legacies of political behaviour in the post-conflict 
period. As elaborated by Lalli Metsola, both labels of ‘ex-combatant’ and 
‘veteran’ are important objects of analysis that shed important light on 
statehood, political recognition, and citizenship post-conflict societies.”28 
 
Beyond definitions of ex-combatant, the programmes in which they 
formally participated have attracted significant academic attention. For recent 
cases emerging from civil wars with internationally-brokered peace deals, such 
as Sierra Leone and Liberia, the primary lens to examine ex-combatant 
trajectories has been through an assessment of the United Nations (UN) 
sponsored, nationally-directed Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme, and 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Through 
both programmes, combatants either get integrated into the new post-conflict 
state forces (SSR) or are demobilised and given financial assistance to 
reintegrate back into civilian life (DDR). While the SSR integration involves 
combatants’ absorption into the official state security apparatus, the DDR 
process seeks to place combatants back into regular civilian life. As outlined in 
the UN’s official DDR framework, the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
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Reintegration Standards Operational Guide, typical DDR programme involves 
between three to four phases, starting with the handing over of weapons 
(disarmament), the removal of the individual from the armed group structure 
(demobilisation), and short-term financial and technical support to facilitate their 
reinsertion back into society (reinsertion).29 The reinsertion phase, is short-term 
and provides financial incentives to enable a transition, while a reintegration 
phase is a longer-term process involving acceptance from a host community 
and the ex-combatant’s ability to sustain their livelihoods in legal and culturally-
accepted ways. For West African conflicts from the 1990s onwards, the SSR 
and DDR processes have been the primary vehicles for states to ensure 
recovery options for combatants from all sides of the conflict. These processes 
have been used in Sierra Leone (2001-2004), Liberia (2004-2009),30 and most 
recently, will be applied in Mali following agreements between the warring 
parties and the government over the technical modalities of the programmes.  
As conflict contexts have evolved, so too have the DDR programmes, 
adapting each generation of programme to meet the new challenges that arise. 
Although each generation of programmes shares similar strategic objectives to 
support peace processes and promote security through the removal of 
weapons and breaking of armed group structures, “traditional DDR” 
programmes have focused primarily on combatants in military structures. 
“Second generation” DDR programmes, by contrast, sought to address the 
problems of violence against unarmed civilians, often perpetrated by local 
militias or gangs. These second generation programmes have been seen as a 
way of expanding into broader security and stabilisation efforts in the initial 
phases of post-conflict recovery, and helping to establish a more secure context 
for longer term peacebuilding efforts.31 The most recent wave of DDR 
programmes has adapted to meet evolving contexts of violent conflict such as 
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Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A Contribution to the New Horizon Discussion on Challenges 
and Opportunities for UN Peacekeeping,” United Nations: New York (2010): 3. 
23 
 
those seen in Afghanistan and in Mali, where violent extremism runs in parallel 
to trafficking, intercommunal tensions, and the presence of transnational 
fighters. 
While funding for these programmes is largely derived from international 
sources, operations and strategic decisions are made through national 
commissions to encourage national-led processes. Jaremey McMullin has 
questioned the claim of ‘nationally-owned’ processes, using evidence from 
Liberia to argue that the national commissions may have been just a cover for 
international actors, resulting in the same group of people setting the 
parameters and target beneficiary groups of the programmes.32 Arguments put 
forth by Robert Muggah, however, reveal that national commissions exert 
significant influence over the processes, as elaborated in his review of DDR 
processes worldwide. 
Notwithstanding these lofty aspirations, on the ground, DDR 
practitioners across all three generations acknowledge that 
most, if not all, aspects of DDR are negotiated and decided in 
the context of highly localised political and economic 
expediencies. An intensely contested period of bargaining, 
rather than soaring expectations set from above, defines the 
parameters of a DDR program, and agreement on basic political 
preconditions is fundamental to the exercise. While some of this 
negotiation takes places in the “formal” domain—among donors, 
national state representatives and agencies—much occurs 
informally, out of sight of the international aid community, among 
project implementers, former commanders, combatants, 
community elites and others. The negotiation of DDR is often 
stop-and-go, contentious and rarely satisfactory to all parties 
involved.33 
 
Personal experience from Côte d’Ivoire similarly revealed that national 
commissions had significant influence over the processes, adapting the 
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parameters of the programme to meet local needs, for better or for worse.34 
This insight is relevant in that it sheds light on one of the ways that local contexts 
exert influence on, and help shape the nature and dynamics of internationally-
sponsored stabilisation programmes. In this sense, such insight acknowledges 
a degree of localised agency at the institutional level, that may or may not be 
extended to the individual levels. When recognising the ability of local partners 
to negotiate the parameters of the programme, it is important to understand 
whether post-conflict actors from all political inclinations have equal stakes in 
shaping post-conflict periods, or whether influence over such programmes 
remains concentrated in the hands of a few. The issue of political plurality in 
post-conflict periods is complex and operates on multiple levels, and as such, 
requires a more in-depth examination of individual political engagement 
activities across ex-combatants with competing political orientations. The 
research presented in this thesis sheds light on issues of political plurality, as it 
is understood by the Ivoirian ex-combatants themselves. 
The emphasis that DDR programmes place on neutral, inclusive, but 
nevertheless technical definitions has moved attention away from the political 
behaviour of ex-combatants, placing priority analysis on whether they were 
successful in reintegration or not. As such, the post-conflict experiences of ex-
combatants have typically been reduced to one desirable goal: reintegration 
back into non-violent civilian life and the ability to forge a meaningful livelihood 
beyond armed combat. Within the context of DDR programmes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the programme and its associated policies have been examined 
primarily from “the imminent goals they themselves set out to deal with”, such 
as immediate socioeconomic reinsertion, with much less emphasis on the 
longer-term implications of these programmes, such as equal inclusion in the 
post-conflict polity.35 This programmatic departure from veterans as political 
blocks to ex-combatants as a technical category generalises both the wartime 
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and post-conflict experiences with limited capacity to reveal the complex nature 
of post-conflict state transitions. By reducing these experiences to the one-
dimensional aim of reintegration, this type of analysis nullifies the complexity of 
both the causes and effects of conflict and overlooks the political dimensions of 
immediate post-conflict societies. My analysis elucidates the complexities of the 
term ‘ex-combatant’ and demonstrates that in the post-conflict social context of 
Côte d’Ivoire, it is a highly ambiguous and political term.  
In response to early DDR programmes, several critiques emerged 
highlighting their failure to optimise the reintegration of high-risk ex-combatants. 
Studies focusing on the programmes themselves drew attention to issues of 
heavy bureaucracy, limited degrees of contextual sensitivity, questionable rates 
of participation36, and sub-standard delivery of skills training for ex-
combatants.37 When examining ex-combatant reintegration, frequently cited 
challenges included low levels of employable skills, on-going health problems, 
difficulty gaining access to land for housing and business, psychological 
stress,38 and a reluctance of communities to accept returnees.39 For some, 
combat experience in armed groups demonstrated increased organisational 
capacities, allowing groups to more efficiently and credibly threaten violence 
and to engage in collective action. By extending this new-found social capital 
into peaceful contexts, the authors suggested that such enhanced organisation 
capacities may be a liability to peace.40 The framing of ex-combatants as high-
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risk individuals in the post-conflict state equally placed emphasis on the risks 
they pose to peace and stability if left disgruntled and idle. Examples of factors 
making them high-risk include their potential to remobilise, their potential 
delinquency, and their ability to join criminal organisations and/or cross-border 
mercenary activities, thus threatening the delicate peace and security emerging 
from a post-conflict settlement.41 Ex-combatants who were idle and have felt 
redundant in South African post-conflict society, for instance, were expected to 
be amongst the first to engage in crime, to trigger social unrest, and to engage 
in renewed hostilities as a way “to give justification to their lives.”42 In such 
cases, crime was identified as a natural response to economic hardship, 
showcasing some of the violent skills that ex-combatants had acquired.43 In 
post-conflict Liberia, a significant ex-combatant presence in the post-conflict 
period was treated as a widespread problem with potential long-term effects on 
the political stability of the country. Liberian ex-combatants, however, behaved 
in an opposite way. They rarely voiced political preferences or expressions of 
dissent in the post-conflict period, in an effort to avoid open conflict or to be 
perceived as instigating conflict. As some of the first academic analyses of ex-
combatants emerging from African civil wars, the studies listed above helped 
to establish the initial narratives of ex-combatants as inherently threatening to 
post-conflict peace, placing a discourse of distinctness between them and the 
larger society. In much of the discourse, ex-combatants are constructed as 
‘outlaws’ and ‘threats’ that are in need of management by the post-conflict state 
with the guidance of the international community.44 While such a view stresses 
their distinctness within a given society, it ultimately constructs an acontextual 
view of ex-combatants across wartime contexts that are highly variable.45 
Jaremey McMullin has argued against the dominant narrative surrounding ex-
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combatants, concluding that such narratives do more to differentiate them than 
to help with their integration.46  
Alternatively, research from Johanna Söderström demonstrates how 
these programmes gave political voice to ex-combatants.  Söderström argues 
that through the acquisition of resources such as knowledge, self-esteem, and 
a new identity, ex-combatants bolstered their capacity to become active 
members of society. These gains were seen to be supported by institutional 
and procedural traits practiced in the programmes that promote democratic 
norms.47 The data presented in chapters 3,4,5, and 6 of this thesis demonstrate 
how Ivoirian ex-combatants chose political actions in accordance to their 
perceptions of the political climate in the post-conflict period, rather than out of 
idleness and frustration.  
In partial response to the shortcomings listed above, there has been a 
positive shift in research that challenges the assumption of ex-combatants as 
high-risk individuals. Research that links ex-combatants with criminal 
organisations found that the majority of ex-combatants, regardless of their 
employment status, simply did not possess the social networks or opportunities 
required to get involved in criminal organisations.48 Adding to this, a recent 
study by Anders Themnér observed that ex-combatants were largely risk-
averse individuals in the post-conflict state.49 Taking ex-combatant trajectories 
from Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ex-combatant 
violence and remobilisation was contingent on the convergence of multiple 
factors, including military affinities, intermediaries, and incentives. Furthermore, 
other studies have challenged assumptions of demobilisation as an integral part 
of lasting peace and stability. In one study comparing demobilisation in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, and Colombia, research 
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showed how the social ties that war provided ex-combatants positively 
impacted their social integration allowing shared experiences to transcend 
social barriers.50 Finally, evidence from Liberia demonstrated that ex-
combatants who were mid-level commanders had a positive impact on peace 
and security when incorporated as brokers of daily services such as transport. 
Additionally, demobilised commanders in Liberia were seen to have the 
potential as mediators between governing elites and ex-combatants. Their 
ability was due, in large part, to their direct access to ex-combatants, as well as 
their ability to distribute goods, jobs, money, food, and scholarships.51 In such 
situations, commanders acted as brokers to bring employment opportunities to 
their former rank-and-file ex-combatants.52 For instance, the motorcycle taxi 
services that flourished in post-conflict Liberia and Sierra Leone greatly 
benefitted from ex-combatant presence as they extended affordable and 
flexible transport services to residents, all the while satisfying their need for 
income. Despite these successes, however, motorcycle transport remains 
stigmatised by local residents who associate the service with brutal individuals 
and petty crime.53 Adding to the research on positive ex-combatant experiences 
is that of William Reno that highlights the ways in which Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean warlords and their affiliated wartime social networks used their 
commercial activities to build social and political support within their 
communities and amongst their ex-combatant followers.54 Reno highlighted the 
benefits of this legacy, allowing some to launch successful electoral campaigns 
and others to protect themselves and their associates from political 
marginalisation and prosecution. Together, these studies, have greatly 
advanced images of ex-combatants in the post-conflict state, adding nuance to 
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the dominant view of them as destabilising factors to the post-conflict period. 
Moreover, these studies suggest that the social networks established amongst 
combatants during the war, whether through informal armed groups or through 
strict military hierarchies remained rather robust in the post-conflict period. The 
phenomenon of ex-combatants keeping their social networks intact in the post-
conflict period was equally observed in Côte d’Ivoire for all groups across the 
political divides. The insight generated by the aforementioned studies is 
relevant for this thesis as it provides precedence for Ivoirian ex-combatant 
experiences to build on. The data presented in this thesis further demonstrates 
how social networks of ex-combatants provide momentum to stake claims, to 
contain political action, or to abstain altogether. For Ivoirian ex-combatants with 
feelings of defeat, wartime networks remained firmly intact, while for those 
considered as the victors, they were used on the basis of convenience. 
As demonstrated, the term ‘ex-combatant’ tends to characterise these 
individuals as an overly homogenous group, which is indicative of a more 
pervasive set of beliefs. Simplifying ex-combatant experiences in the post-
conflict period ultimately stems from a reductive reading of their participation 
and, arguably, an under-estimation of their agency as individuals. In one of the 
first articles to shed light on the nuances of Ivoirian combatant experiences, 
Magali Chelpi-Den Hamer noted the variation in armed group participation of 
pro-Gbagbo militias in the rural southwest. With the fluid composition of the 
groups, Chelpi-Den Hamer reveals the challenges of distinguishing ex-
combatants from general supporters of the cause. In some cases, individuals 
may have considered themselves as ‘combatants’ only for a short period, 
usually during a violent event, while others maintained their combatant identity 
years after a violent episode. While some were amongst the first to be recruited, 
others joined much after the violent periods, with opportunistic motives. Others 
still, were recruited locally, very close to where they lived, while some were 
tasked with relocating to support the war effort.55 Understanding the motivations 
of why individuals mobilised and joined the armed groups can shed significant 
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light on what they may look forward to in the post-conflict period. For individuals 
who joined for an ideological cause, a simple victory or defeat may suffice in 
the post-conflict period. For others who joined for more opportunistic reasons 
such as financial reward, more complex post-conflict trajectories are likely to 
follow. While this thesis is limited in its ability to trace individual trajectories from 
armed group mobilisation to post-conflict political engagement, it opens 
interesting avenues for future research. Cases such as Mali provide an 
intriguing terrain for such research as the warring parties continue to negotiate 
the peace agreement, while a number of new armed groups simultaneously 
emerge and demand inclusion in the political negotiations.56 As made clear, the 
experiences of combatants in this study were highly varied, rather than a 
common unified wartime experience. Although its focus was on the wartime 
experiences, it presents itself as a sort of precursor to understanding that the 
combatant/ex-combatant experience is not uniform. The insights presented 
from these studies demonstrate the evolution in analysis around issues of ‘ex-
combatants’, as well as underscore the need for more nuance across highly 
varied experiences. This thesis builds on the more recent insights of ex-
combatant politics by mapping the different types of post-conflict political 
actions taken by Ivoirian ex-combatants. In doing so, it sheds light on the 
inherently political undertones of the label and the ways in which it is used in 
the post-conflict period. 
 
Social Reconfigurations during Violent Conflict 
 
Alongside the increased nuance around the topic of ex-combatants, 
there has been a similar movement to understand how violent wars can 
produce reconfiguring effects on local social, political, and economic orders. 
This body of research, while generally analysing at the societal level, has called 
for more flexibility in how civil wars are understood, as well as the ways in which 
their legacies affect post-conflict orders. As summarized by Terrence Lyons, 
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“war destroys certain types of political institutions but provides the settings for 
others to thrive in.”57 Conflicts are multi-faceted, requiring careful examination 
to understand their full spectrum of implications on the post-conflict period.  
A growing number of studies have recognised the ways in which local 
populations adapt their lives around ongoing violent conflict.58 In some cases, 
order and governance emerge locally during times of violent conflict.59 
Research specific to Africa has demonstrated that when conflict erupts and the 
formal institutions of government are diminished, “alternative forms of control 
and management establish themselves”.60 Timothy Raeymaekers’ research on 
eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) reveals how political power 
develops in acutely localised contexts, beyond the reach of official state 
power.61 In these cases, the prevailing conventions of government are 
transformed by local actors ‘on the margins’, but who have managed to fill 
spaces between receding state power and expanding market areas. Social and 
political spaces are altered as a result of the brokering functions these 
individuals play across various geographical zones and localised political 
orders.62 Examples of alternative forms of control and management include 
trade that continues through unconventional and makeshift channels, including 
a range of actors from businessmen, middlemen, soldiers, and petty traders. 
Raeymaekers demonstrates how in eastern DRC, the economic activities of the 
Nande traders effectively bridged communal methods of exchange with global 
capitalist orders, resulting in a socially stratified space during times of 
uncertainty and crisis.63 Similar observations were made in Côte d’Ivoire, 
                                                          
57 Terrence Lyons, “Victorious rebels and postwar politics,” Civil Wars 18, no.2 (2016): 167. 
58 For examples see Patricia Justino, Tilman Brück, and Philip Verwimp, A Micro-Level Perspective on the Dynamics 
of Conflict, Violence, and Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Stephen C. Lubkemann, Culture in 
Chaos: An Anthropology of the Social Condition in War (Chicago,: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
59 Ana Arjona, “Wartime Institutions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (2014); Zachariah Cherien Mampilly, 
Rebel rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
60 Mats Utas, “Introduction: Bigmanity and Network Governance in African Conflicts,” African Conflicts and Informal 
Power (London, Uppsala: Zed Books, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2012), 2. 
61 Timothy Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo: Power to the Margins 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
62 Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo Power to the Margins, 2. 
63 Raeymaekers, Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo Power to the Margins, 67. 
32 
 
describing how informal economies adapted and flourished during the conflict 
through their provision of crisis-related documents, propaganda, and services. 
These new conflict-themed markets emerged through the efforts of individuals 
who otherwise would have remained economically marginalised during the 
interwar period.64  
Elisabeth Wood’s 2008 article provides a theoretical foundation from 
which the transformative effects of conflict on social processes can be 
examined. In this article, Wood identifies six social processes that are impacted 
by armed conflict: political mobilisation, military socialisation, the polarisation of 
social identities, the militarisation of local authority, the transformation of gender 
roles, and finally, the fragmentation of the local political economy.65 Civil wars, 
she argues, can radically affect the pace and direction of these processes, 
resulting in a reconfiguration of local social orders. During such 
reconfigurations, potential exists for the development of new social orders, the 
dissolution of others, or a changed internal structure.66 Recognising that both 
the processes of normalisation and the creation of order during times of conflict 
require a certain degree of agency from local populations sets the grounds to 
observe whether post-conflict transitions have become more inclusive, or 
whether the same power brokers and systems of governance recreate 
themselves. This thesis is motivated by Wood’s framework and the potential for 
inclusive political order to emerge in the post-conflict period. It concludes, 
however, that post-conflict political orders remain largely exclusive, as the 
perceptions of the participating individuals themselves ultimately determine 
who will participate and who will not. 
Moving beyond the societal level, recent studies also explored wartime 
configurations at the individual level of analysis. Reconfigurations of order, in 
these studies, involve the emergence of new actors, likened to middle-men, 
who utilise a combination of social networks and incentives to mobilise 
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combatants into armed groups as they themselves gain prominence. Violent 
conflict, in this regard, has been seen to open spaces for new actors to emerge, 
re-shaping the distribution of power and influence across a new set of actors.67 
Similarly, in seeking to identify the conditions in which ex-combatants 
remobilise and move from aggrieved individuals to a collective violent 
enterprise, Anders Themnér develops the concept of “entrepreneurs of 
violence” and shows how the opportunities to re-engage in violence are 
facilitated by the presence of three intervening variables: military affinities, the 
use of intermediaries, and the provision of selective incentives. As a recruitment 
strategy, the political and military elites or the ‘entrepreneurs of violence’, make 
use of intermediaries such as mid-level commanders and ‘second-tier’ 
individuals. These individuals are useful because of their proximity and direct 
contact with ex-combatants and their communities.68 Studies specific to Côte 
d’Ivoire have begun to explore these dynamics through the concept of 
‘ascension sociale’, akin to upward mobility for social, economic, and political 
standing within a society. Throughout the conflict, a variety of individuals 
emerged, either as vigilante group leaders and their “gbohni” (Ivoirian slang for 
“youth-followers”), or as independent actors attempting to display their status 
as ‘big men’. Their objectives in doing so were to capitalise on perceived 
incentives allocated to commanders and leaders of armed groups.69 Many 
combatants affiliated with the pro-Gbagbo movement followed a similar logic 
when attempting to establish themselves as fierce leaders with loyal followers, 
as they saw this as one of the ways in which they could climb in social, 
economic, and political stature.70 Together, these cases demonstrate that 
violent conflict can foster the emergence of new actors and power brokers, 
many of which may extend their influence into the post-conflict period. These 
studies demonstrate the possibility of individual transformations. Carrying these 
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findings forward, this thesis includes individual-level analysis of political 
engagement in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. 
If conflict can produce such transformations, then, it should equally allow 
for a reconfiguration of political norms, empowering new sets of actors and 
altering past political behaviour. Although academic researchers are 
increasingly aware of the transformative effects of armed conflict on the 
structures of society, the standing assumption amongst many policy-makers is 
that violent conflict has more costs to society than it does benefits, therefore, 
reinforcing the current conception of post-conflict peacebuilding as restorative 
of pre-conflict orders and power distributions.71 William Reno has made 
successive calls for a renewed understanding of conflict, effectively 
demonstrating how post-conflict peace-builders need be mindful of the shifted 
distributions of powers. Analysts who are mindful of such reconfigurations can 
provide more nuanced readings of the broader post-conflict periods, as well as 
the actors who participate and shape its trajectories. 
Recently, there has been a growing body of research of the 
transformation of armed actors into political actors across various types of 
conflict. This area of study provides a bridge to the common examinations of 
ex-combatants in the post-conflict state and that of post-conflict transformations 
more generally. In these studies, analysis is carried out at the group level, 
examining how armed groups transition into political parties, and identifying 
what might account for their successes or failures.72 One study that examined 
the transformation of the Colombian armed group M19 into a political party, 
found that, within the group, levels of political mobilisation varied significantly 
after the its military victory.73 Within the former M19, political trajectories were 
broken down into three main categories: the resilient who sustained or 
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increased their political mobilisation efforts; the remobilised whose political 
participation dropped but who were gradually becoming revived due to renewed 
support for the party’s ideals, and finally; the removed, whose participation 
dwindled and showed little signs of revival.74  
Where analysis is still budding is in the study of these very actors beyond 
the initial transition period, including internal party dynamics.75 Moreover, as 
this thesis identifies, political mobilisation efforts of ex-combatants need not 
necessarily be restricted to collective organisations. The position of this thesis 
is consistent with that of Johanna Söderström in that one can “expect different 
dynamics during different periods of the ex-combatants’ life”,76 thus placing 
importance on the potential for transformation over time. Where this thesis 
contributes to academic discussions is through its analysis of various levels of 
political mobilisation within five to six years into the post-conflict period. Its 
analysis encompasses group mobilisation, through both formal and informal 
channels, as well as individual efforts from those who sit at the margins of 
political influence. Despite the potential for violent conflict to trigger social and 
political reconfigurations that carry into the post-conflict state, evidence 
collected five to six years into Côte d’Ivoire’s post-conflict period demonstrates 
that the political norms of the post-independence period have continued into 
the post-conflict period. Data collected on how and when ex-combatants 
choose to politically engage with the state demonstrate that individual 
expectations of politics drive individual decisions on how, when, and who can 
engage in political claims-making. In other words, the practices of clientelistic 
governance that Ivoirian ex-combatants have come to expect operate both as 
a catalyst and as a constraint for political action. In this sense, clientelism is a 
pre-condition for political claims-making and for the more disruptive methods of 
political engagement. As this thesis demonstrates, political engagement of ex-
combatants in Côte d’Ivoire has been unequal, with some groups choosing 
more vocal and disruptive routes, and others, the most experienced fighters, 
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disengaging altogether. This finding runs counter to standing assumptions that 
battle-hardened ex-combatants engage in more disruptive forms of political 
mobilisation. 
Noting the variation found across groups of ex-combatants in Côte 
d’Ivoire also brings about the question of whether the post-conflict period offers 
the same playing field to all formerly armed groups, or if it is more conducive to 
some over others. Researchers addressing this question have theorized that 
the way in which a conflict ends has an impact on the post-conflict transition 
process, and subsequently the ways in which formerly armed actors engage 
politically. These studies examine the ways in which civil wars were won, either 
through a military victory or through a negotiated political settlement.77 
Research from Monica D. Toft contends that civil wars that end in rebel victory 
are more likely to bring about democratic outcomes. The reasoning behind this 
is that victorious insurgents who go on to form governments in the post-conflict 
period likely have demonstrated military capabilities to dissuade spoilers and 
incentives to govern in a just manner.78 In such cases, victorious insurgencies 
wield legitimacy from local constituents, as well as from the international 
community, making the “victor’s peace” potentially more stable and 
democratic.79 Research countering these claims, such as the study by Fortna 
and Huang have contended that insurgent victories did not necessarily result in 
democratic outcomes, while Terrence Lyons has demonstrated that insurgent 
victory had the reverse impact, making authoritarian regimes more likely, thus 
creating a situation of “we rule because we won”.80 Lyons differentiates 
traditional political parties from those of rebel-formed political parties, noting 
that the latter were not created to win elections, but rather “as military 
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organisations focused on winning armed struggle.”81 In post-conflict periods, 
these armed groups turned political groups may benefit from wartime fatigue 
amongst the population, and are in turn more likely to gain credibility through 
their military victory.  
Looking more specifically at civil wars that ended in insurgent victory, 
Terrence Lyons has identified several conditions that determine whether a 
victorious insurgent government will be strong or weak in the post-conflict 
period. Amongst the conditions identified are the length of the civil war, the size 
of the area that it encompassed (and that rebels controlled), and finally, the 
extent of external interference. When taken together, Lyons contends that if an 
insurgent army gained experience effectively controlling a large area for a long 
period of time, with little external influence, it would be more likely to form a 
strong government in the post-conflict period, as is the case in Ethiopia.82 A 
victorious insurgent regime would likely demonstrate attributes such as 
cohesive leadership, internal discipline, a well-structured hierarchy, and would 
have established patterns of military administration over territories under their 
control.83 Should an insurgency not be able to meet these conditions, as is the 
case in the DRC, the post-conflict government would more likely be weak with 
little control of its territory.84 Such understandings can shed important light on 
how larger societies move past violence and transcend war.85 
 In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, analysis on the ways its conflict ended are 
making important strides. Giulia Piccolino relates how Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict 
came to end by a decisive military defeat of the FRCI over Laurent Gbagbo. 86 
In the analysis, Piccolino defends the choice of ‘victor’s peace’ to describe the 
post-conflict period in Côte d’Ivoire. While my analysis supports the notion, 
especially with its influence in shaping political behaviours of ex-combatants, it 
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hesitates to classify Côte d’Ivoire as a decisive military victory. In the article, the 
military victory is attributed to the pro-Ouattara Forces Nouvelles/FRCI, with 
indirect acknowledgement of the role of the French forces and the United 
Nations (UN).87 To this day, this is highly contested amongst Ivoirians. Much of 
the success on the battlefield of 2010-2011 in Abidjan during the post-electoral 
crisis, the period under Piccolino’s examination, were won by the Commando 
Invisibles, a group that my interview data demonstrates has faced the highest 
rates of persecution in the post-conflict state. In keeping with understandings 
put forth by Lyons above, the case of Côte d’Ivoire is not clear cut. While my 
thesis maintains that the FN insurgent group obtained a political victory, it is 
wary of claims of a decisive military victory by the FN/FRCI. Moreover, my 
analysis demonstrates that much of the reluctance that the current Gbagbo 
supporters and youth of the Commando Invisibles have, when recognising the 
Ouattara government as legitimate, stems from the fact that they perceive the 
international community to have militarily secured Ouattara’s position, rather 
than a decisive military victory of the pro-Ouattara Forces Nouvelles/ FRCI. 
 
Political Continuities in Post-Conflict Côte d’Ivoire 
 
This analysis of Côte d’Ivoire focuses on the opportunities and 
constraints for political engagement, as identified by the ex-combatants 
themselves. The variation of political engagement activities across groups of 
Ivoirian ex-combatants is explained by the country’s historical practices of 
governance, notions of ‘victor’s justice’, and finally, for those opportunistic 
individuals, the enduring secrecy surrounding key events of the crisis. This 
thesis, therefore, follows Kriger with respect to the emphasis it places on history 
and politics to understand the political opportunities available to ex-combatants 
in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. Additionally, it also supports the argument of 
William Reno that pre-existing political orders have a significant impact on the 
organisation of armed groups during conflict. In his study Warfare in 
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Independent Africa,88 Reno demonstrates how the behaviour and organisation 
of armed insurgent groups are influenced by the pre-war political contexts in 
which the groups emerged. Reno classifies the Ivoirian armed groups as 
‘warlord rebels’, suggesting that the leaders of these groups replicated the 
same political structures from which they emerged, “appropriate[ing] the 
existing instruments of political power and us[ing] them in even more intensive 
ways at the expense of building bureaucratic institutions.”89 Consistent with 
Reno’s analysis, much of the data gathered for this thesis supports the 
argument that many of Côte d’Ivoire’s rebel leaders did emerge from within the 
ranks of the national military and from close knit political circles, and have since 
taken lucrative positions in the larger security sector.90 My analysis builds on 
Reno’s argument, extending the influence of post-independence political norms 
into the post-conflict period, in which ex-combatants, and the larger society 
more broadly, have come to expect and recreate similar patterns of 
governance.  
More broadly, this thesis fits into the larger contentious political literature, 
identifying clientelistic ties as a necessary pre-requisite for claims-making in the 
post-conflict period. As such, it touches on the notion of political opportunity 
structures, as defined by Sidney Tarrow. Political opportunity structures imply 
the following: 
Consistent but not necessarily formal or permanent dimensions 
of the political environment that provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for 
success or failure.91 
In this sense, political opportunities significantly shape and condition the ways 
in which political contention manifests itself. It equally influences the methods, 
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frequently referred to as repertoires, used by those engaging in contention.92 
As applicable to the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the expectation of specific practices 
of governance, learned in the post-independence period, influences behaviour 
in the post-conflict period, which ultimately recreates the same political norms 
that existed before. As such, the notion of violent conflict as a transformative 
experience for post-conflict social orders is significant. While elites and former 
warlords (“ComZones” as named in Côte d’Ivoire) rose to prominence 
throughout the conflict and managed to maintain their political, economic, and 
social influence in the post-conflict period, the reconfigurations of social order 
to a more inclusive state were bleak for the general population, including groups 
of ex-combatants who did not position themselves favourably with the ruling 
regime. 
 
Clientelism and Systems of Post-Independence Governance 
 
The dominant framework for understanding governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been that of patrimonialism and patron-client exchanges — concepts 
that have been used to explain the shortcomings of developing states to 
maximize their economic and political potential. The concepts, broadly, have 
been applied to situations in which relationships of loyalty and dependency 
influence formal political and administrative procedures, despite the presence 
of bureaucratic institutions and procedures.93 Several causes of these 
exchanges have been put forth by academics, with explanations including 
factors such as a small public realm, the strength of clan-centred relations, 
ethnicity and sub-national identities, the historical predilection of dyadic, two-
way exchanges in rural societies, and as a form of informal social assurance to 
weather difficult economic environments.94 In such cases, any given position of 
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power obtained by an individual would likely be valued for the resources and 
opportunities that it would provide to the individual’s family and kin.95 Early 
conceptions of this type of governance were similarly put forth by Jean-François 
Bayart to analyse how inter-elite exchanges and competition were used to take 
power and maintain political stability and dominance. In his analysis, Bayart 
took a state-centric approach to describe how power was determined by control 
of, or access to, the State. To ensure political stability, state resources were 
used to forge alliances with different groups of social, political, and economic 
elites. This elite-centred method of distribution often took the form of overt 
power-sharing arrangements, encouraging support across power-brokers and 
allowing for the preservation of the status quo.96 Building on Bayart’s argument, 
Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle explained how the distribution of 
state resources in clientelistic ways promoted a political stability that also 
carried into periods of political transition, such as after elections with regime 
change.97 This thesis supports this argument by suggesting that political 
expectations premised on past practices significantly influence the political 
behaviours of individuals in the post-conflict state.  
Clientelistic exchanges, as they pertain to a variety of African cases, 
however, may not always be negative. In Chabal and Daloz’ seminal book 
Africa Works, the authors highlight how “power is personalized and […] 
legitimacy continues primarily to rest on practices of redistribution.”98 Moreover, 
they demonstrate how clientelistic exchanges need not only support the status 
quo of the political elite but can also serve a more general constituency. In this 
sense, distribution to the community (across various understandings of 
‘community’) can serve the common good, rather than simply individualistic 
enrichment.99 The notion of distribution to communities in need was recently 
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brought up in an interview for this thesis, where a self-proclaimed hard-line 
supporter of Laurent Gbagbo called for a more humanistic interpretation of how 
pro-Ouattara former ComZones were carrying out the distribution of benefits to 
‘their own’. In this explanation, which came to the defence of his perceived 
adversary, the distribution of state resources to the base of ethnic and political 
supporters of Ouattara was a natural and humane way of helping those in 
precarious socioeconomic situations.100 
Over several decades, researchers applied notions of clientelism to their 
studies in both developing and developed countries, with large amounts of 
studies focusing on Southeast Asia and Africa. The widespread application of 
the term is important to this study because it helps set the general criteria from 
which clientelistic exchanges can be identified in Ivoirian governance. Broadly, 
clientelistic exchanges have been identified in both authoritarian and 
democratic societies, and have been observed to, in some cases, fade over 
time with economic development, or, in other cases, adapt and survive.101 
Although a well-developed body of literature has been devoted to clientelistic 
exchanges, there is a persisting lack of conceptual clarity and consensus for a 
common definition. Despite the lack of a common definition, several elements 
of clientelistic exchanges have emerged over time that are important to the 
theoretical basis of this thesis. First, clientelistic exchanges are characterised 
by dyadic relationships, implying either a face to face transaction, or more 
recently, a transaction through brokers and social networks. In this sense, 
“those at the top of the pyramid generate resources that are channelled down 
the pyramid, while vote and other forms of fealty flow upward.”102 In a 2007 
study by Kitschelt and Wilkinson, clientelistic exchanges were also extended to 
groups, moving analysis beyond transactions of the individual. Through their 
notion of “collective clientelism”, benefits directed at the ‘group’ were identified 
as clientelistic if they could be obtained by the in-group but were withheld from 
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others on the outside.103 The notion of collective clientelism is different from 
political campaigns targeting of specific segments of society, in that the 
exchange of political support is integral to receiving the benefit. In regulated 
and transparent political campaigning, membership in the targeted group 
remains, regardless of whether there is individual political support or not.104 
Second, a clientelistic exchange is also characterised by 
contingency/reciprocity. The element of reciprocity implies that there will be a 
reciprocal benefit for both parties. In such exchanges, a credible promise of a 
benefit also serves this function, even if the good of service is not delivered 
immediately.105 Third, is that of hierarchy. For such an exchange to happen, 
one individual is usually of higher socioeconomic or political status and can use 
their influence and access to resources for the benefit of an individual or group 
in a lower position. In such an asymmetrical relationship, political support is 
usually offered by those of lower status to secure access to benefits from those 
of higher status.106 The fourth and final common element of clientelistic 
exchanges is that of iteration. Clientelistic exchanges have a sense of 
continuity, differentiating them from one-off exchanges or bribes. In the 
clientelistic exchange, each side makes decisions in anticipation of future 
interactions. Should both parties respect the terms of the exchange, a degree 
of trust can be built over time, resulting in a degree of predictability to the 
exchange.107 Recent applications to governance in Africa have followed much 
of these criteria, often adding emphasis on elite exchanges. In Van de Walle’s 
words:  
It is more useful to think of clientelistic politics [in Sub-Saharan 
Africa] as constituting primarily a mechanism for accommodation 
and integration of a fairly narrow political elite than as a form of 
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mass party patronage. Most of the material gains from 
clientelism are limited to this elite. The stronger link between 
political elites and the citizenry is through the less tangible bonds 
of ethnic identity. Even in the absence of tangible benefits, 
citizens will choose to vote for individuals of their own ethnic 
group, particularly in ethnically divided societies. Less than the 
expectation that they will benefit directly from the vote, citizens 
may feel that only a member of their own ethnic group may end 
up defending the interests of the ethnic group as a whole, and 
that voting for a member of another ethnic group will certainly not 
do so.108 
 
Van de Walle’s observations are important when considering the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire, where clientelism has a significant history in the politics of the country. 
Where Van de Walle’s explanation both reflects and departs from the Ivoirian 
case, however, is through its emphasis on ethnic ties. Similarly, voting across 
party lines remains ethnically-driven, both historically and in the post-conflict 
period. Where it departs is in the ways that clientelism was practiced during the 
33-year reign of Houphouët-Boigny. While building a delicate balance of elite 
clientelism, Houphouët-Boigny deliberately maintained a top-down system of 
governance and elite dependency that was fairly representative of ethnic 
groupings in Côte d’Ivoire. It is through these practices of governance, that 
Houphouët-Boigny became an iconic ruler, both challenging the negative 
expectations of clientelistic governance as well as setting the standard for 
political expectations that would carry through to the post-conflict period. Details 





This chapter sought to lay the theoretical groundwork necessary to 
understand the empirical data presented in the chapters that follow. The 
extensive discussion allowed for the conceptualisation of the ex-combatant 
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label, the combination of research on veteran compensation, clientelism, and 
wartime transformations laid the base for understanding the post-conflict 
transition of Côte d’Ivoire.  
 In the chapters that follow, the post-independence practices of 
clientelistic governance will be used to explain why ex-combatant political 
mobilisation and claims-making takes place the way it does, as well as how it 
can be seen as a continuation of post-independence political norms. Ex-
combatant political mobilisation, this thesis demonstrates, is driven by a bottom-
up politicisation of the ex-combatant label, in accordance with expectations of 
clientelistic exchanges.  
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Chapter 3: Conducting Research in Post-Conflict Côte d’Ivoire 
 
This chapter describes the analytical intrigue of Côte d’Ivoire as a case 
study, as well as provides an explanation of the methods of data collection 
used. Finally, it explains the unique insights and challenges drawn from 
previous professional experience in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire as A Case Study 
 
The case of Côte d’Ivoire was chosen for several reasons. Despite a 
political conflict that spanned over 11 years, levels of violence and destruction 
were relatively low. Such a context, in which the majority of participants did not 
engage in armed combat, provides a compelling landscape to observe how 
wartime labels of ex-combatant are carried into the post-conflict state, and 
whether they carry the same utility for all rival groups. Moreover, since its 
independence, Côte d’Ivoire has a history of political mobilisation against the 
ruling regime of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and has, consequently, established 
patterns in governance to appease such manifestations of discontent. While the 
political history of the country is discussed in Chapter 4, simply put, Côte 
d’Ivoire is an interesting case to assess whether pre-established political norms 
have influence on the post-conflict period. In this sense, the case of post-conflict 
Côte d’Ivoire is well suited to examine why some ex-combatants engage in 
political claims-making and others do not. 
While the case of Côte d’Ivoire is intriguing in the ways explained above, 
it is also limited in its comparability to other recent violent conflicts in sub-
Saharan Africa. Unlike Liberia and Sierra Leone, its regional neighbours, Côte 
d’Ivoire did not experience mass atrocities and humanitarian crises. This 
matters significantly when following the trajectories of ex-combatants in the 
post-conflict period. Similarly, it diverges from the recent conflicts in the 
Maghreb and Sahel, which have the added element of terrorist armed group 
presence and transnational fighters. Comparative analysis of political 
mobilisation and claims-making with the ‘ex-combatant’ label would make for 
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interesting ‘most-different’ case studies and could help identify this research 
applies to other cases beyond that of Côte d’Ivoire. That said, as previously 
mentioned, the case that resonates the most with that of Côte d’Ivoire is that of 
Zimbabwe- a liberation struggle. Despite both countries being different in the 
type of conflict experienced, with different types of opponents, and different time 
frames, claims-making was remarkably similar. Comparisons with the post-
conflict political engagement of Zimbabwe’s veterans aligned to the ruling 
ZANU-PF political party bear remarkable similarities to the ex-combatants of 
Côte d’Ivoire who have aligned themselves with the post-conflict regime of 
Alassane Ouattara and who have been the most active in claims-making. While 
work from Norma Kriger does not explicitly examine clientelistic ties, it has 
demonstrated the importance of loyalty to the ruling regime, the presence of 
political continuities across time, as well as the importance of history and 
politics in shaping post-conflict periods. This thesis, therefore, uses Kriger’s 
findings as a starting point for comparison, to help focus its analysis and to 
examine whether or not there are larger trends across conflicts that can be 
identified. 
Despite having many of the same pre-conditions as conflicts like Sierra 
Leone’s or Liberia’s, such as virulent rhetoric and a mass influx of weapons, 
levels of violence and atrocities remained relatively low and manifested 
themselves predominantly in the form of inter-community reprisal attacks.109 
From April 2011 onwards, Côte d’Ivoire, with guidance from the international 
community, successfully implemented a series of reforms and programmes to 
consolidate peace and security, and to promote national reconciliation. 
Together, these activities were aimed at mending the social, economic, and 
political cleavages created during the 11-year political crisis. The transition that 
preceded the post-electoral violence demonstrated by several positive 
indicators, including the successful completion of a Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration programme (DDR) and a Security Sector 
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Reform programme (SSR),110 stable economic growth recording 8.8% GDP 
growth in 2016,111 returning investors,112 and a series of free elections devoid 
of violence or intimidation.113  
For many international observers, Côte d’Ivoire exhibited a model post-
conflict trajectory in which peace and security have been re-established, 
encouraging foreign economic investment and large-scale infrastructure 
projects to follow suit.114 It has largely contained sporadic community reprisal 
attacks between ethnic groups, promoted an agenda of national reconciliation, 
and held peaceful presidential elections in 2015. Such a neatly crafted storyline, 
however, does not account for the multiple actors, desires, and grievances at 
play. The national benchmarks of post-conflict recovery, rather, gloss over 
these periods of temporary crisis-related contention, in which the perpetrators 
of instability have, for the most part, come from within the ruling regime’s own 
support base. In November 2014, for example, reintegrated soldiers from the 
then Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), staged multiple protests 
across the country, demanding back-pay for services rendered during the crisis. 
Again, in January and May 2017, similar groups of soldiers carried out mutinies 
with similar demands. Alongside and in between these events, multiple protests 
and pleas have been made by individuals claiming ex-combatant status, 
demanding similar settlements. Such periods of contention, in which wartime 
labels have been leveraged to advance individual interests, have mostly been 
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carried out by the perceived ‘victors’ of the crisis, with relatively fewer instances 
of contention from those with perceptions of defeat.115  
Designed as a within-case comparison, focusing singularly on Côte 
d’Ivoire, this thesis makes comparisons between the political engagement 
initiatives of three general groups of ex-combatants: the Gbagbo supporter 
group, the FN supporter group, and the Commando Invisibles. Within the FN 
supporter group, two further comparisons are made between those who were 
integrated into the state armed forces and are in close proximity to individuals 
of influence, and those who were demobilised, officially or on their own, and 
who sit at the margins of ruling regime favour. By examining this political 
engagement across groups with different political affinities and proximity to 
state institutions, this thesis engages in a more nuanced exploration of ex-
combatant political engagement in the post-conflict state and demonstrates that 
a broader understanding of ex-combatant political behaviour facilitates 
understanding of the broader trends in post-conflict governance. 
This research stems from past professional experiences working in Côte 
d’Ivoire in support of the national Disarmament, Demobilisation, and 
Reintegration (DDR) programme, between 2014 and 2015. During this initial 
experience I observed diverging ex-combatant perceptions over for whom post-
conflict benefits were intended. Initially understanding Ivoirian ex-combatants 
as a single group, discussions with colleagues began to reveal that great 
divergence existed, not only in terms of perceptions of post-conflict 
opportunities, but also with regard to political affiliations. From these 
observations grew the current line of inquiry, seeking to understand the ways 
in which political engagement varied across groups, and whether the method 
of claims-making, in particular, had extended beyond communities of ex-
combatants.  
To answer the research questions, a total of 12 months of fieldwork were 
conducted in Côte d’Ivoire, in two stages. The first stage entailed a two-week 
                                                          




scoping visit in February 2016 to re-establish past relationships, connect with 
former colleagues, and explore the viability of shifting from employment to a 
research role. The exploratory field visit was essential to re-establish contact 
with key stakeholders. During visits with friends and former colleagues, clear 
lines were drawn between the past employment and the nature of the doctoral 
research. Having worked in a highly political programme with implications on 
national security, it was important to be completely transparent with the 
motivations of the research, reassuring the stakeholders that its purpose was 
not to exploit any confidential knowledge or networks. Equally important was 
gaining a sense of how the security environment was changing with the many 
funding streams tied to post-conflict recovery soon to be cut. The 
consequences of the funding reduction, it was explained by Ivoirian 
professional contacts, would have direct implications on those who gained 
employment in these fields.  
I commenced the second stage of in-depth fieldwork in August 2016 with 
six months of immersive qualitative data collection and an additional six months 
in-country of writing and collecting additional data to fill any identified gaps. 
Researching in a field so closely related to past professional experiences 
allowed for the use of appropriate local argot (slang) to both develop rapport 
and to quickly and accurately navigate the Ivoirian-specific post-conflict terrain. 
In this regard, this research benefits from the pre-established rapport and 
familiarity with Ivoirian culture, customs, norms, and social networks to more 
readily ease conversations into topics beyond the headlines of the crisis. In a 
context of two armed mutinies, much of the headline news led to difficulties 
accessing self-proclaimed ex-combatants, particularly for those who feared 
persecution for the mutinies of others. Establishing trust and rapport became 
essential to elicit answers from the respondents, who otherwise might have 





Information Identification and Inclusion  
 
This thesis draws from informal discussions with gatekeepers, semi-
structured interviews with ex-combatants from the three groups, and 
international and local media coverage of select events of political engagement.  
The majority of my analysis is based on observations from the economic 
capital city of Abidjan. This choice was made for both analytical and practical 
reasons. Analytically, Abidjan is the site of convergence for ex-combatants from 
all three armed groups considered in this research. While it is true that FN 
supporters’ stronghold is typically in the northern city of Bouaké, the heart of 
the 2017 mutinies, and that Gbagbo supporters’ stronghold is in the southwest 
around Gagnoa, Daloa, and Guiglo, both leadership and the majority of public 
displays of political engagement carried out by ex-combatants either occurred 
in Abidjan or were directed to the government officials based in Abidjan. 
Furthermore, despite the headquarters of the former northern rebellion being 
based in Bouaké, claims-making was always directed towards Abidjan. For the 
Gbagbo supporters, despite their strongholds being in the southwest of the 
country, their current political engagement is restricted to political party lines, 
with the headquarters and subsequent command of the Front Populaire Ivoirien 
located in Abidjan. For the Commando Invisibles, they are exclusively based 
out of Abidjan, which is also the site of their armed combat activity in 2010-
2011. As such, Abidjan was the site of convergence for all three groupings of 
ex-combatants and was an ideal location to observe the interaction between 
ex-combatants and their target audience, the national government. The second 
reason that data collection was focused in Abidjan is in relation to the security 
climate. Breaches in national security, on account of the political engagement 
activities, resulted in restrictions in mobility for regular civilians and to essential 
purposes of commerce. For the events examined in this research that initially 
occurred outside of Abidjan, such as the 2017 mutinies, security concerns and 
restrictions prevented observing the events as they unfolded. In times of 
temporary instability due to the mutiny, protests, and other demonstrations, 
unnecessary movement was discouraged by both the national authorities and 
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consular offices. Abidjan remained the most secure location in the country, with 
an ample supply of competing local accounts of the events in the local media 
outlets. In case of heightened disorder, Abidjan also has an international airport. 
With sporadic outbreaks of protest and arrests, conducting interviews in Abidjan 
was the safest location. From Abidjan, ample security was provided to reinforce 
state institutions, and because of the typical road blockades that get erected 
during these events, was the surest location in case a swift exit was required. 
Through focusing the data collection in Abidjan, this research collected 
data that was sufficient to indicate general trends in political engagement 
activities and the responses of the ruling regime. The trade-off, however, is that 
this research was not able to see some of the events of political engagement 
unfold in person. To have been present in Bouaké during the mutinies of 2017 
would have allowed for a richer data collection in which greater numbers of 
mutineers and civilian voices could have been integrated into my analysis. The 
same goes for the Constitutional Amendment of October 2016. Although the 
Gbagbo supporters focused their political engagement activities in Abidjan in 
protest of the proposed reforms, a more complete understanding of Gbagbo 
supporter sentiments could have been captured from cities like Gagnoa, Daloa, 
Guiglo, and Duékoué, all strongholds of Gbagbo and his FPI political party. 
Inclusion of cities outside of Abidjan would also have revealed if there were any 
changes in perception beyond the large urban city, allowing more access to ex-
combatants who remain in their villages. Abidjan, however, is a mixed group 
area for claims-making, and therefore, allowed access to all groups who 
targeted the post-conflict regime in the economic capital. 
The second key source of data was local newspapers, international 
media coverage, and public billboards, complementing existing data about 
each act of public political engagement, as well as official state responses, 
when made public. The newspaper articles used in this research are those that 
were published in relation to the events of political engagement that this thesis 
examines. The articles were obtained either in hard copy or online. 
Acknowledging that the local newspapers are recognised by the majority of 
Ivoirians as being biased, a variety of newspapers representing competing 
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perspectives and political preferences were consulted. The newspapers 
consulted represented the main competing perspectives in the country: 
Fraternite Matin (Official Government), Le Patriote (RDR- Ouattara’s political 
party), Notre Voie (Opposition-FPI political party), and Abidjan.net (online- flash 
news of events as they happen, closer to government). Local newspapers were 
used as indicators of political perspectives, collected across sources with 
diverging views. Newspaper articles sourced from international media outlets 
were particularly useful in monitoring how major events of claims-making were 
being framed, and more interestingly how local ex-combatants occasionally 
leveraged the international spotlight to extend their appeals to international 
audiences and national government for financial benefits.  
 
Participant Selection and Methods 
 
To answer my research questions, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with ex-combatants across all three identified groups, as well as with 
international observers from embassies, international organisations, and local 
NGOs. The sampling method used during the semi-structured interviews 
derived primarily from selection across political affiliations, and then made use 
of the snowballing technique. For the selection, gatekeepers from each target 
group, Gbagbo supporters, FN supporters, and Commando Invisibles, each of 
which represent a different political affiliation, were engaged in discussions 
about the political trends of the day, as well as what they knew about claims-
making and political engagement amongst the ex-combatants from their 
respective political affiliations. The three gatekeepers used in this research had 
previously worked with the national DDR programme, and in some cases, held 
family ties with the leadership of each political line. In their capacities as 
national DDR staff, they were tasked with liaising with their respective groups 
of ex-combatants to encourage participation in the programme. Of the three 
original gatekeepers, two were of Ivoirian descent and played coordination 
roles, for each side. One coordinated pro-Gbagbo militia groups in Abidjan as 
well as holding familial ties with Laurent Gbagbo, and the other coordinated 
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groups of Jeunes Associés116 (FN supporters) and had allegedly worked within 
the northern rebellion from its most nascent stages. The third gatekeeper was 
an international professional who maintained amiable connection to the 
Commando Invisibles group, a group that was, and, remains to this day, 
virtually inaccessible to the general public on account of their choice of 
remaining politically and socially disengage from Ivoirian society since returning 
from exile in 2015. Together, the gatekeepers facilitated access to groups that 
might otherwise have been difficult, as well as provided useful insights into 
cultural norms and expectations when engaging in this type of subject matter. 
Through the discussions with gatekeepers, the identification of which recent 
attempts of claims-making held political significance, allowed for a more 
localised framework around the interviews with ex-combatants that followed.  
Following these initial interviews with ex-combatants, upon my request, 
participants usually agreed to extend contact and the inquiry to fellow ex-
combatants who were also willing to discuss how they perceived their place in 
the post-conflict period. The risk of relying on personal networks and affiliations, 
however, was that of homophily. This had the potential to create a situation in 
which, in the Ivoirian ex-combatant context, might mean collecting data from 
contacts with similar views and experiences. As such, introductions to new 
participants may have been made with a view of reinforcing the opinions 
already presented, rather than identifying divergent experiences and opinions. 
To mitigate these risks of selection bias and homophily in social networks,117 
any points of contention within each of the broad categories of FN supporters, 
Gbagbo supporters, and Commando Invisibles were recorded, and then filled 
with targeted interviews from individuals possibly overlooked. The interview 
data used in this thesis comes from ex-combatants from both the Sangaré and 
Affi N’Guessan political divide within the broad category of Gbagbo supporters, 
                                                          
116 The sub-group of Jeunes Associés is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 on FN Demobilised ex-combatants. 
117 Karen Jacobsen and Loren B. Landau, “The Dual Imperative in Refugee Research: Some Methodological and 
Ethical Considerations in Social Science Research on Forced Migration,” Disasters 27, no. 3 (2003): 185-206. 
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as well as from the pro-IB and pro-Soro factions within the FN, as elaborated in 
Chapters 6,7 and 8 of this thesis.118 
Over the course of the first six months, I conducted 58 individual 
interviews, five group interviews, and held numerous informal discussions, with 
self-identifying ex-combatants, and 18 local and international observers from 
embassies, the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire peacekeeping 
mission (UNOCI), NGOs, professors, and government employees. The 
interviews generally lasted between 45-60 minutes and were conducted either 
on an individual basis or in groups of four to five, according to the preference 
of the respondents themselves. It was observed how those with feelings of 
defeat, the Commando Invisibles and the Gbagbo supporters, gravitated 
towards group interviews. Those most proactive in claims-making, largely 
representative of the FN supporting group, rarely showed hesitation about 
individual interviews, often bringing their own supporting documents to present 
as proof of their attempts to engage the regime in a discussion about possible 
compensation. Additionally, numerous informal discussions were held with taxi 
drivers and at local maquis,119 to gain a more holistic understanding of how ex-
combatant political engagement was seen more broadly. Semi-structured 
interviews were useful in ascertaining the participants’ own perceptions of an 
experience related to the topic at hand.120 Providing a rough structure for the 
interviews allowed me to keep discussions within the general area of interest, 
all the while also increasing opportunities for the ex-combatants to raise any 
issues or trends that they deemed important that might have been overlooked. 
Following each interview, participants were informed that they could always 
review or retract their comments should they desire. While the participants 
accepted in a reassured manner, none of them took the offer up. Subsequent 
                                                          
118 To be elaborated in Chapters 2 and 4, describing the divide within the FN leadership, dividing fighters from the 
pro-IB and pro-Soro camps. Pro-IB eventually became the Commando Invisibles, and pro-Soro eventually formed the 
majority of ex-combatants who are examined in Chapters 4 and 5 as a broad category of FN supporters. 
119 Maquis are open-air roadside restaurants and bars, highly frequented by Ivoirians after working hours and on 
weekends.  
120 Michele J. McIntosh and Janice M. Morse, "Situating and Constructing Diversity in Semi-Structured Interviews," 
Global Qualitative Nursing Research 2 (2015): 1. 
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follow-up discussions were also held on a needs-be basis. The majority of 
interviews were conducted in public locations, designated by the respondents 
themselves. In some cases, this meant at maquis or in their respective offices, 
if they had them.  
One of the challenges experienced when conducting interviews was in 
regard to inconsistent answers by the same respondent to the same questions. 
This challenge sheds light on what I believe to be crucial to understanding 
research during times of post-conflict transitions: that of reduced employment 
opportunities and lay-offs in post-conflict-related sectors. In this regard, job 
insecurity and its manifestations within the personal lives of the participants 
sometimes influenced the responses obtained. The immediate post-conflict 
environment of Côte d’Ivoire saw the influx of international programmes and 
funding for post-conflict recovery. In such contexts, employment opportunities 
were created, granting many Ivoirians the opportunity to earn a stable income 
and develop skills in development and security work. With the gradual 
drawdown of these programmes, however, many lost their employment and 
their stable salaries. While navigating an environment such as this, it was 
important to constantly assess the motivations behind certain statements 
offered by the respondents who had been employed. It was observed that for 
many of the respondents who were in the final months of their contracts, 
answers to questions sometimes fluctuated depending on their own prospective 
employment opportunities. The fluctuating answers were a reminder of the 
subjective nature of this research, where the respondents’ moods, 
perspectives, answers, and general interpretations of reality were, at least to a 
certain degree, contingent on unstable circumstances. In these cases, further 
light-hearted discussion was required to eventually unearth their opinions apart 
from the stressor of the day.  
An additional challenge was in relation to my limited financial capacity 
and inability to consistently meet my respondents in neighbourhoods of their 
choice. During the first six months of fieldwork, my financial means were 
exceptionally low. By way of offsetting costs for transportation, I sometimes 
requested that the gatekeepers, with whom I built rapport with prior to doctoral 
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fieldwork and were comfortably familiar with, come to me. This decision, 
however, came with significant risk. One of the gatekeepers facilitating access 
to the FN supporting group, was also involved in weapons collections for the 
government and had a local reputation of occasionally financially defaulting on 
his commitments. As partial reassurance to myself, I maintained amiable 
relations with the appropriate armed forces authorities, one of which the FN 
gatekeeper was trying to gain employment from. Further complicating the 
matter was the eventuality of the FN gatekeeper not gaining employment, at 
which point he started to suggest that he be paid for his assistance in contacting 
ex-combatants. Furthermore, he began to discredit the other gatekeepers and 
respondents, signalling to me that he knew who the other respondents were. In 
response, I reminded him about the anonymity of the research project, refrained 
from commenting on his personal attacks against other respondents, and 
explained clearly and firmly that no monetary compensation would be provided 
through this work. I also made an effort to gradually phase out my dependence 
on the FN gatekeeper. Of vital importance when conducting research into 
themes of high risk, such as ex-combatant networks, it is vital to have a clear 
understanding of the power dynamics on the ground and to triangulate 
information on who each respondent is, what their reputation is, and what 
activities they may be linked to. To allow such respondents into a researcher’s 
private residence requires a fairly intimate understanding of the dynamics of 
local power brokers. Had I not previously been exposed to these networks in a 
professional manner, and had I not benefitted from the cover of the appropriate 
armed forces authorities, the risks of working with such individuals likely would 
have outweighed the benefits.   
Of equal importance, is an explanation of how access was gained to the 
Commando Invisibles group, a group where original members are deliberately 
maintaining a low profile due to their fears of persecution from the regime. 
Adding complexity to the issue of access is that of identification as there are 
numerous ex-combatants who sit on the fringes of influential circles and who 
have tried to appropriate the name of the Commando Invisibles in order to 
benefit from post-conflict pay-outs. To start, the Commando Invisibles was 
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much smaller in comparison to the other two groups, with a narrow operational 
theatre restricted to one particular neighbourhood in Abidjan, that of Abobo. 
Moreover, much of this group’s power and security came from their deliberate 
“invisibility”, making their identification a difficult task beyond a few leaders with 
a public profile. Identification of respondents from the Commando Invisibles 
group, therefore, was derived exclusively from one gatekeeper, and was limited 
in the amount of participants interviewed. All interviews were conducted in 
accordance to the preferences of the leader, in the presence of four to five of 
his closest fighters. Although these interviews could not be recorded, the leader 
permitted hand-written notes of what was being discussed. Gatekeeper 
confirmation, along with past professional experience interacting with this 
group, was vital to elicit participation from the original members, as well as to 
decipher which claims of Commando Invisibles identity were plausible and 
which were not. In Chapter 8, specific to the political engagement of the 
Commando Invisibles, narratives from the original members are presented 
alongside those with alternative accounts. For the majority of interviews used 
in this thesis, information was triangulated by cross-checking narratives 
between respondents, through discussions with international observers, and 
through local and international media accounts. 
The interviews conducted for this research used either a recording 
device or hand-written notes. For interviews conducted with a voice recorder, 
transcriptions were written verbatim in French in an effort to preserve the 
original messages. For those that relied on hand-written notes, the field notes 
were digitized as soon as possible and occasionally complemented with 
additional observations when notable. As Côte d’Ivoire uses French as its 
official language, all interviews with Ivoirians were conducted in French. 
Complementary interviews, usually with members of the diplomatic community 
and international organisations were conducted in English. The data presented 







The research for this thesis was carried out in accordance with the 
University of Edinburgh’s ethical review standards. During all discussions with 
gatekeepers, as well as with interviews with ex-combatants and complementary 
sources, discussions were initiated by first making small talk and then 
introducing myself, the research, and why they were being approached. From 
the onset, deliberate measures were taken to clarify that this research was 
conducted independent from any organisation of political group and was for the 
purposes of personal doctoral study. From there, the area of study was 
introduced and a brief explanation of the types of questions to be asked was 
provided. Participants were consistently informed that any of the information 
they provided was voluntary and could be retracted at any time. Upon sensing 
that they understood the objectives and terms of their participation, verbal 
consent was then obtained.  
Verbal informed consent was preferred as many of the respondents were 
illiterate, including some higher-profile individuals who participated in this 
research. Following the end of the political conflict in 2011, many ex-
combatants were absorbed into the formal state apparatus, of which the 
majority gained employment in the armed forces. Amongst some of the highest- 
ranking ex-combatants to be absorbed into elite positions, levels of literacy are 
variable. This observation held true for many other ex-combatants interviewed, 
particularly those most heavily engaged in claims-making, the FN supporters. 
The use of verbal consent across all interviews ensured that no participants felt 
marginalised and that the data collection remained consistent. Verbal consent 
also helped set the mood for relaxed discussions, which was crucial with the 






Challenges and Reflexivity 
 
One of the most pervasive challenges in carrying out this research was 
the challenge of spoken and unspoken expectations from the respondents and 
the pressure that puts on the research relationship. This challenge was 
particularly present with certain groups of FN supporters, who anticipated 
facilitated access to resources and opportunities for their participation. While 
working with these groups, respondents would finish interviews requesting that 
I utilise my perceived ties to government officials, UN leadership, and military 
officers to help them find employment, or at the very least, to lobby on their 
behalf.121 To mitigate these challenges, I reinforced my position as a neutral 
researcher, carrying out research for my own doctoral study. In most cases, this 
explanation sufficed, while in a minority, additional details of my separation from 
the UN and the nature of my doctoral programme were necessary. 
The second challenge involved my past employment with the UN 
peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire, and the political bias that it is perceived 
to have had amongst many Ivoirians. Allegations of the UN mission’s political 
bias in support of Ouattara and his FRCI were predominant in discussions with 
supporters of both the PDCI and, even more so, amongst supporters of the FPI. 
For many of these respondents, the FN rebellion benefitted from intervention 
from both France during the 2011 capture of Gbagbo and from a passive 
support from the UN mission to ‘clean-up’ the political opposition. Even 
amongst Ivoirians employed by the mission, political frustrations were echoed 
across many informal discussions, with many seeing their employment as a 
stable income at the expense of their political preferences. This passive hostility 
to the UN mission meant that respondents from either the PDCI or the FPI 
almost always responded with caution or hostility at the beginning of our 
interactions. Through our discussions, however, after seeing that their opinions 
and criticisms would be included without bias, conversation flowed more 
naturally, and respondents opened up about broader themes not captured in 
                                                          
121  Note: interviews with groups from the Gbagbo supporters and the Commando Invisibles did not interpret the 
interactions as such. They are also significantly less involved in claims-making. 
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this thesis such as France’s presence in the country and the roles of the 
international community, and in particular, the ICC. While much of the interview 
data on these broader themes is not presented in this thesis, it did significantly 
shape my analysis that political tensions remain strong in the post-conflict 
period, that loyalties to past political patrons remain in-tact, and that individuals 
are placing high hopes of the elections of 2020 to truly determine the political 
outcome of the 11-year crisis. 
The third challenge involves local security tensions and respondent 
willingness to participate in the research. While Côte d’Ivoire’s security situation 
remained relatively stable during the period of fieldwork, a few events occurred 
that pitted sub-groups of Ivoirians against state security forces. One such event 
was the Compagnie Ivoirienne d’électricité (CEI) protests in Bouaké on the 22nd 
of July 2016, in which military and police reinforcements were sent to quell 
protests about rising electricity costs. The confrontation, which is speculated to 
have significant ex-combatant infiltration, resulted in one death, tens of injured, 
and between 44-50 arrests in association with accounts of pillaging and theft.122 
Other events, such as the demonstrations leading into the 30th of October 2016 
Referendum and the January 2017 mutiny, were met with a similar level of state 
reaction. While authorities were more careful about possible deaths and 
injuries, arrests continued to be made without clear or justifiable reason to many 
of those demonstrating. The seemingly arbitrary arrests had a particular impact 
on respondents who considered themselves as the politically defeated, who 
mused about fearing for their own persecution regardless of whether they had 
participated in the unrest of the day. In a handful of cases, state investigations 
into these events made several respondents reluctant to participate in the 
interviews, especially amongst those self-identified as Gbagbo supporters and 
members of the Commando Invisibles.  
                                                          
122 “Côte d'Ivoire: un mort dans une manifestation contre la hausse de l'électricité,” Radio France Internationale, July 
22, 2016, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20160722-cote-ivoire-mort-manifestation-bouake-electricite; for public responses to 
the arrests, see “Côte d'Ivoire: Bouaké toujours ‘chaud’, nouvelle manifestation devant un camp militaire pour la 




The fluid security situation in the country during fieldwork underscored 
how post-conflict contexts could be dynamic and volatile, quickly affecting what 
topics Ivoirians were comfortable discussing. During the periods of heightened 
suspicion, I chose to wait a few weeks before conducting interviews. I also 
refrained from contacting my best-placed informants, as I did not want to be 
seen meddling into issues of state security and potential suspects. The mutinies 
of January and May 2017 were particularly problematic for engaging 
participants to discuss the events, as widespread fear of persecution ensued 
thereafter. During these times, the gatekeepers were vital in securing access, 
although, they too, spoke of heightened vigilance and difficulty reaching the 




This chapter provided an overview of the methodological choices of this 
research. As stated above, post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire provides a unique 
landscape to examine how labels of ex-combatant are used in the post-conflict 
period. More importantly, the methods of data collection used while conducting 
fieldwork for this topic are arguably the most suitable for the particular time 
period and topic at hand. The data collected, and subsequently presented in 
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 respond to the primary interest of this thesis, that is 
understanding why some ex-combatants mobilise to make financial and 










If political affinities and proximity to influential political actors shape the 
political behaviours of ex-combatants in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, then it is 
essential to examine if there is precedence. This chapter sets out to do just that, 
tracing the historical practices of governance and the ways that they influence 
political behaviour in the post-conflict period. Since 2011, the post-conflict 
financial opportunities for those who supported Ouattara and the FN rebellion, 
the victors, and unfavourable treatment for those who supported Gbagbo and 
Ibrahim Coulibaly (“IB”), the politically unaligned, reflect what ex-combatants in 
this study have come to see as the continuation of ‘politics as usual’. To better 
understand this point of view, this chapter examines the historical practices of 
governance since independence in 1960, demonstrating how the acquisition of 
land, as well as lucrative posts in the public, private, and military service, were 
used as resources of redistribution in the post-independence period. It also 
demonstrates precedence for expectations of salaried posts and pay-outs for 
those who consider themselves to belong to the victor’s camps. These practices 
not only show that Côte d’Ivoire has a record of clientelistic governance that 
rarely resulted in a balanced distribution of resources across political affinities, 
but that expectations based on the past continue to influence the behaviour of 
ex-combatants and their choices of political engagement in the post-conflict 
period. This chapter draws from literature on Ivoirian post-independence 
governance, patron-client relations in the Ivoirian state, and recent accounts of 
the 11-year political crisis. Interview data from Ivoirian respondents is used to 
complement accounts of the 11-year crisis, offering useful insights into local 




Adding to the post-independence review, this chapter also outlines the 
key events of the 11-year political crisis from the coup of December 1999 to the 
fall of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011. The second section of this chapter 
documents what is publicly known about the key events and actors, revealing 
the enduring presence of unconfirmed facts around each event. This review 
exposes the gaps within competing narratives of the crisis, which have 
consequently opened windows of opportunity for new groups of local actors to 
make claims for financial rewards. By providing murky details of commonly cited 
wartime stories, individuals on the fringes of the conflict attempted to secure 
personal benefits. By presenting an overview of the competing narratives for 
the most frequently recounted events of the crisis, this section lays the 
foundation for Chapter 8 (Commando Invisibles), where data demonstrates that 
some individuals with little ties to the conflict have exploited unconfirmed 
narratives of the crisis to make similar claims to FN supporters. Together, these 
points demonstrate how political instability in the post-conflict period has 
developed, with ex-combatants from the victor’s engaging in more disruptive 
claims-making behaviour than those considered to be defeated. This chapter 
sets the foundation to understand the lasting legacies of post-independence 
governance in post-conflict periods and adds the necessary background 
understanding of the different political affinities that can be observed in post-
conflict Côte d’Ivoire. 
 
Post-Independence Governance and Discontent 
 
The discontent and division that characterised the 11-year Ivoirian crisis 
have been examined from several angles, including the politicisation of 
citizenship,123 ethnic dynamics,124 land grievances,125 religious and mystical 
                                                          
123 Abu Bakarr Bah, “Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire,” African Affairs 109, no 
437 (2010): 597. 
124 Jean-Pierre Dozon, Les clefs de la crise ivoirienne (Paris : Karthala, 2011). 
125 Catherine Boone, “Electoral Populism where property rights are weak: Land politics in contemporary sub-Saharan 
Africa,” Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (2009): 1183-201. 
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dynamics,126 and the intersection of history, indigenous claims, politics of 
insurgent youth, and economic factors.127 Drawing on these accounts, this 
section provides an overview of the grievances that led to the political 
polarisation of the crisis, where the primarily southern-based supporters of 
Gbagbo were pitted against those of northern descent. As with any conflict, the 
pre-conditions that led to the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire are complex and multi-
faceted. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this chapter, the history of migration 
and land tenure are prioritised, as they were the grievances most frequently 
vocalised by Ivoirian participants in this research. Many of the political affinities 
that were forged leading into the conflict continue to define political alliances in 
the post-conflict period and subsequently impact the choices of ex-combatant 
political engagement. 
 
Economically Promising Lands and Mass Migration 
 
Since 1893, when Côte d’Ivoire was declared a French colony, economic 
activities were centred on the production of export products such as palm oil, 
cocoa, and coffee in the fertile lands of southwest. In the 1920-30s, resistance 
to French exploitation of these lands manifested itself amongst groups 
indigenous to the southwest, the most significant discontent being with the 
Kruan-speaking groups.128 Due in part to the clashes with the Kruan-speakers, 
as well as other indigenous groups, the French colonists decided to shift their 
reliance on labour from southwest populations to those dominating the north of 
Côte d’Ivoire. Ivoirians of northern descent typically included ethnicities from 
the Mande and Voltaic-speaking groups, who inhabited and migrated between 
                                                          
126 Marie Miran-Guyon, Guerres mystique en Côte d’Ivoire, (Paris: Karthala, 2015). 
127 Mike McGovern, Making war in Côte d'Ivoire, (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
128 In this thesis, the term indigenous is used and follows James Anaya’s definition “living descendants of pre-
invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. They are culturally distinct groups that find themselves 
engulfed by other settler societies born of empire and conquest”. See James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in 
International Law (Second Edition) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3. The term “indigenous” is also the 
closest translation to Ivoirian uses of “autochtone”. 
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the Ivoirian territory and Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso.129 The shift in labour, 
however, was not without complications. To secure enough labourers to meet 
their production needs in the southwest, the French facilitated the movement of 
northern labourers south. To do so, a series of policies were enforced, including 
the 1933-1947 Upper-Volta territorial fusion that combined what is now Burkina 
Faso with Côte d’Ivoire.130 Alongside this, the French encouraged the relocation 
of local elites from Akan groups, such as the Agni, to the most fertile lands. 
Following their relocation, Agni settlers were treated as official chiefs who then 
hired labour from their plantation earnings. Upon relocation, these elites formed 
a core segment of the local bourgeoisie. The mass immigration of what 
eventually became locally known as “northerners/Dioulas/allogenes” into the 
southwest to take part in the plantations meant that more people were looking 
to make a livelihood from the same resources, and that newcomers, in 
particular, were seeking to acquire land for their own economic activities. Upon 
arrival in the southwest, migrants were authorised to work the land for their own 
use, often in exchange for providing labour services or gifts to the indigenous 
populations who retained a sense of moral authority over the land.131 Despite 
the varying degrees of moral authority retained by the traditional authorities, 
indigenous systems of governance began to be sidestepped in favour of 
economic prosperity. As a result of these migrations, and the favouring of those 
who pursued economic activities in line with the French plantation strategies, 
traditional authorities indigenous to the plantation areas were weakened. Their 
traditional forms of governance ran in tandem with those “arranged in terms of 
income, education, and political influence.”132  
 
                                                          
129 David A. Chappell, “The Nation as Frontier: Ethnicity and Clientelism in Ivoirian History,” International Journal of 
African Historical Studies 22, no. 4 (1989): 676; Robert Mundt, African Historical Dictionaries no. 41: Historical 
Dictionary of the Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire) (Metuchen, N.J, London: Scarecrow, 1987), xv. 
130 Mundt, Historical Dictionary of the Ivory Coast (Côte d'Ivoire), 9. 
131 Catherine Boone, Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice, 
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 188. 
132 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 186. 
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The tensions originating from issues of land tenure built the foundation 
for the grievances that would erupt decades later.133 Although not particularly 
contentious in the beginning, over time migrant populations were perceived to 
increasingly sidestep the customary laws of land tenure and interpersonal 
relations began to weaken. As described by Catherine Boone, the Dida 
communities of the southwest provide an example of weakened relations 
between the migrant and host communities. 
The first migrant workers were incorporated into the households 
as “adopted relatives”, but outsiders quickly established land-use 
rights, and less personalized relations between the indigènes134 
and the outsiders became the norm.135 
As a result, Boone points out that generational shifts began to emerge, 
changing social relations between host communities and new arrivals. 
Boone’s observation of generational shifts resurfaced in this thesis’ 
interviews with Ivoirians indigenous to the southwest. Describing how tensions 
built between indigenous populations and migrant workers, an Ivoirian 
professor with Dida ancestry explained remarkably similar patterns to those 
identified by Boone. When speaking about his home community and the ways 
in which migrant-indigenous relations changed over time, the professor stated 
the following. 
In the beginning, there were close relations between the workers 
and the indigenous. From the second and third generations, 
however, relations became less close. They brought their 
families to settle. Consequently, the new arrivals no longer 
needed to nurture the relations with the indigenous communities 
because they depended on their families.136 
The new demands placed on the land, combined with the increasing presence 
of migrant populations with increasingly distant social connections, aggravated 
inter-ethnic relations and laid the foundation for subsequent clashes, 
                                                          
133 Ruth Marshall-Fratani, “The War of ‘Who Is Who’: Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivoirian Crisis,” 
African Studies Review 49, no. 2 (2006): 15. 
134 Ivoirian colloquial term that implies “indigenous”. 
135 Boone, Political Topographies of the African State, 188. 
136 Ivoirian Professor, interview by author in Abidjan- II Plateaux, October 5, 2016, in-person. 
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accusations of state-led favouritism, and the delicate balance of clientelistic 
practices as a form of governance. 
Post-colonial Côte d’Ivoire, while notorious for its clientelistic exchanges, 
managed to challenge the negative stigma of patrimonialism for over 20 years. 
The combination of strong personal rule and regulated redistribution were 
thought to contribute to its political stability and economic growth.137 For 
observers of Côte d’Ivoire during the height of its post-colonial success, stability 
was attributed to multiple factors: a strong charismatic leader; an all-
encompassing single political party—the Partie Démocratique de Côte D’Ivoire 
(PDCI), that successfully absorbed rather than mobilised political resistance; 
an institutionalized state structure; a growing economy that facilitated payoffs 
to the politically active; and the presence of regional blocks of cooperation that 
limited possible destabilisation from forces beyond Côte d’Ivoire’s immediate 
borders.138 Côte d’Ivoire, under Félix Houphouët-Boigny, became a state in 
which the redistribution of goods was regulated by a strong central authority 
through formalised and ethnically inclusive channels. Thus, the combination of 
Houphouët-Boigny’s strong personal power with bureaucratic state institutions, 
resulted in a sort of hybrid-system in which “the imprint of neopatrimonialism 
was capped and ring-fenced” by the strong bureaucratic institutions that 
performed the routine functions of government.139 
To more clearly understand how practices of regulated patron-client 
relations were applied, the practice of ethno-regional balancing within 
government institutions must first be explained more fully. In a country with over 
60 ethnic groups, Houphouët-Boigny recognised that ethnic tensions were a 
possible source of political instability. The response, in terms of governance, 
involved both political elite and local political dynamics. Houphouët-Boigny is 
known to have hand-selected individuals for elite government positions, as well 
as for creating systems of political distribution that reflected the ethnic diversity 
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of the country. For appointments of the political elite, Houphouët-Boigny 
maintained an ethno-regional balance working with select individuals for the co-
optation and redistribution of economic incentives and state resources.140 Elites 
were rewarded for their abilities to maintain contact and hold control over their 
respective ethnic constituencies, so long as their actions did not fuel ethnic 
contestation of the PDCI.141 Analysts noted how the elites that were hand-
selected by Houphouët-Boigny demonstrated significant cohesion due to their 
obligations to honour the commitments set from the top-down.142 At the local 
levels, Houphouët-Boigny allowed for PDCI party lists to be developed within 
each jurisdiction. The autonomy granted to the jurisdictions, albeit in a state-
defined way, ensured a rough ethnic balance by reflecting the local ethnic 
demographics, and, in most cases, compelled local jurisdictions to remain loyal 
to the PDCI.143 Under his rule, both formal and informal systems of reciprocity 
and centre-periphery linkages emerged, allowing for stable ethnic 
representation and the development of other forms of representative political 
formations such as associations and workers unions.144 With all of these factors 
taken together—that is, the deliberate diversity applied to elite-level 
appointments, combined with the PDCI-controlled ‘autonomous’ party lists — 
Houphouët-Boigny ensured that one ethnic group was not over-represented 
vis-à-vis the others. Moreover, in addition to mitigating the risk of political 
instability, this regulated form of patrimonial governance, specifically the 
selection of elites, was also useful in preventing the rise of ethnic barons who 
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could potentially mobilise ethnic groups who might have felt their needs were 
being side-lined.145 As reinforced by Boone,  
Houphouët built a ruthlessly centralized and highly concentrated 
party-state that gave rural interests few sites of access to the 
state and state power, and few sites that would be political 
entrepreneurs [“barons”] at the local level could use as 
scaffolding to advance their own political ambitions and/or the 
interests of rural Ivoirians.146 
Those granted power by the regime, were encouraged to invest in home 
communities, all the while working to maintain their positions and favour from 
Houphouët-Boigny. In this sense, the selected elites were dependent on the 
power granted to them from Houphouët-Boigny, and, therefore, maintained 
loyalty to the regime. This form of exchange differs from situations in which local 
elites are then co-opted by the state and may eventually, with enough resources 
and political know-how, vie for political power of their own. Nevertheless, 
despite the careful attention devoted to ethnic representation at the national 
level, not all resources were distributed in a manner perceived as fair across all 
ethnic groups. Over time, the distribution of resources outlined below ultimately 
aggravated inter-ethnic tensions and created widely held perceptions of unfair 
benefits for those with connections inside Houphouët-Boigny’s government, 
and more importantly, for those who continued to offer political support in the 
face of challenged popularity. 
 
Resources for Redistribution: Land and Office 
 
As explained above, Houphouët-Boigny and the PDCI party governed in 
a highly centralized way and held tight control over state resources, all the while 
reinforcing the decentralized and egalitarian societal structures of the Ivoirian 
south. For rural areas in the south, Houphouët-Boigny implemented a strategy 
of “administrative occupation”. Administrative occupation, implemented by the 
regime in its purest form, involved the following: politics and state spending 
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were avoided in rural areas; political organisations were discouraged at local 
levels; and commodity-buying activities for the plantations were left in private 
hands with little state intervention.147 As such, little room was left for political 
mobilisation or for the acquisition of political resources without a certain degree 
of state co-optation. Access to state resources was limited, and when occurring, 
took place within the political context enforced and promoted by Houphouët-
Boigny and the PDCI.148 As elaborated by Catherine Boone, 
Houphouët wanted to ensure that his regime did not bequeath to 
a decentralized and relatively egalitarian rural society the very 
political (institutional) resources that farmers would need to 
organize themselves politically to advance claims and 
complaints on the center.”149 
Restricted and top-down defined access to state resources in the post-
independence period has arguably shaped local expectations of resource 
distribution in the post-conflict state, particularly amongst groups of ex-
combatants. 
During the first two decades of independence, Côte d’Ivoire experienced 
rapid economic growth, driven in large part by its production of cocoa and 
coffee, and its reliance of foreign capital and expertise in key industries.150 
During the 1960s, deliberate measures were taken to expand the primary 
agricultural exports of cocoa, all the while encouraging the diversification of the 
sector into other commodities such as palm oil, cotton, rubber, and fruit. In 
addition to the revenues generated from the primary agricultural exports, 
economic growth was supported by a series of investment incentives designed 
to attract foreign capital, namely in the import-substitution manufacturing sector 
or the agro-productive processes.151 In tandem with the expansion, parastatal 
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companies became notorious for their lucrative benefits, as did the expansion 
of industries jointly financed by the state and private investors. During this era, 
it was also common for members of the political elite to be appointed to these 
lucrative positions, creating a nation-wide perception of facilitated appointment 
for those who were already considered to be on the ‘inside track’.152 
Alongside the distribution of these posts, land became increasingly used 
as a resource of patronage, reinforcing its centrality in the inter-communal 
tensions already present. In 1963, Côte d’Ivoire’s Code Domanial, stated that 
all land that was not declared under a formal title would become land of ‘national 
domain’. As a result, indigenous land claims were mostly upheld when it was 
politically pragmatic to do so.153 This practice, in which Houphouët-Boigny 
famously stated that “the land belongs to the person who makes it productive” 
(“la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur”), granted the state the ability 
to distribute land accordingly, once again sidestepping indigenous systems of 
land tenure. These policies, although appealing to the growing migrant 
population, fuelled tensions between indigenous and migrant populations who 
seemed to be welcomed unconditionally by the PDCI.  
Further adding to indigenous grievances of land as a resource of 
patronage, was the extension of electoral voting rights to non-Ivoirian citizens. 
In the one-party elections of the 1980s, migrant populations inhabiting the 
southwest were given voting cards, inevitably casting their ballots for the same 
ruling party that granted them access to the land and now gave electoral voting 
rights.154 Coupled with the facilitated access to land for migrant populations, the 
extension of voting rights was largely seen as a tactic of Houphouët-Boigny to 
maintain the control of his political party over the course of multiple presidential 
elections.155 The tension attributed to the expansion of civic participation rights 
is complemented by the research of Catherine Boone (2009), where she 
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demonstrates how promises of land increasingly featured in electoral 
campaigns as an attempt to mobilise constituencies to the disadvantage of their 
rivals and of other minorities.156 As Houphouët-Boigny himself was Baoulé, an 
ethnic group found mostly in the central parts of Côte d’Ivoire and known to 
have greatly prospered from the cultivation of southern lands, practices such 
as these fed into perceptions of opportunities for the ‘in-group’ at the expense 
of all others, particularly the indigenous southwest populations.  
The use of land as a resource for redistribution during times of electoral 
mobilisation, however, is not exclusive to Côte d’Ivoire. Combining their 
observations from both Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe, Norma Kriger and 
Catherine Boone identified a series of pre-conditions necessary for land to 
become a viable resource to mobilise support. First, there had to be weak legal 
restraints around land rights, allowing rulers to allocate land as they desired. 
Second, was the presence of multiparty elections, in which the electorate had 
to have multiple options beyond the ruling party. Finally, the redistribution of 
land as a resource of patronage is also linked to a dwindling fiscal state 
capacity. When other state coffers run low, land may be one of the final 
resources that can be offered.157 In line with the observations of Kriger and 
Boone, the issue of land and its redistribution for electoral support is a theme 
that re-emerged in Côte d’Ivoire. Under the successive regimes of Bédié, Guéï, 
and Gbagbo, each leader made promises in one way or another, to transfer 
land from those deemed to be in opposition, be it “foreigners”, regional 
migrants, immigrants, or minorities, and give it back to their supporters and loyal 
patriots.158 The redistribution of land seemingly for political support, this thesis 
argues, sets up expectations of governance and redistribution that award 
political supporters. These same dynamics are observed in the post-conflict 
period amongst groups of Ivoirian ex-combatants.  
Adding to these expectations are the trends of redistribution that grew 
out of the 1970s and 1980s. The 1970s were characterised as the beginning of 
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the economic downturn, while the 1980s were characterised by increasing 
strikes, non-payment of civil servants, allegations of corruption, and a budding 
resistance to Houphouët-Boigny’s one party rule.159 With the decline in 
commodity prices and the infamous “cocoa war”, economic prosperity began to 
dwindle, forcing the Ivoirian government to turn to IMF-sponsored austerity 
measures.160 The IMF structural adjustment loans, combined with decreasing 
commodity prices, led to eventual difficulty in paying-off debts.161 In a recent 
account of Côte d’Ivoire’s engagement with French and American economic 
models of growth, Abou Bamba identifies numerous factors that lead to the 
economic downturn in the 1980s. Amongst the factors identified are an over-
reliance of foreign credit to finance large-scale development projects, political 
clientelism, and the management of state resources, underscored by a 
misplaced faith in the capitalist model of development.162 At the same time, the 
demographics of the rural areas, by the late 1980s, in the southwest had 
drastically shifted, with residents composed of up to 50-60% of non-indigenous 
inhabitants.163 These migrant populations were seen as reaping the “lion’s 
share of benefits for economic development”.164 The increased population, the 
closing land frontier, the decreasing production prices, as well as the reverse 
migration patterns of urban to rural, placed unprecedented strain on indigenous 
communities in the southwest, setting the stage for the politicians of the 1990s 
and 2000s to place issues of land and citizenship at the heart of public 
debate.165 
Concurrently, job security in the public sector began to dwindle, 
prompting members of privileged families to increasingly seek positions for their 
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relatives in the Ivoirian army.166 Recent accounts from both Mike McGovern and 
interview data from 2016-17, describe how during the 1990s, the Ivoirian army 
was still seen as an Armée Fonctionnaire, (a bureaucratic army). The army, in 
this sense, was perceived more as a part of the civil service that engaged more 
in bureaucratic processes than military operations. Increasingly, children of 
wealthy families comprised a significant percentage of the army’s new recruits, 
a trend described to have gone alongside the increasing accounts of 
unpunished insubordination.167 The army, however, was not without its share 
of structural adjustment austerity measures. Being subject to pay-cuts, a 
“laissez-faire” attitude developed amongst the soldiers who would resort to 
substituting their incomes by doing things such as putting up roadblocks and 
increasingly accepting bribes for routine checks.168 Discussions held with 
Ivoirians on this matter, and occasionally mentioned in passing in the Africa 
Research Bulletin, revealed that the phenomenon of clientelistic ties influencing 
military recruitment continued through successive governments of Bédié (1993-
1999), Guéï (1999-2000)169, Gbagbo (2000-2010)170, and most importantly, 
Ouattara’s post-conflict regime (2011-present).171 One Ivoirian observer, 
explained how each government would divvy up open spots and encourage 
recruitment accordingly.172  
While little is documented about this practice before Houphouët-Boigny, 
or even throughout successive governments, the distribution of military posts 
as goods enables them to be viewed as a resource of patronage. This provides 
a historical reference to post-conflict political claims placed by individuals 
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seeking military conscription in a similar manner. This thesis demonstrates that 
the increased insubordination, coupled with methods of recruitment no longer 
dependent on trials of physical and mental feat, gave grounds for post-conflict 
claims of facilitated military integration for those with favourable political 
affinities and with little interest beyond a monthly salary. Moreover, they also 
gave grounds for rapid military promotion for those already in the army, both of 
which are discussed in Chapters 6,7, and 8. Originating in the Houphouët-
Boigny era and continuing across political leadership leading into the 11-year 
Ivoirian crisis, both land and posts in public and private office allowed political 
leaders to establish an upper-hand politically amongst loyal constituents. The 
preferential access to these resources in the post-independence period shaped 
local expectations of resource distribution in the post-conflict state, particularly 




For the most part, Houphouët-Boigny was known to have promoted a 
culture of dialogue rather than one of conflict. At the same time, the charismatic 
leader was equally suspected of using a strategy of intimidation to ward off 
potential political dissidents and traitors. If political dissent was suspected, 
Houphouët-Boigny is known to have kept the individual under intense scrutiny 
for a large enough time for them to either prove or implicate themselves, at 
which point the first course of action would be a dialogue, in a father-son way.173 
On the other hand, there were occasions where Houphouët-Boigny responded 
firmly to dissent, at first purging and then trying to rehabilitate potential 
challengers. In these situations, some have alleged that ‘faux plots’ were 
identified by the ruler, whose targets were as diverse as students returning from 
their studies abroad or his closest allies. The results were widespread 
detainments on invented charges, followed by the eventual release and co-
optation of accused individuals into his political influence. Less cooperative 
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individuals frequently faced show trials or were subjected to other forms of 
humiliating degradation such as slanderous remarks to family members and 
spouses.174 When seeking to quell possible military uprisings against similar 
punishment and humiliation, Houphouët-Boigny would begin to extend state 
benefits to both non-commissioned officers and officers, although the extent of 
such appeasement is unclear175. This behaviour lead some academics to 
believe that over the course of his 33-year reign, and especially in the first 
decade, Houphouët-Boigny effectively created, punished, and co-opted political 
opponents as a way of consolidating his political power and maintaining his 
allure as an uncontested paternalistic ruler.176 By creating scandals around 
certain political ‘personalities’, Houphouët-Boigny sought to “bring the whole 
country to its knees.”177 
Despite the generally stable political climate and the emphasis placed 
on pacified dialogue, Houphouët-Boigny’s 33-year reign was occasionally met 
with isolated plots of resistance, predominantly from groups of Bété, a sub-
group of the Kruan in the southwest. In 1963, for instance, Houphouët-Boigny 
learned that there were potential plots against the regime.178 In response, he 
reacted with harsh punishment for the seven suspects, three of which were 
sentenced to death, one of which received 15 years of forced labour, one with 
“harsh punishment”,179 and one which was acquitted. The final suspect was 
found dead in their prison cell.180 For those who were eventually released, they 
were placed in administrative directorships or were co-opted into the political 
elite.181 Other notable examples include the 1969-70 Bété and Sanwi uprisings, 
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in which a small group carried out a violent attack on state representatives and 
security forces in the southwest city of Gagnoa, planting a flag and declaring 
the “Independent State of Eburnie”. Houphouët-Boigny’s response was a brutal 
repression by the army, in which thousands of Bété were killed.182 Additional 
instances of resistance were a foiled plot by the Bété and Gouro junior military 
officers in 1974, and a university-led strike calling for multi-party elections in 
1982. These instances were met either with offers of lucrative posts within the 
state apparatus or by public humiliations denouncing the treasonous acts. As a 
result of these actions, Houphouët-Boigny became an increasingly polarised 
figure amongst indigenous populations of the southwest.  
From the 1980s onwards, resistance to the political and economic status 
quo gained momentum with the formation of a new political party, the Front 
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). Created clandestinely in 1982 in the southwest city of 
Dabou by a small group of friends, the FPI became officialised in 1990 with 
Laurent Gbagbo at its head. The party held a socialist ideology, making 
Gbagbo, a “militant of unions and politics since 1969”, a fitting leader.183 The 
FPI, under Gbagbo’s leadership, began to lobby for the rights of rural dwellers, 
students, workers, and the unemployed. More importantly, he began to publicly 
question the legitimacy of Houphouët-Boigny as an uncontested ruler.184 
Gbagbo argued that Houphouët-Boigny’s policy of open electoral participation 
for non-citizens favoured political victory for Houphouët-Boigny because of the 
continued concessions, particularly land and voting rights, he provided to 
migrant workers.185 By swelling his electoral base to ensure political victory, the 
voices of indigenous Ivoirians, those from the southwest, were diluted.  
Within communities, persisting tensions over land manifested 
themselves into larger themes of citizenship and belonging, both of which 
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featured prominently in the political rhetoric of both Gbagbo and the internal 
Houphouët-Boigny successor Henri Konan Bédié. Both began to draw on the 
notion of “Ivoirité”, a concept introduced by Ivoirian scholar Niangoranh Porquet 
in an effort to develop a unified cultural signifier and identity.186 In its inception, 
the term Ivoirité was conceived as noble and unifying concept, circulating 
amongst Ivoirian intellectuals since the 1970s to define Ivoirian identity.187 The 
concept, however, was co-opted by politicians in the 1990s as a nationalist 
term, first by Henri Konan Bédié in 1993, eventually resulting in the social and 
political exclusion of Ivoirian residents with mixed heritage. The concept 
influenced policy during the electoral reform in 1994, that stipulated that 
presidential and legislative candidates must be born to parents with Ivoirian 
nationality.188 The requirement to have parents of Ivoirian nationality limited the 
presidential candidacy of Houphouët-Boigny’s former Prime Minister, Alassane 
Ouattara, an Ivoirian of mixed northern lineage.189 Later, in 2000, the term was 
used to buttress further political amendments such as the referendum of July 
2000, in which 86.53% of Ivoirians voted in support of Article 35, a constitutional 
amendment stipulating that candidates wishing to run for presidential elections 
must have both a father and mother born on Ivoirian soil. The struggle over 
succession of Houphouët-Boigny’s government, between both Bédié and his 
former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, is one that set the political forces in 
motion leading into the 11-year conflict, and, as will be evident in the following 
chapters, continues to define political loyalties across groups of ex-combatants 
and Ivoirians alike.190 Additionally, the politically contested positions following 
the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 further fanned the flames of anti-
northerner and northern-resistance positions across the country, particularly in 
the south. 
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The politicised version of Ivoirité gained popularity fuelling a series of 
inter-ethnic land disputes in the southwest rural areas and exacerbating 
tensions over nationality in the urban centres.191 University student unions 
sympathetic to Gbagbo’s FPI increasingly hardened their stance, aligning 
themselves with the FPI’s call for a renewed and enforced national identity. By 
1998, under Bédié’s government, these ideas of citizenship became codified in 
the Code Foncier, excluding those considered to be foreigners from owning 
land, and stopping foreigners who worked the land from passing it on to their 
families.192 As a result, in 1999, approximately 20,000 Burkinabés and other 
non-Ivoirians were expelled from Côte d’Ivoire by community gangs of the 
southwest who felt emboldened by the change in government policy.193 This 
series of events ultimately gave way to the 11-year political crisis, and shaped 
the political norms of Ivoirians that continued into the post-conflict period. 
 
The 11-year Crisis: Unverified and Opportune 
 
When analysing the Ivoirian crisis, two observations stand out: the first being 
the relative absence of wide-scale violence, deaths, or humanitarian disasters 
that typically characterise violent civil war in Africa;194 and the second, the 
multiple narratives of key events that perpetuate uncertainty around the identity 
and the number of actors involved. As Côte d’Ivoire has only recently 
transitioned beyond immediate post-conflict recovery, this section 
complements the few academic sources with personal accounts, media 
accounts, and human rights documentation. This section sheds light on the 
unconfirmed facts surrounding key events of crisis. It lays the foundation 
necessary to understand how the lack of certainty ultimately created windows 
of opportunity for opportunistic claim-makers in the post-conflict period, as will 
be presented in Chapters 7 and 8. Furthermore, this section builds on the 
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history of clientelism in Côte d’Ivoire, showing where opportunities of distortion 
lie, and argues that the past practices of redistribution influence claims-making 
in the post-conflict period.   
 
1999 Coup d’Etat 
 
Setting off a series of events that would make up the 11-year long 
Ivoirian crisis was the first successful coup d’état on the 24 December 1999, 
ousting President Henri Konan Bédié, Houphouët-Boigny’s successor. Within a 
context of increasing communal violence targeted towards Ivoirians of northern 
or migrant descent, as well as material grievances amongst the army, Ivoirians 
awoke to what has been locally referred to as “le Père Noel en Treillis” (“Santa 
Claus in Fatigues”) that resulted in the placement of the former Chief of Staff 
under Houphouët-Boigny, General Robert Guéï, as the interim head of the 
state.195 
Beyond the vague recognition that the assailants were likely of northern 
descent, little concrete evidence is publicly known. In one account, which is 
supported by most academic and international newspapers, the coup was 
launched by a small group of disgruntled mid-ranking officers in the army, 
seeking payment owed to them for their service in the United Nations Mission 
in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).196 This particular version falls 
neatly in line with the models of mutiny put forth by Maggie Dwyer in which the 
exposure to other militaries obtained through participation in UN peacekeeping 
missions can trigger waves of claims-making upon return home.197 Locally, the 
identity of the assailants is more complex. Amongst Ivoirians, there is an 
understanding that the assailants of this coup are the same individuals that 
would carry out the 2002 attempted coup that lead to the declaration of the 
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northern rebellion. Some of these individuals came from the ‘camorra’ group, 
who would later serve as Guéï’s presidential guards and then be fired due to 
suspected loyalties to Ouattara.198 In a third account, presented by a 
Commando Invisibles member who alleges they participated, the coup was the 
unintentional consequence of drunken banter amongst the soldiers, who at the 
time of their intoxication were emboldened and motivated to make demands, 
and were later met with a rash reaction from the head of state.199 In this 
particular rendition, it was not planned nor organised. In yet another account, 
which appears in the international journal Jeune Afrique, the 1999 coup is 
described as a planned event organised by three individuals, one of which was 
Ibrahim Coulibaly (alias “IB”), who would go on to lead the northern rebellion in 
the initial years, and later lead the Commando Invisibles combatant group of 
Abidjan during the post-electoral crisis of 2011.200 Over time, both international 
and local journals have tended to attribute the coup to IB.201 If the coup was 
indeed instigated by IB and two collaborators, his involvement suggests a 
deeper political motive and weakens versions professing financial grievances 
as the primary motivator. While the motivations for the coup play a nearly 
inexistent role in present-day claims-making beyond individual demonstrations 
of arcane knowledge, the coup marks the beginning of a series of unconfirmed 
events defining the key events of the 11-year political conflict and that hold well 
into the post-conflict period. The remaining ambiguity surrounding the 1999 
Coup, like several events to follow, provides enough flexibility for ex-
combatants to later distort the narrative to suit their needs. 
Following the coup of 1999, Guéï proceeded to establish a transitional, 
temporary, government with the objectives of promoting national reconciliation 
and ridding Côte d’Ivoire of its endemic corruption. From the onset, Guéï 
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maintained that his role was to carry the country through to the next presidential 
elections. Over the course of a few months, however, Guéï began to appeal to 
nationalistic trends thus further propelling anti-northerner/foreigner sentiments 
to the forefront of public debate. For some, Guéï’s gradual shift to a nationalist 
discourse was little more than a political strategy to set himself up for his 
presidential candidacy a year later.202 In July 2000, a referendum was held, with 
86.53% of Ivoirians supporting Article 35, a constitutional amendment 
stipulating that candidates wishing to run for presidential elections must have 
both a father and mother born on Ivoirian soil, thus excluding Ouattara from the 
upcoming elections. Carrying the momentum of the referendum, anti-northerner 
protests broke out at the French embassy, demanding the removal of Ouattara 
and his supporters from Ivoirian territory.203 Within this context, Guéï 
announced his intention to run for president. 
 
The “Complots” of 2000 and 2001 
 
Similar to the 1999 Coup, two subsequent events further complicated 
the narrative of the conflict. During the reign of Robert Guéï and the subsequent 
early leadership of Laurent Gbagbo, two separate attempted coups took place: 
the “Complot du Cheval Blanc” of 2000 and the “Complot de la Mercedes Noir” 
of 2001.  
On the evening of the 17th of September 2000, approximately 20 armed 
men attacked the private residence of interim president Robert Guéï. Violence 
broke out between the unknown assailants and Guéï’s presidential protection 
team, resulting in the death of two presidential guards. Allegedly, Guéï’s white 
horse, believed to have mystical powers, was also killed in the confrontation, 
thus baptising the event the “Complot du Cheval Blanc”.204 Guéï, uncertain of 
who was behind the assault, suspected a foreign-backed attack carried out by 
those loyal to Alassane Ouattara, whose loyalists were widely accused of 
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instigating the 1999 Coup, as mentioned above, and immediately fired the 
Ministers of Security, Transport, and Justice, all of which had alleged ties to 
Ouattara.205 The attempted 2000 coup, also now believed to be connected to 
northerners, further fuelled hostilities against migrant communities across the 
country.206 According to one informer, when speaking about ‘cheval blanc’, he 
claimed that the assailants were the same actors as those behind the 1999 
coup that reacted to Guéï’s shift in political stance. Originally placed to help 
restore justice for all, Guéï’s re-orientation towards nationalistic and 
exclusionary politics not only put him in opposition to their desired candidate 
Alassane Ouattara but required a strong reaction.207  
A little more than a month after the attempted coup, Ivoirians returned to 
the polls for the 22 October 2000 presidential elections. In opposition to Robert 
Guéï were Laurent Gbagbo and his Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) party, and 
Alassane Ouattara and his Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) party. 
Ouattara, however, was excluded from the elections as a result of Article 35, 
which enforced a criterion of both mother and father to be of Ivoirian descent. 
Following the elections, both Gbagbo and Guéï declared themselves winners, 
setting off a series of violent clashes between Gbagbo, Guéï, and Ouattara 
supporters in the streets.208 During this time, in a public address, Gbagbo called 
on his supporters to engage in what would become known as the first of many 
“Chasse aux Dioulas”, a call for popular uprising against those of northern and 
foreign descent. Gbagbo supporters, including both youth groups and larger 
communities, attacked the opposition, with the justification of ridding the city of 
those northerners who supported Ouattara. Over the course of three days, 
Abidjan experienced unprecedented violence that resulted in 155 deaths, 316 
wounded, and approximately 50 disappearances.209 As a result of rising 
violence, Guéï fled, leaving Gbagbo as the new President of the republic. 
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Less than three months after Gbagbo’s victory, on the evening of the 7-
8 January 2001, the second attempted coup took place, this time targeting 
Gbagbo’s government. Very little is documented about this attempted coup, 
other than it involved several heavily-armed 4x4 vehicles led by a black 
Mercedes vehicle, which are all said to have come from the north of the country. 
It is said that upon being attacked along the highway by state forces and several 
hours of fighting, the mysterious convoy retreated to the north, allegedly to the 
areas known to be bastions of Ouattara, Ferkessedougou and Kong, as 
recounted by respondents from both Ouattara and of Gbagbo political 
preferences. The assailants, it is said, took refuge in Burkina Faso, thus 
supporting Gbagbo’s initial suspicions that the “Complot de la Mercedes Noir” 
was carried out by armed militia men, believed to be from the Dozo traditional 
hunting group, or by foreign fighters who were covertly backed by foreign 
governments.210 At least 31 arrests were made of suspected northerners 
following the 2001 Coup.211 Early Ivoirian news clips suspect groups of Dozo 
traditional fighters or foreign fighters, both of which originated from the north, 
under the leadership of IB.212 Although the identities of the assailants have yet 
to be verified, it is assumed, by many Ivoirians, that the assailants were likely 
those with ties to Burkina Faso and who would go on to form the northern 
rebellion.  
Both the “Complot du Cheval Blanc” and the “Complot de la Mercedes 
Noir” continued the Ivoirian tradition of secretive plots against government 
officials, as initiated during the time of Houphouët-Boigny. More importantly, 
however, are the elusive stories that emerge locally. The secrecy and claims 
that append both complots are highly relevant for understanding the basis of 
post-conflict political claims-making in Côte d’Ivoire. While evidence around 
both events is still vague, some of the existing evidence about the events 
suggests that early involvement in the northern rebellion was limited to a core 
group of individuals who re-emerged time after time. Accusations of Dozo 
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traditional hunters and foreign backing as comprising a ‘parallel army’ for 
Ouattara,213 while most likely true, undermine post-conflict claims of early and 
forgotten participation, advanced by individuals seeking financial gain in the 
chapters that follow. For individuals citing the complots as their earliest combat-
related engagement, the reference of unverified details has often been added 
credibility to their claims in the post-conflict state.  
 
The 19th of September 2002 and the Partition 
 
From the beginning of September 2002, rumours began to circulate 
across Abidjan about an upcoming coup, prompting the state to increase 
security around key institutions and political figures’ homes. On the night of the 
18th, while president Gbagbo was on an official visit to Rome, attacks were 
carried out in Abidjan at minister’s homes and the gendarmerie school and 
camp. On the morning of the 19th, two major cities in the north, Bouaké and 
Korhogo, were declared under the control of rebel forces. Hours later, former 
interim president Robert Guéï was assassinated with his body found in simple 
civilian clothing near to the Hotel Ivoire. It is assumed that Guéï was making his 
way to the Cathedral in Plateau.214  
Within days of the coordinated attacks, a public announcement was 
made declaring a movement in the north and a new political party, the 
Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI). Guillaume Soro, was declared 
as its spokesperson and political leader. The degree of coordination and 
planning put into the initial days of what eventually become known as the 
Forces Nouvelles (FN) northern rebellion, suggested a long-standing plan. 
Alarming to many observers was the number of new weapons in the possession 
of the rebels, along with new trucks, satellite telephones, and large amounts of 
liquid assets.215  
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Originally placing the blame for the attack on Robert Guéï, on the 24th 
September, Gbagbo shifted blame to Burkina Faso, suggesting it was all a plot 
by Blaise Compaoré to destabilise Côte d’Ivoire.216 Burkina Faso officially 
denied any involvement. Four days later, Gbagbo called on France to help, in 
accordance with a bilateral defence agreement dating back to 1961. France, 
however, refused involvement, claiming that the events that had taken place 
were an internal problem, and did not constitute a foreign invasion.217 
Immediately following the events, neighbourhoods in Abidjan identified as 
“northern” were attacked and pillaged, leaving a death toll of approximately 
300.218 Within days, France deployed its military forces in Opération Licorne, 
tasked with protecting French citizens. French forces, moreover, secured a 
demarcation line that effectively split the country in two between the loyalist 
south and the rebel-held north.219 This buffer zone was later secured by UN 
peacekeepers from 2004 until it was dismantled many years later. 
Consistent with the rest of the crisis, secrecy surrounded the origins of 
the FN’s equipment, with some observers suspecting the hand of Burkina 
Faso.220 Early accounts from 2004, estimate that between 700 and 800 soldiers 
took part in the siege, occupying strategic military positions in the northeast 
cities of Korhogo, Bouaké, and Abidjan.221 Secrecy also exists in terms of the 
leadership and the origins of these fighters- a secrecy that can be easily 
exploited in the post-conflict period for political claims-making. One account 
describes the identity of the assailants as soldiers from Gbagbo’s state forces 
that were about to be retrenched.222 Early academic accounts, as well as 
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interview data collected by this research, highlight the presence of foreign 
fighters from Burkina Faso making up the initial ranks of the rebellion. This 
conclusion is further supported by the description of some fighters not knowing 
their way around the major cities they went on to control.223 In terms of 
leadership, discrepancies lie around whether it was Ivoirian or Burkinabé led. 
According to one FN supporter, the assailants where acting under the 
instructions of the nascent northern rebellion, sponsored and supported by 
Burkina Faso’s president, Blaise Compaoré.224 This particular version also 
serves as an explanation for how the rebellion was able to sustain itself over 
the course of seven years, with Burkina Faso providing financial and weapons 
support, soldiers, instructors, and logistical support to the FN rebellion.225 
Competing accounts describe all military operations of the nascent rebellion as 
falling under the leadership of IB, with Guillaume Soro serving as the 
spokesperson.226 This last version has important implications for how post-
conflict claims-makers describe their wartime experiences, as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 8 (Commando Invisibles), where aligning oneself with 
IB is opportunistic at times and detrimental at others, depending on the 
audience. 
 
Protracted Tensions: 2002-2010 
 
From the partition of the country in 2002 to the presidential elections of 
2010, few confrontations between organised armed forces of the south, against 
organised armed forces of the north occurred.227 As many of the migrant 
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workers remained in the southwest plantation areas, localised inter-ethnic 
confrontations were the primary form of violence experienced during this time. 
The initial months of the rebellion were marked by a series of small-scale violent 
inter-ethnic reprisal attacks between and within communities, particularly in the 
southwest.228 The prevalence of small disputes at the local level in the 
southwest, shed important light on the type of violent conflict that characterised 
the greatest portion of the 11-year crisis, as well as the type of engagement 
required by combatants.  
On the 17th of October 2002, a cease-fire was signed in Bouaké, the 
headquarters of the northern rebellion, to end hostilities. Both parties, however, 
continued to mobilise and arm supporters. On the 28th of November 2002, two 
new rebel-aligned armed groups were formed in the west of the country, 
Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand-Ouest (MPIGO) and Mouvement pour 
la Justice et la Paix (MJP), and were eventually absorbed into northern 
rebellion.229 While the emergence of two new armed groups signals mass 
support amongst the northern population or fragmentation among leaders, 
some respondents explained that their creation was little more than a strategic 
attempt by the FN to bypass the restrictions imposed on the FN by the 
ceasefire. If neither of the new groups had signed, they would not be bound by 
the same restrictions.230 Once again, and consistent with almost all events of 
the crisis, little is known about the size and composition of MPIGO and MJP. 
Both groups were suspected of having recruited Sierra Leonean and Liberian 
mercenaries, though exact figures of participation remain unknown.231 
Alternative versions describe how the membership of MPIGO swelled with 
                                                          
Mladenov, Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2013), 62; Dan Halvorson, States of Disorder: 
Understanding State Failure and Intervention in the periphery (New York: Routledge, 2016), 143. 
228 Scott Strauss, “‘Briefing: It’s sheer horror here’ Patterns of Violence during the first four months of Côte d’Ivoire’s 
post-electoral crisis,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 487. 
229 McGovern, Making War in Côte d'Ivoire, 20. 
230 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, August 20, 2016, in-person. 
231 Miran-Guyon, Guerres mystique en Côte d’Ivoire, 54. Military Officer Etat Major General, informal discussion with 
the author in Abidjan-Plateau, February 16, 2015, in-person. 
90 
 
approximately 800 Dozo traditional hunters prevalent in northern areas of Côte 
d’Ivoire.232  
Within the FN-controlled territories, institutions mirroring those of the 
Ivoirian state began to form with tax systems of vehicles, economic governance 
structures, banking systems, and laissez-passers for NGOs and international 
diplomats between zones.233 In 2006, the FN carried out a re-organisation of 
the northern territory into zones- each under an individual’s influence. Leaders 
of each of the ten zones earned the title of “Commandant de Zone” 
(“ComZone”) and commanded groups of individuals tasked primarily with 
securing roads and monitoring mobility within and across zones. Moreover, 
ComZones equally took hold of natural resources such as gold mines and 
began a series of lucrative economic activities. Further detail of these activities 
will be presented in Chapter 6 (Integrated FN). 
In the south, the rebellion was perceived amongst many as a form of 
foreign invasion by northerners and, in more politicised cases, French political 
meddling. Resistance to the northern rebellion took many forms, from official 
militia groups with clear leadership and territorial influence, as well as smaller-
scale community defence groups, focusing more on securing their remote 
locations and monitoring mobility around their towns. In the time that followed 
the attempted coup, the infamous escadrons de mort commenced activities, 
with secretive and silent assassinations of those perceived as complicit in the 
northern rebellion.234 At the community-level, examples such as the 16th 
October Daloa executions of Muslims and northerners were carried out upon 
return of the city to government control. In this particular case, speculation 
surrounds the exact figures as well as the presence of Angolan mercenaries.235 
Complementing the armed aggressions, southern-loyalists formed 
complementary groups of protestors and militant supporters, known as the 
Jeunes Patriotes, consolidating their presence in every part of the capital city 
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Abidjan and engaging in renewed nationalist and anti-northerner sentiments.236 
Amongst their tactics of political aggression were public forums such as the 
“Sorbonne” or the many “Parliaments”, perpetuating nationalistic, and 
increasingly, xenophobic discourse. These different types of forums served as 
public outreach and dialogue platforms to spread political messages and to 
mobilise support for Gbagbo’s positions vis-à-vis the northern rebellion and 
associated localised grievances such as land issues in the southwest. 
Alongside these forums, civilian supporters often set up informal shops, 
sometimes selling nationalist merchandise in support of the southern cause.237 
Armed assaults by informal supporters of Gbagbo against French and UN 
expatriates were mounted on two separate occasions: one as retaliation for a 
French retaliatory attack on Gbagbo’s aerial powers in 2004,238 and the other 
as retaliation against the growing presence of the UN, its arms embargo, and 
its sanctions on key leaders in 2006.239 In both cases, violent protests, led by 
Gbagbo’s Jeunes Patriotes broke out around the French embassy and UN 
peacekeeping headquarters in Abidjan, with targeted attacks against French 
expatriates and foreigners.  
During the same time period, a series of peace talks took place, the two 
most notable being the Linas Marcoussis agreement in 2003, and the 
Ouagadougou agreements in 2007. Neither were upheld, with both parties 
quickly violating their terms, resulting in the refusal of either side to disarm.240 
The Ouagadougou Political Agreement, along with its four supplements, did, 
however, initiate a series of attempts to re-unify the country and to hold a new 
set of presidential elections, by relaxing Article 35 and allowing Alassane 
Ouattara to run. Disagreement at the elite level as to the sequence of 
requirements for the Ouagadougou Political Agreement to be upheld, led to the 
presidential elections being postponed several times until 2010. For Gbagbo, 
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the total reunification of the territory was a necessary pre-requisite before 
elections could be legitimately held, citing logistical arrangements and 
restricted access of state officials as the primary inhibitors.241 The FN, under 
leadership of Soro, prioritised the divided territory to better assure their future 
and avoid intimidation.242 These elections, held in theoretically unified territory 
although northern regions were still under the de facto control of the FN, mark 
the second major confrontation between both camps. 
 
2010 Post-Electoral Crisis and the Battle of Abidjan 
 
The post-electoral crisis is arguably the most significant confrontation 
between state forces of the south, and Ouattara supporters, and was significant 
enough for greater armed participation amongst Ivoirian combatants from both 
sides. Like most of the crisis’ notable events, the persistence of unverifiable 
facts creates the strongest basis for individuals to lay claims to post-conflict 
compensation for their participation. 
On the 30th October 2010, the presidential elections commenced, 
resulting in two rounds ultimately pitting the candidacy of Gbagbo against that 
of Ouattara. Both rounds had a participation rate of over 80% and resulted in 
the victory, although marginal, of Ouattara with 54% of the vote.243 Although 
certified by the UN peacekeeping mission and declared by the Independent 
Electoral Commission, the Constitutional Court, perceived as pro-Gbagbo, took 
a different stance. It called for the annulment of the results from 13 
departments, thus giving grounds for Gbagbo and his supporters to contest the 
results.244 
Despite the international political support for the president-elect 
Ouattara, he was unable to take full control of the state, as Gbagbo still held a 
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monopoly on the security institutions that remained loyal to his regime, including 
the Gendarmerie and special units like the Brigade Anti-Emeute, and the Centre 
de Commandement des Operations de Sécurité.245 Ouattara, unable to instil 
his leadership, was placed under the protective security of the UN 
peacekeeping mission, thus fuelling local perceptions of being a puppet 
candidate of foreign control that was too weak to lead the country.246 Hesitant 
to mobilise his own supporters, those who did opt to protest were bloodily 
suppressed by the gendarmerie. During this time, Gbagbo called for enforced 
curfews within Abidjan, while his supporters continued their raids, forced 
removals, and violently confronted northerners across the south of the country. 
Roadblocks were erected, inflammatory xenophobic speech was intensified, 
and the United Nations was restricted access to many contentious sites and 
mass graves.247 
The Commando Invisibles shifted the balance of military power. Under 
the leadership of IB, the Commando Invisibles launched targeted attacks on the 
military strongholds of Gbagbo’s specialised forces, inflicting significant 
damage to their quarters and prompting many to abandon their posts.248 The 
Commando Invisibles make up one of the most elusive parts of the crisis, with 
their identities and numbers defined only by speculation. What is known about 
this group, however, is that they engaged in armed combat in support of 
Ouattara, and that because of their efficient military tactics within the northern-
dominated commune of Abobo, they successfully destabilised Gbagbo’s forces 
enough to open ground for the FN rebellion to descend from the North, via the 
West of the country, and take control of Abidjan.249 Their embedded presence 
within Abidjan signalled that Gbagbo’s Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) 
were not infallible.250 
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As the FN descended in the west, large scale human rights abuses were 
committed against south-western populations resistant to the FN, by this time 
known as the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI).251 Amongst the 
atrocities recorded were the pillaging and burning of villages, and the 
massacres of Duékoué and surrounding southwest areas. As the FRCI 
established control in the southwest, tactics such as showcasing 
disembowelled bodies and excessive violence were used as a way of pacifying 
and deterring any possible resistance.252 In one account, put forth by French 
scholar Richard Banégas, on the 1 and 3rd of April 2011, the FN, now the FRCI, 
encircled Abidjan and launched sporadic attacks from the periphery, while the 
Commando Invisible engaged in armed combat from within. Realising the force 
and military capabilities of the northern rebellion, multiple officers and rank-and-
file soldiers loyal to Gbagbo defected or surrendered. On the 11th of April 2011, 
French forces surrounded Gbagbo’s residence, holding him in place while the 
FRCI arrested him.253 Thereafter, Ouattara was able to take office and to form 
the first post-conflict government. In a matter of days, on the 27th of April, IB, 
former military leader of the northern rebellion and leader of the Commando 
Invisible was assassinated by the FRCI.254  
As previously stated, the post-electoral crisis is arguably the most 
significant confrontation between state forces of the south, and Ouattara 
supporters. It is also crucial to recall how the Commando Invisibles’ guerrilla-
style tactics were the most significant combat waged against Gbagbo’s state 
forces. The post-electoral crisis became the most lethal period of the 11-year 
political crisis. Fatalities are thought to number around 3,000, with some of the 
worst episodes of violence occurring in the southwest plantation areas, as the 
FN and their associated Dozo fighters descended to take control of Abidjan.255 
These events are important as the battlefield was significant enough for greater 
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armed participation. Like most of the crisis’ notable events, the persistence of 
unverifiable facts creates the strongest basis for individuals to lay claims to 
post-conflict compensation for their participation. 
 
Post-Conflict Period: A New Form of Instability 
 
As violent outbreaks trickled into the initial post-conflict years, Côte 
d’Ivoire’s social, political, and economic recovery commenced. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the Ivoirian crisis differs from other Sub-Saharan conflicts 
in a number of ways: it had few armed confrontations between loyalist-state 
forces and the armed groups of the FN, it had relatively few civilian casualties, 
and it did not have any large-scale humanitarian disasters.256 As of 2004, 
academic observers from neighbouring countries had commented on the 
relatively short period of combat, with low levels of destruction and 
casualties.257 Ethnographic research by Mike McGovern, made similar 
observations, extending them to 2007.258 By 2011, academic observations 
remained on standby of whether widespread armed violence would erupt, with 
Scott Strauss saying the following in 2011. 
Despite conditions that favoured widespread mass atrocity, as 
feared by many credible observers, the dynamics of violence in 
Côte d’Ivoire- at least as of this writing- consistently avoided 
sustained exterminatory violence.259  
Complementing these accounts are those by the UNHCR that recorded that, of 
the 25,000 refugees that fled into Liberia, many described fleeing the fear of 
potential violence, rather than violence itself.260 
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Similar to other conflicts, Côte d’Ivoire received the post-conflict 
recovery options typically provided to internationally-mediated peace 
agreements in African countries, including support for institutional power-
sharing, disarmament, human rights monitoring, capacity-building 
programmes, and support for democratic elections.261 However, in a crisis 
characterised mostly by inter-communal violence and the swelling of a parallel 
system of civilian governance in the north, the lines between combatant and 
civilian became blurred making it difficult to determine who should access post-
conflict recovery compensation. One observer, who assisted with Gbagbo’s 
side of the peace talks, explained how it was near-impossible to identify who 
actually participated from either camp, even within their own camp.262 Many 
who were actually in the rebellion, had passed away, giving way for a whole 
new group to present themselves as veritable fighters. Verification of 
authenticity became a near-futile task, with significant influence reserved for 
those who held powerful war-time posts, such as the leaders of armed groups. 
For one international observer, the distribution of post-conflict posts benefitted 
more than ex-combatants.  
People around, who were somehow involved in the 
conflict… somehow! The girlfriend of the guy who put 
air in the cars of the guys who wore uniforms!263 
 
For other observers, critiques arose around the irrational nature of 
integrating so many fighters, without sufficient analysis of the army’s needs. 
Observers began to notice how “friends”, “brothers”, and “sisters” were being 
named to posts, without obvious pre-requisite competences.264 While such 
appointments easily allow observers to decry corruption, at least two interviews 
with Gbagbo supporters suggested it was likely that the move was less to profit 
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the commanders and more to help out low-income people.265 While the second 
is less sinister, it does support the notion of military posts as goods of 
redistribution, in a manner reflecting the post-independence distribution of 
military posts mentioned above. 
The distribution was arguably one of the factors that led to perceptions 
amongst ex-combatants from competing groups that the posts were available 
more easily to those who supported Ouattara and the FN. Adding to this 
perception was the dominance of one narrative over the others, that of the 
victor’s camp. In the narratives that dominated the post-conflict period, 
disproportional emphasis was placed on the violations committed by the 
Gbagbo camp, neglecting those of the FN and largely omitting the experiences 
of the Commando Invisibles.266 This sentiment was echoed across interviews 
with those who considered themselves as the defeated, telling stories of how 
they had friends and family members living in the northern-dominated areas of 
Abidjan who were also assaulted and chased out of the area. These accounts 
have failed to appear in more formal historical versions of the conflict.267  
The emphasis placed on the violence of the Gbagbo supporters, as well 
as the relative neglect of the FN-derived violence may explain the relative 
absence of Gbagbo supporters and Commando Invisibles amongst post-
conflict claims-makers. In this sense, FN-supporting ex-combatants may feel 
emboldened as the dominant narratives are less accusatory towards them. 
However, as a closer examination into the different forms of political 
engagement in the chapters that follow will reveal, the stigma associated with 
early narratives may only be a marginal factor in determining ex-combatant 
political behaviour. As will be demonstrated, it is rather the political affinities 
held by each group, as well as their expectations of governance that determine 
their levels of engagement in the post-conflict state. 
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In tracing the common trends of governance in Côte d’Ivoire since its 
independence from French colonial rule in 1960, this chapter highlighted the 
ways in which clientelistic exchanges were frequently used to consolidate 
political support during Houphouët-Boigny’s rule. It demonstrated how the 
acquisition of land, as well as lucrative posts in the public, private, and military 
service, were used as resources of redistribution in the post-independence 
period. In doing so, it demonstrated precedence for post-conflict expectations 
of salaried posts and pay-outs for those who consider their wartime support of 
the Ouattara political candidacy to be justifying grounds for obtaining benefits 
in the post-conflict period. Such expectations, in which benefits in the form of 
financial compensation and facilitated employment into state salaried positions 
in exchange for political support, is consistent with Allen Hicken’s conception of 
clientelism, as outlined in Chapter 2. The common elements of clientelism, 
those of dyadic relationships, contingency/reciprocity, hierarchy, and iteration, 
all of which define a specific form of distribution dependent on political support 
and loyalty, not only characterised post-independence governance, but 
continue to shape expectations for post-conflict distributions of goods amongst 
ex-combatant populations.268 This finding is likely to extend beyond ex-
combatant populations and into those of the wider Ivoirian society. 
This chapter laid the groundwork to support its argument that the 
expectations of clientelistic governance, visible through the voiced political 
affinities of ex-combatants as well as their proximity to individuals of political 
influence, are locally expected to carry into the post-conflict period. The 
expectation of these patterns, this thesis posits, continue to influence the 
behaviour of ex-combatants and their choices of political engagement in the 
post-conflict period. A similar argument was put forth by Michael Bratton and 
Nicolas Van de Walle, who applied the same logic to states undergoing 
democratic transitions.269 Bratton and Van de Walle argued that “the systematic 
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use of state resources to promote stability through clientelism”, consistent with 
the literature on post-independence Côte d’Ivoire, was “likely to influence 
individual actions after the transition”.270 In such contexts, any imbalance or 
opposition that threatens political stability is likely to continue to be mediated by 
access to state resources, which would themselves be distributed in 
accordance with familiar methods. The institutional legacy of clientelism, would 
leave its mark on a state undergoing democratic transition and would likely 
continue to influence practices of governance going forward. Influential political 
actors in the post-transition phase, therefore, are likely to carry with them past 
practices of governance and decision-making, as are the institutions that they 
interact and depend on. As elaborated by Bratton and Van de Walle, 
The power of institutional actors to shape democratic 
consolidation after the transition is largely conditioned by the 
political spheres created beforehand. Political actors are 
constrained by the past roles of such institutions as the military, 
political parties, and the interest associations.271 
Following this logic, one would expect pluralistic democracies to derive from 
states that previously supported ideas of competition and plurality. The 
following chapters provide significant evidence that the same holds true in post-
conflict contexts. Collectively, Chapters 5,6,7 and 8 support Bratton and Van 
de Walle’s notion of institutional legacies, framing it rather as political 
continuities as it applies to the local expectations and political behaviours of 
Ivoirians in the post-conflict period. As post-independence governance in Côte 
d’Ivoire exhibited pervasive degrees of clientelistic exchanges, Ivoirians in the 
post-conflict state have come to expect a continuation. As a result, many of the 
calculations of whether to be politically engaged or not, and in what form, are 
influenced by this history.  
The calculation of opportune time to engage specifically in claims-
making behaviours is further observed to apply to groups with little knowledge 
of the conflict, but who have equally engaged in claims-making activities on the 
basis of political affinity and common ethnicity. The overview of the 11-year 
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political conflict revealed where gaps in the narratives currently lay and how 
these might open windows of opportunity for future exploitation for claims-
making. This observation is more closely analysed in Chapters 7 and 8 where 
individuals who morally supported the northern cause and have similar ethnic 
identities have engaged in claims-making under the label of ex-combatant, 
despite little convincing evidence that they participated. Such phenomena begs 
the question of whether clientelism by association is also at play. 
In the chapters that follow, the common explanation given by ex-
combatants with competing political affinities was that the opportunities and 
benefits of the post-conflict period were largely intended for those who had 
supported the victorious rebel insurgency of the FN and its chosen candidate, 
Alassane Ouattara. As such, the choice to engage in claims-making, whether 
in more passive or disruptive forms, was an opportunity reserved for the those 
with political affinities tied to the victors. Such logic suggests that because 
political support and loyalty were exhibited during the 11-year conflict, 
distributions of financial and employment benefits should be divvied up as such. 
The defeated, it was explained by both victors and defeated, would have to wait 
until their own came into power. It is from this passive acceptance that this 
thesis draws its core argument that the political engagement across groups of 
ex-combatants is mostly influenced by expectations of political continuities- that 






Chapter 5 : Gbagbo Supporters as Opposition Ex-combatants 
 
To begin an examination of the differential manner of political 
engagement activities across groups of Ivoirian ex-combatants, this chapter 
first presents the case of those with political affinities tied to the politically 
defeated in the 11-year crisis: the Gbagbo supporters. In the data presented 
below, supporters of Laurent Gbagbo do not engage in public displays of 
claims-making for individual financial incentives, nor do they leverage their 
labels of ex-combatant. Rather, they choose to engage in mainstream 
opposition politics, through institutionally-endorsed channels under the banner 
of the Gbagbo-created Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) political party. Much of the 
reluctance to advance their individual interests, this chapter demonstrates, is 
rooted in feelings of defeat. Accordingly, individuals from this group do not feel 
they have access to the same political and economic opportunities as their 
counterparts.  
This chapter further demonstrates how the Gbagbo supporters’ 
expectations of clientelistic governance have influenced their political 
engagement strategies as well as provided justification for why some are to 
benefit from post-conflict spoils and others are not. Through the interviews 
highlighted below, Gbagbo supporters provided various explanations of why 
benefits for ex-combatants, particularly those tied to financial gains, were the 
natural spoils of the victor’s: those who supported FN-backed Alassane 
Ouattara. The logic underpinning the excerpts below was simple: it was their 
time in power. Such an expectation, this thesis argues, stems from past 
practices of governance, in which successive regimes distributed state 
resources and employment opportunities in exchange for political loyalty. 
Following this logic, FN supporters, and more broadly, supporters of Ouattara, 
were being rewarded for their political loyalty during the 11-year crisis, while 
those from the Gbagbo-camps would wait for ‘their turn’ when the FPI, and in 
some cases Gbagbo himself, came back to power. In this sense, suggestions 
made by the respondents below demonstrate their long-term commitment of 
political loyalty to the central figure of Gbagbo himself and to the party.   
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In Jeremy Speight and Katrin Wittig’s recent paper on rebel 
transformations into political parties, they argue that pre-conflict political status 
quos can be challenged by the ways in which ex-combatants are integrated into 
the post-conflict political system.272 Although focusing their analysis on rebel 
and insurgent movements, the logic suggests that through peace negotiations, 
armed actors become viable political actors, occasionally displacing (and 
replacing) long-standing political parties at the negotiating table. As both the 
FN and Gbagbo supporters went were absorbed back into pre-existing political 
parties, the political status quo remained largely undisturbed. While the FN 
supporters make claims directed at government officials, Gbagbo supporters 
are internally navigating a divided party with contested leadership, all the while 
remaining loyal to the founding father, Laurent Gbagbo. They have hedged their 
bets on an eventual return to power of the FPI.   
In the sections that follow, the events of the 31st of October 2016 
Constitutional Referendum are examined as they clearly depict the constraints 
and opportunities of political engagement perceived by the Gbagbo supporters 
themselves. To begin, a brief overview of political history of the FPI, situated 
within the larger political landscape of post-independence Côte d’Ivoire will be 
presented. This section will then be followed by an examination of the 2016 
referendum, as an example of political engagement activity carried out by 
Gbabgo-supporting ex-combatants. The political engagement observed 
amongst Gbagbo supporters is broken down into two parts: that of the broad 
strategy of national opposition politics, and that of the intra-political party 
cleavages. This chapter demonstrates how expectations of clientelistic 
governance amongst Gbagbo supporters explain why they accept that their FN 
counterparts advance financially despite having the same ‘ex-combatant’ 
status, as well as how these expectations sow seeds of hope should their 
preferred candidate ever reclaim power. 
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Actor Background: Gbagbo Supporters 
 
Amongst the three groups presented in this thesis, Gbagbo supporters, 
FN supporters, and the Commando Invisibles, Gbagbo supporters have the 
longest history of organised political engagement in independent Côte d’Ivoire. 
Initial bases of political support were founded across the southwest through the 
creation of local associations, and through various politically dissident events 
targeting the PDCI under Houphouët-Boigny’s one-party state. This section 
provides an overview of the political landscape following independence, the rise 
of the FPI, and the fall of Laurent Gbagbo in April 2011.  
Since independence in 1960, Houphouët-Boigny and his PDCI political 
party held a virtual monopoly over political participation and access to public 
office. Under the one-party state, Houphouët-Boigny defined how politics were 
conducted, how political actors were recruited, and chose the political priorities 
of the state.273 Within the PDCI itself, competing visions for the party prevailed 
across the different ‘generations’ of recruits who internally vied for positions of 
influence typically awarded on the basis of seniority and availability.274 The 
Ivoirian political elite of the PDCI’s one-party state consisted mostly of those 
who were educated abroad. Building from the explanation provided in Chapter 
4 about Houphouët-Boigny’s top-down selection of elites, Jeanne Maddox 
Tougara further explains how loyalty to the party developed, much of which was 
in the hope of political integration. 
As descendants of common folk—devoid of political clout in their 
home districts and usually without financial backing—they [the 
appointed elite] tended to remain largely dependent on 
Houphouët for political rewards. In the past, they queued up, 
albeit informally, behind PDCI loyalists who could help usher 
them into fruitful careers.275  
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Not only does the quotation reveal how political dependence developed, it 
introduces Nicolas Van de Walle’s argument that political party strength and 
longevity depend, at least in part, on informal personal networks as they do to 
organisational heritage.276 The early years of the PDCI demonstrate how the 
benefits of informal personal relations whether effective or not, entered the 
psyche of Ivoirians hoping for eventual integration into the state apparatus. This 
is observed to have carried into the conflict period, with Gbagbo-supporting 
youth vying for political influence,277 and, as this thesis argues, continues into 
the post-conflict period. 
 Against a backdrop of PDCI domination, as well as mounting tensions 
between migrant and indigenous communities in the southwest, the FPI was 
formed clandestinely in 1982, as the first formal opposition party to Houphouët-
Boigny ‘s one-party state. The party was led by Laurent Gbagbo: an Ivoirian 
academic with socialist leanings from the southwest Bété ethnic group. As a 
university lecturer, Gbagbo publicly decried the one-party state. An example of 
early resistance was a speech Gbagbo had prepared on democracy and the 
merits of multi-party competition, which he was prevented from giving.278 As a 
result, the speech was circulated informally to bypass the strict policies of 
Houphouët-Boigny on political dissent. Since its creation, the FPI steadily grew 
its support-base and status as an influential opposition party, whose power 
culminated in the year 2000, when Laurent Gbagbo won the presidency, under 
‘calamitous conditions’. It was this political victory that set off the first wave of 
mass violent political mobilisation, with supporters of the outgoing transitional 
president, Robert Guéï (Transitional government), former president Henri 
Konan Bédié (PDCI party), and disqualified presidential candidate, Alassane 
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Ouattara (RDR party), taking to the streets to violently defend their political 
preferences. 
In the initial years of his reign, Gbagbo experienced two attempted coup 
d’états, the first being the Complot du Mercedes Noir, and the second the 19th 
of September 2002 attacks, both of which prompted him to bolster security 
measures in the south. In tandem, his support-base grew more vocal with an 
anti-northerner rhetoric as inter-communal tensions raised. As the territorial 
division solidified and the UN and France took measures to contain the crisis, 
the anti-rebellion/northerner rhetoric broadened to that of an anti-colonial 
stance, drawing on notions of a new liberation for Côte d’Ivoire.279 For many 
Gbagbo supporters, whether armed or unarmed, loyalty was deeper than a call 
for state security, it was also in response to the collective memory of colonial 
rule, issues of land tenure, and the deeper cause of the autonomy and self-
determination of the Ivoirian state.280 
Over the course of the crisis, militant support for Gbagbo and the FPI in 
the south increased significantly. Gbagbo drew his military strength from many 
channels, both formal and informal, both armed and unarmed. Officially, the 
state security forces, the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS), were tasked 
with upholding peace and stability within the Ivoirian territory. Within the FDS, 
alongside the national army, gendarmerie, and the police forces, was a series 
of complementary forces used during the crisis including the Brigade Anti-
Emeute (BAE), the Centre de Commandement des Opérations de Sécurité 
(CECOS), the Akouédo Battalion, and the Republican Guard. Independently, 
each faction was tasked with its own areas of jurisdiction. Taken together, they 
formed the backbone of what became known as a repressive security 
apparatus, staffed increasingly with FPI supporters and allegedly drawing on 
the support of Angolan and Liberian mercenaries within their ranks.281 
Alongside the official state forces, Gbagbo drew strength from informal forces, 
including several state paramilitary forces (militias), Auto-Defence Groups 
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(GAD), the ‘Patriotic Galaxy’, and university student organisations, in particular, 
the Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). The presence 
of these formal and informal forces varied across the southern territories 
remaining under Gbagbo’s state authorities. 
In the southwest of the country, since 2002, the regime was bolstered by 
many paramilitary movements, the most notable being in the cities of Duékoué, 
Guiglo, and Toulépleu. These areas, located in the fertile lands of the 
southwest, were plagued by episodes of inter-communal violence between 
migrant communities and those indigenous to the area. Additionally, many GAD 
groups developed in and around the southwest. Consolidated tallies, provided 
by the national authorities of DDR, cited 32 groups with over 23,000 participants 
mobilised within their ranks.282 Participation in these paramilitary groups, while 
done on a voluntary basis, was vast and ad hoc. Many of the people took up 
arms because they felt they had to protect their land and culture, and their 
participation often increased during periodic attacks from northerners and 
migrant residents.283 While some participants were militarised for a few months, 
others kept their membership and communication with their armed group alive 
for many years after violent outbreaks. Others still, joined groups long after 
violent outbreaks during relatively peaceful periods.284  
In Abidjan, the regime was bolstered by the Groupement des Patriotes 
pour la Paix (GPP), which combined militia movements under the direction of a 
handful of leaders and became a force that would eventually act as the armed 
wing of the Patriotic Galaxy.285 The Jeunes Patriotes, falling under the 
leadership of Charles Blé Goudé, was composed of three large federations 
acting under the leadership of young influential figures. Seen as the civilian 
wing of the movement, they coordinated a series of public forums, such as the 
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Parliament, Sorbonne, and Agoras,286 across the city that mobilised civilian 
protests, marches, and general pro-Gbagbo sentiments. Additional civilian 
support for the regime was bolstered though university student organisations 
such as the Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI). 
FESCI is of particular relevance, as the crisis resulted in two of its former 
leaders becoming pitted against each other: Charles Blé Goudé of the Jeunes 
Patriotes, and Guillaume Soro, spokesperson and eventual leader of the FN 
northern rebellion.287 Under the successive leadership of these individuals, 
youth relations between Gbagbo supporters and those of migrant backgrounds 
became more polarised. 
Together, the combination of the official FDS structures with informal 
armed and unarmed groups resulted in a broad range of mobilised political 
support for the regime amongst much of the country’s southern populations. In 
the name of national security, members of these groups engaged in raids on 
neighbourhoods perceived as favourable to Ouattara. They also engaged in 
looting, and violence against populations of northern descent, as well as in a 




Despite a long and nearly successful attempt to hold onto political power, 
the fate of Gbagbo supporters changed drastically on the 11th of April 2011 
when Laurent Gbagbo was captured by the FN forces. Following the crisis, the 
International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Laurent Gbagbo, his wife 
and ex-First Lady Simone Gbagbo, and the leader of the Jeunes Patriotes, 
Charles Blé Goudé. To date, both Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé are 
on trial for crimes against humanity at the ICC, while Simone Gbagbo was tried 
                                                          
286 These spaces operated as open-air forums, allowing members of the public and anyone passing by to hear the 
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citizenship, and political developments.  
287 Banégas, “Post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire,” 459-460. 
288 Banégas, “Post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire,” 463. 
289 A colloquial term used when talking about the fall of Gbagbo on April 11, 2011. 
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in Côte d’Ivoire.290 In contrast, Guillaume Soro, former head of the FN and 
adversary to Blé Goudé, was appointed to government. As a result of the 
capture, it is believed that many of the most militant supporters of the Gbagbo 
regime went into exile in Ghana or Liberia, were imprisoned, or were killed.291 
Persecution went beyond prominent political figures, with the targeting of pro-
Gbagbo communities by state authorities. Instances of arbitrary arrests, 
detention, and torture were recorded by international observers, targeting 
individuals with continued loyalties to the fallen Gbagbo regime, as well as 
against individuals thought to be of strategic importance in planning the residual 
cross-border attacks on state forces.292 The cross-border attacks were thought 
to be planned by those loyal to Gbagbo’s FPI, and, consequently, resulted in a 
series of arrests and illegal detentions of individuals perceived to be Gbagbo 
supporters.293 Government crackdowns on FPI supporters in Abidjan typically 
took place in districts that were dominated by the FPI youth that were from 
ethnic groups that traditionally supported the party: that is, those originating in 
the southwest, and inhabiting districts like Yopougon.294 The frequency of the 
targeted attacks against Gbagbo supporters have since engrained a deep-
rooted fear of persecution, compelling them to worry about their safety should 
they be seen as disturbing the peace. 
Devastated by the defeat and the imprisonment of their leader, the FPI 
political party also underwent an internal leadership dispute, resulting in two 
camps:295 the official state-recognised FPI political party lead by Pascal Affi 
N’Guessan, former Prime Minister under Gbagbo, and the more hard-line 
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loyalists lead by Aboudramane Sangaré, former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
under Gbagbo. The distinguishing feature between the two is the decision to 
participate in Ivoirian political life or to reject it and abstain entirely with much of 
their actions hinging on the return of Laurent Gbagbo from the ICC. Simply 
stated, the Affi camp believes that it is important to participate in political life by 
negotiating with state authorities, as they prioritise the life and sustainability of 
the party regardless of whether Gbagbo is found guilty.296 Conversely, the 
Sangaré camp largely sees Affi’s strategy as a back-handed way to turn the 
page of Gbagbo and the legitimise the Ouattara regime, and have, therefore, 
chosen to prioritise a withdrawal from political life until they see the return of 
their leader.297 Although each camp is headed by a different leader with a 
slightly different vision of the FPI, both are unified under their loyalty to a central 
figure: Laurent Gbagbo. As such, the cleavages can be seen internally as a 
fight within a single family, rather than two different political ideologies. 
 
Post-Conflict Political Engagement: Opposition Politics 
 
While participation in civic life is generally taken as a positive sign of 
democratic governance, that of the Gbagbo’s supporters is somewhat 
constrained. Engagement in political parties is not only a way of voicing their 
political preferences but is also perceived to be one of the few options available. 
During interviews for this thesis, respondents across political affinities 
overwhelmingly stated that Gbagbo supporters did not have the opportunity to 
engage in claims-making or to leverage their status as ‘ex-combatants’ to gain 
employment or pay-outs. During an interview at the headquarters for the 
Nouvelle Alliance de la Côte d’Ivoire pour la Patrie opposition party,298 the youth 
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leader explained the reluctance of Gbagbo supporters to attempt to gain 
employment in the armed forces or as public servants. The explanation gives 
insights into how the distribution of posts is expected to be carried out, placing 
emphasis on whether an individual is from the same ‘clan’299 or not.  
We [Gbagbo supporters] do not make claim to posts, we do not 
concern ourselves with trying to get into the public service, 
because we know that even if we tried, they would not give it to 
us. Even with the exams. If you get one, they will just jump over 
you. If you are not from their clan, it is sure that nothing will be 
given to you. So we prepare ourselves psychologically. 
Psychologically, we are prepared for many things, because we 
know that we cannot count on them for anything. We don’t cause 
them any trouble with this.300 
Similarly emphasizing the importance of political affiliation and ‘clan’ 
membership, in a different interview, a former member of the FDS who served 
under Gbagbo explained why they were unable to leverage their ex-combatant 
status to make claims. 
We, we are in a position of weakness, we-the ones that they call 
Pro-Gbagbo. Because we lost the war. So today, [FN supporters] 
are putting pressure. Because it is them that can make claims 
because it is their ‘camp’ in power. So, it’s them that can put on 
pressure.301 
The above statements shed light on a theme that was repeated frequently with 
respondents from the Gbagbo supporters group: they could not advance their 
claims because of either real or perceived obstacles in the post-conflict period. 
When probing deeper into the constraints that they identified, deterrents for 
claims-making were rooted in perceptions of an unfair political context that 
favoured those who pledged loyalty to the post-conflict regime. The above 
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quotations, echoed across interviews with Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants 
from diverse backgrounds, including formal state forces, militia groups, and 
militant political supporters, reflected how pervasive these ideas were. In a 
context perceived to be one-sided and where the memories of persecution are 
fresh, the political party becomes the most suitable vehicle to advance political 
interests all the while remaining relatively anonymous.  
 
National Opposition Politics 
 
For those with little opportunity to stake claims, but who wished to remain 
politically active, engagement with the national opposition political party, the 
FPI, was the preferred option. In a democratic context, political parties exist to 
aggregate and represent individual interests. If individual grievances are shared 
by many, political parties are an effective means to communicate these 
grievances, as well as demands for change, upwards to the national 
legislatures.302 Opposition parties, more specifically, have the capability to keep 
ruling regimes accountable to its citizens, as well as provide political choice and 
alternatives to the people.303 Dissident political activities, however, may put 
individuals at risk of negative repercussions on either their livelihoods or their 
safety.304 In a context in which one believes in the prominence clientelistic 
political practices, political parties allow for a simpler form of political 
engagement that not only allows to the vocalisation of political dissent, but also 
demonstrates commitment to the central figure of the political party. In the case 
of the FPI, this central figure is Laurent Gbagbo. Within the boundaries of 
national opposition politics, ex-combatants, via the FPI political party, engaged 
with the state within negotiated and state-endorsed limits.  
The choice of national opposition politics demonstrates continuities 
within the traditional support base of the FPI. As practiced in post-
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independence periods during the reign of Houphouët-Boigny, early resistance 
was organised and largely representative of southern populations through the 
FPI political party. Over the course of 12 months of fieldwork in Côte d’Ivoire, 
the political engagement activities were exclusively carried out under the 
banner of the FPI party. At no point were any public demonstrations seen where 
Gbagbo supporters leveraged the label of ex-combatant, nor were there any 
demands for integration into the state security forces. What was observed 
amongst the Gbagbo supporters, however, were two levels of coordinated 
political engagement: that of opposition politics at the national level, and that of 
intra-party loyalties and cleavages. At the national level, Gbagbo supporters 
operated on a group basis through the party, with a high degree of compliance 
to the leaders of each political camp. The same held true at the party level, 
albeit to different leaders. Both levels of engagement demonstrate the 
importance that Ivoirians from this group place on relationships of loyalty and 
the beneficial transactions that could occur in a favourable climate. This finding 
is somewhat surprising given the widespread nature of leveraging wartime 
labels and experiences utilised by FN-affiliated ex-combatants. Moreover, it 
further reinforces the underlying argument of this thesis that ‘ex-combatants’ 
are far from a homogenous group, and whose conduct in the post-conflict 
period is determined largely by forces impacting clientelism: political affiliation 
and proximity. 
For both the Affi and Sangaré camps, calls for political engagement were 
delivered in a top-down manner, with the leader of each camp declaring what 
the course of action would be. Most important to this thesis are the observations 
that political engagement by the Gbagbo supporting group rarely deviated from 
the central command, and consistently refrained from ad hoc individual or 
collective efforts to make claims. The strong degrees of unity under the orders 
each camp’s respective leaders, rather than disjointed actions, reveal that even 
amongst the defeated, systems of loyalty to central patrons remain intact. As 
directly put by a Gbagbo-supporter who worked in the national DDR 
programme, the FPI party had once again become the face of opposition in the 
post-conflict period, its membership comprising of both ex-combatants and 
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general supporters. In the quotation below, the order was to abstain from the 
vote for the proposed constitutional amendments, discussed below. 
There are many youths that see themselves reflected in the 
party. It’s a party where, like all parties, you have to follow the 
orders. These youths abstain from voting because they are 
following the orders that were imposed on them by the 
leadership.305 
Contrary to the case of the FN supporters who largely act independently and 
self-organise to engage in claims-making, Gbagbo supporters have been 
observed to respect a strong central command, answering to its calls for action 
and inaction. Further elaboration on the methods of political engagement 
orchestrated in a top-down manner through the FPI political party is 
demonstrated through the example of the Constitutional Amendments of 2016. 
  
Constitutional Amendment and the Third Republic 
 
On the 30th of October 2016, Ivoirians went to the polls in a national 
referendum to change the Constitution. The most controversial changes put 
forth were developed by a small committee hand-selected by the President and 
included the following: the creation of a Vice-President and Senate, to which 
one third of representatives are to be appointed by the President; removal of 
the age limit of the President; and removal of controversial Article 35 of 
citizenship that sparked the 11-year crisis.306 Additionally, the changes allowed 
for future constitutional amendments to be obtained by a two thirds approval 
from the National Assembly and new Senate, a provision that the opposition 
said facilitated future changes that the President or his state authorities wishes 
to make.307 Especially controversial was the exceptionally short time period to 
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campaign, with the post-conflict regime releasing the document to the public 
only seven days before the vote. This decision, consequently, left only a seven-
day window for political parties to explain the document to their constituents. 
With only a week before the public went to the polls, the decision to revise the 
Constitution was seen as curtailing the ability of the opposition, civil society 
groups, and the public to review the proposed changes to the Constitution. In 
response to the criticisms of the opposition, the state authorities argued that the 
amendments were necessary for national peace and reconciliation, with a 




The ruling party’s campaign in support of referendum dominated the 
public space for many weeks leading into the vote. Across the capital city, large 
billboards displayed images of amicable relations across ethnicities, of young 
professionals, and of traditional leaders embracing. Slogans underneath a 
prominent “Yes” linked support for the referendum with improved social 
cohesion, modernity, peace, stability, and economic development. In stark 
contrast, public space allotted to the “No” campaign was little in comparison, 
with a monopoly of political advertising seemingly reserved for the state 
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October 2016. Source, author’s own. 
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authorities. When asked about their lack of public advertising, representatives 
from the FPI appeared frustrated, directing attention to the dominance of one 
political affinity over the other. 
While the proposed content of the constitutional changes raised 
concerns, most criticisms focused on the rushed timeline. As a result, questions 
arose surrounding the legitimacy of the revised Constitution and the ability of 
Ivoirians to understand what they were voting for. Billboards such as the ones 
pictured above, were criticised for appealing to emotional themes and glossing 
over legal substance. The allegiances of the committee selected by the 
President to draft the Constitution was a further point of criticism, thus calling 
into question the representativeness of the proposed changes.308 Additional 
concerns surrounded the state’s attempts to control demonstrations during the 
campaign period, with security forces dispersing protesting crowds and 
detaining a handful of opposition leaders. Actions taken by the regime to curtail 
the opposition were drastic enough that Human Rights Watch drew attention to 
the lack of access to state media. In their publication on the matter, they 
described the brief suspension of two opposition-leaning local newspapers to 
have undermined open competition and to have limited the opposition’s ability 
to explain their positions to the public.309 
Leading the way amongst the opponents to the proposed constitutional 
amendments was the FPI, which were divided between the Affi and Sangaré 
camps and their supporters. Although both camps were unified in the broad 
strategy to boycott the vote, their respective public demonstrations differed in 
terms of acceptance of the limits imposed be the regime. The following section 
provides an overview of the unified national response, followed by an 
examination of the internal intra-party cleavages that affect the political 
engagement choices of their respective support bases. 
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Boycotting as a National Opposition Strategy 
 
Regardless of whether they supported Affi or Sangaré, the choice of 
boycotting the vote was unified. Engagement such as boycott loosely falls 
within the literature on civil resistance, that is, a form of collective political 
engagement that eschews violence in favour of non-violent tactics.310 A basic 
tenant of civil resistance is its emphasis on a pluralistic idea of power, making 
those who rule ultimately dependent on the support that comes from below.311 
The FPI’s choice of boycott sought to challenge the legitimacy of the regime’s 
proposed amendments. Researchers of civil resistance argue that activities 
such as boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, and protests have rarely been systematically 
repressed, even by authoritarian regimes, and remain an effective way of 
demonstrating resistance.312 Much of its success is owed to the appeal of non-
violent activities to a broader set of society and its ability to attract moderate 
observers.313 
While Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants spoke of the strategic 
significance of the boycott and of the security risks associated with the vote, 
there was still a common bottom-line. This relied on a shared belief that 
Ouattara had made a Constitution according to the desires of his entourage, 
his political party, and ultimately his northern-dominated support base. 
Although the supporters of Ouattara and Gbagbo experienced the same crisis, 
the windows of opportunity are only open to a few and the revisions within the 
Constitution are perceived to be a testament to that. The comments of FPI 
leader Affi N’Guessan on the constitutional amendments in a news article are 
telling. 
As somebody once said, why be satisfied to participate in the 
dessert when you were excluded from the appetizer and the 
main dish. […] Ouattara operates with Côte d’Ivoire as an owner 
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vis-à-vis a personal patrimony. What he proposes is less than a 
Constitution, it is his will to organise the devolution of his 
patrimony to his successors so that this  
heritage remains in the family.314 
 
For the FPI and its support base, boycotting elections is hardly a new strategy. 
In 1995, the FPI allied with Ouattara’s RDR party to boycott the elections held 
by then president Henri Konan Bédié over allegations of rigged elections. More 
recently, during the legislative elections of 2012, approximately one year after 
the highly contested and violent presidential elections between Ouattara and 
Gbagbo, the FPI, opted to boycott once more.315 The momentum of boycotting 
was then carried through to the 2015 presidential elections, where voter turnout 
was officially cited at 52.86%.316 However, multiple national and international 
observers suspect that this number was inflated. As one representative of the 
diplomatic community put it during an informal discussion, Côte d’Ivoire had not 
seen real elections since 2010.317 When considered together with widespread 
feelings of political exclusion, a history of armed resistance, and a plethora of 
disenchanted members, one wonders why boycott was a desirable strategy at 
all, as opposed to more active and aggressive forms of political opposition. 
The boycott to be held over the 30th October referendum was not 
necessarily uniform in meaning for those who engaged in it. For some, it was a 
sombre acceptance of a pre-determined outcome, while for others it was tied 
to a political strategy that signalled a loss of trust. For others still, the boycott 
was a safe response to potential state-led persecution and insecurity. 
Commenting on the rationale behind the boycott, one observer with familial ties 
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to those that support the Sangaré camp explained that for some, such elections 
were pre-determined, thus stripping the people of any real participation.  
It is the Sangaré’s who are abstaining from the vote, because 
they do not consider it to be legitimate or transparent. For them, 
the vote is, the elections are, known in advance, are rigged in 
advance. There is no transparency. Or the CEI [Ivoirian Electoral 
Commission] is already corrupted. These are all the reasons why 
they are launching this boycott.318 
Commenting on the strategic significance of the boycott, the youth leader from 
the NACIP party mentioned above described the loss of trust that such a 
boycott signalled to the authorities. The following excerpt from the interview 
reveals the allure of the boycott and the strategic significance it is expected to 
carry. 
 When you stay home, it’s a little blow. It’s a weight. It weakens 
them significantly. Because you are not even in agreement with 
those that say “No”. Same with those that say “Yes”. We are 
many! The minority of people who will go and share the “Yes/No”, 
they represent almost nothing! [Gives example of 20 people, 15 
abstain and only 5 go. 4 say no.] It’s not the 4 that we will look 
at, it’s the 15 that are saying they don’t want any of it. It means 
that they are not even in agreement with either camp.” [I 
intercede and explain notion of strategic vote]. “Here, we don’t 
see it like that. We refuse and we don’t move. It’s a heavy weight 
as well. Because they know that they are no longer liked, they 
are no longer in the hearts of the people. They will inflate the 
numbers [of participation], but they know deep down that they 
stole it.319  
In this sense, boycott carried a sort of moral weight. The regime would be 
shown that they no longer have the support of the masses, thus making their 
actions, and any future actions dependent on this decision, a unilateral 
imposition. The term ‘social distance’, implying the degree of intimacy or 
remoteness between different social groups of people, is worth introducing 
here. As applied in the Civil Resistance literature, social distance is a variable 
that influences the desired impact of an action. The shorter the distance, the 
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more impact the action will have. The moral undertones of this last statement 
reveal an advantage over the regime, that might, if a short social distance 
existed,320 destabilise the plans and injure the credibility of future actions.321 
That Ouattara’s drafters displayed indifference to the pleas of the FPI, however, 
suggests that the regime was not affected by the moral implications of the 
boycott.  
For others still, the choice of boycott was in response to the recent 
arrests and aggressive treatment of opposition leaders Sangaré and Mamadou 
Koulibaly. One hard-line322 youth participating in this research justified the 
boycott in the following way: 
You saw how they aggressively handled the leadership of the 
opposition? They—they want to participate politically, but they 
don’t want the opposition to participate politically. What type of 
democracy are we in? We see in the world, that each party can 
do their own campaigns. You need convincing arguments to tell 
the population to vote Yes or No. Do you see how it was poorly 
handled?323 
Elaborating further, the same youth added comments on the hesitance of 
Gbagbo supporters to engage in more vocal political behaviours beyond the 
FPI party. 
There is always caution. The fear is always there. They 
aggressively broke up those youth [groups] for simply voicing 
their discontent with the Constitution. They flattened them. They 
broke them down. They yelled at them, and then they 
aggressively handled the leaders of the opposition. The 
treatment of Mamadou Koulibaly? As if he was a delinquent. So 
the youth, what will they make claims for? Who will they lay 
claims to?324 
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Despite the caution and fear explained above, there is still a clear political will 
to participate in the broader political system as it is. Boycotting then, is still a 
strategy within an established political system. This strategic acceptance of the 
political status quo demonstrates a certain respect for the state institutions and 
processes. Rather than reject and overthrow the system in its entirety, 
importance is placed on an eventual change of regime. This is an important 
finding as it demonstrates that even amongst groups of ex-combatants with 
significant reason for collective grievances, there is not an automatic response 
of using violence to enforce their desired outcomes. As aptly stated by the youth 
leader of NACIP, the opposition simply desires a change of regime, rather than 
an overhaul of the whole political system. 
The concerns of the youth of FPI today are that the power 
changes. The challenge is not to find a way to insert yourself into 
their system, but to have the system change. Because the way 
that the power came, the youth are hesitant to collaborate with 
them.325  
It is not the political norms that are under scrutiny by the Gbagbo supporters, 
rather it is leadership, the regime, and the way that they came to power. 
Boycotting the vote, is then, an expression of dissent against the rulers, rather 
than against the system.  
Although boycott was the broad strategy of the FPI, an understanding of 
the cleavages within the party is necessary to uncover the different levels of 
political engagement. 
 
Intra-Party Cleavages and Opposition 
 
Within the FPI camps, there are both unifying and dividing perspectives. 
For both camps, the ultimate criticism of the Constitution was that it deviated 
from ‘the people’, and was perceived as a document made by, and for, the 
current ruling state authorities.326 Despite both choosing a march as part of their 
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public demonstration against the Constitution, there was a divergence in 
approach, with one respecting the constraints imposed by the regime and the 
other disregarding them. For Affi and his FPI political party, the eventual course 
of action was a march and a call for supporters to abstain from the vote. 
Similarly, the Sangaré camp staged a march and called on his supporters to 
abstain. The crucial difference, however, is that while the Affi group acted in 
accordance with state-imposed constraints, the Sangaré camp acted on its own 
volition, resulting in aggressive suppression from state security forces. 
Although their internal cleavages will be discussed in the intra-party section, the 
semblance in their response to the state authorities’ proposal reflects the larger 
national-level opposition political strategy. 
 
State-Authorised Response: Affi’s Compliance 
 
To express their discontent, the Affi camp of the FPI responded in a way 
that respected both the desire of the regime and its institutions. As described 
by two different individuals on separate occasions, one of whom was the Youth 
Leader of the FPI Affi camp and the other of whom coordinated the party’s 
security, the following course of action was developed. Initially, a sit-in was 
planned for the 5th of October 2016 and was to be held at the National Assembly 
on the day that the Constitution was to be presented internally to elected 
representatives. The sit-in was in response to the FPI’s sentiment that their 
concerns were not being heard nor addressed. Upon running this proposal past 
the regime, however, it was rejected. The regime formally prohibited the sit-in, 
both directly to the party and with an official communiqué de presse.327 The 
latter explained that since the administration had not received written 
notification of the event, the Prefecture of Abidjan did not authorise it. The 
document also reminded the public that demonstrations in public domain 
required authorisation. Such an event, it stated, would bring public disorder. 
Elaborating further, both respondents from within Affi’s camp of the FPI, 
                                                          




described the reason presented to Affi. Allegedly, the state authorities were 
concerned that the sit-in could trigger violent confrontations, adding to a 
situation that was already precarious due to an internal political dispute 
between president Ouattara and the Speaker of the House, and former rebel 
leader, Guillaume Soro.328 It was determined that, in light of the regime’s 
internal disputes, it was too big of a risk to allow FPI grievances in such close 
proximity. The state did, however, grant Affi’s FPI permission to stage a march, 
far away from the national assembly. One of the respondents, serving in the 
security unit for Affi’s FPI, described his attendance in two meetings with the 
national authorities to set the terms of the march. Over these two meetings, 
they met with the Prefet of the region, and set the times, dates, and venues. 
Although the FPI preferred Wednesday, the 5th of October to coincide with the 
release of the proposed Constitution to the National Assembly, the authorities 
urged them to choose Sunday. They complied.329  For the locations of the 
march, Affi’s camp proposed the itinerary, and ended up marching initially from 
the community of Adjamé towards the central district and government centre of 
Plateau. The regime then intervened once again, and told them to go towards 
Agban, in the direction of a military camp.330 Finally, in agreement with the 
regime, the march took place on the 8th of October 2016, in the Place des 
Martyrs area of downtown Abidjan.331  
In the end, Affi’s camp of the FPI altered its original plans in accordance 
with directives from the regime. Although originally intended to be a 
demonstration against state actions, on their own terms in a more contentious 
way and in a more contentious local (in front of the national assembly), the 
political party carried out a peaceful demonstration following state orders. When 
inquiring why Affi’s FPI willingly altered its course of action in compliance with 
the conditions placed, the respondent from the FPI party explained the following 
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logic. As a strategy, the FPI did not resist the demands of the state. Internally, 
it was understood that if they resisted and marched on the days they wanted in 
the direction they wanted, there would be a risk that the state forces would 
resort to aggressive suppression, possibly injuring some of the reluctant 
participants who were already wary of the potential repercussions their 
opposition might evoke. According to the leader of the FPI Youth wing, this 
anticipated aggression would ultimately hamper the growing movement of vocal 
discontent, placing participants in high-risk environments that could result in 
their refusal to mobilise in the future. The strategy, then, was to march 
peacefully, gradually ridding the participants of fear and the sense of 
oppression from the regime.332 
 
Non-Authorised Response: Sangaré’s Defiance 
 
Although similarly opposing the proposed Constitution, the Sangaré 
camp deviated from Affi’s strategy by determining the terms of their march 
independent from state authorisation. Allegedly, the Sangaré camp was 
authorised to hold their demonstration within the confines of the national football 
stadium, located in the central district of Plateau, not too far from the National 
Assembly.333 Appearing in a local newspaper, however, the spokesperson for 
the Sangaré camp declared that their choice of political engagement would only 
be made through a discussion with its supporters,334 diverging greatly from 
Affi’s strategy of negotiating the terms of political engagement with the regime. 
The march would be carried out on the streets of downtown Abidjan, within the 
public eye. Sangaré called on his supporters to participate in a march, entitled 
“the march of dignity and rediscovered honour of the Ivoirian people” on the 
20th of October.335 Instead of staying within the stadium, the march started at 
                                                          
332 Leader of FPI Youth, interview. 
333 Leader of FPI Youth, interview. 
334 David Gone, “Côte d’Ivoire / Nouvelle Constitution: Abou Drahamane Sangaré donne la position du FPI vrai,” 
October 3, 2016, http://www.afrique-sur7.fr/30498/cote-divoire-nouvelle-constitution-abou-drahamane-sangare-
donne-la-position-du-fpi-vrai/. 
335 Translation from ‘la Marche de la dignité et de l’honneur retrouvés du Peuple ivoirien’. 
124 
 
the large intersection Indenié Adjamé and moved in the direction of the Place 
de la République/Presidential Palace in downtown Plateau. This difference in 
approach is important to understanding the nuances in the FPI. It shows that 
despite following the same broad act of political resistance that Affi’s followers 
engaged in, there is also internal posturing and competition amongst the two 
factions, and a public attempt to distinguish themselves from one another to 
bolster their support base. 
On the 20th of October 2016, Sangaré and his political allies, collectively 
and temporarily known as the Front de Refus, led their supporters to the streets 
to oppose the new constitution. Shortly after, however, police arrived to 
disperse the crowds as the event had not been authorised. To quell the 
demonstration, police used a combination of crowd control tactics together with 
the arrests of influential personalities within the march.336 Aboudramane 
Sangaré was amongst the first to led into a police vehicle, followed shortly 
thereafter by Danièle Boni Claverie, the ex-President of the political party 
l’Union pour la Démocratie et la République (UDR), and Konan Kouadio 
Simeon, the former presidential candidate in 2015. Following the arrests of the 
leaders, police fired tear gas on the remaining demonstrators, which broke up 
the march within a one-hour period.337 
Following the events of the 20th of October, the Minister of the Interior, 
explained to local and international journalists that the government responded 
as they did to the demonstration by the Front de Refus because it was 
prohibited. The protestors had not obtained the proper authorisation from the 
government. Negotiations with the Prefect, which were similarly held with Affi’s 
FPI, did not result in an agreement over the route that the demonstrators were 
to take.338 On the 22nd of October 2016, Sangaré and other prominent leaders 
of the march, organised a press conference to denounce the behaviour of the 
police and to call its supporters for a new demonstration. Upon explaining the 
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situation, the leaders called for a “giga meeting” in the FPI bastion, Yopougon. 
On the 30th of October, the day of the vote, images spread on social media of 
a handful of individuals from the town of Gagnoa vandalising voting booths and 
tearing voting cards.339 As alleged by members of the Affi camp, these small 
acts of individual vandalism were discreetly encouraged by Sangaré through 
informal channels.340 
Not adhering to state conditions had consequences for the political 
opposition beyond the Sangaré camp. The leader of another opposition political 
party, Liberté et démocratie pour la République (LIDER), led by the former 
President of the National Assembly under Gbagbo, Mamadou Koulibaly, was 
also arrested on the morning of 5th of October 2017 at the National Assembly. 
Koulibaly and his party had decided that they too would participate in the sit-in 
planned by Affi’s FPI, originally scheduled to coincide with the release of the 
new constitution to the National Assembly. When Affi’s FPI changed course, 
Koulibaly maintained the original plan, insisting that everybody had the right to 
welcome the President as he opened a new session.341 Although Koulibaly 
initially resisted his removal, the responding security officer called for back-up, 





The political approach of the FPI, and more broadly that of the Gbabgo 
supporters, is arguably rooted in a general perception of ‘victor’s justice’ and an 
expectation of clientelistic political practices. Often linking their disadvantaged 
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political position to the way that the post-electoral crisis unfolded, Gbagbo 
supporters overwhelmingly voiced sentiments that implied a degree of 
acceptance, albeit reluctant and begrudging, of the current situation. This 
section looks briefly into the frequently cited examples of victor’s justice, both 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) trial and the integration of Gbagbo 
supporters into the military and the public sector. These two observations were 
the most cited during the fieldwork by the respondents themselves. The section 
then links these perceptions to expectations of clientelistic practices of post-
conflict governance. 
In 2015, Laurent Gbagbo, the first head of state to be tried at the ICC, 
was tried for four counts of crimes against humanity for the violence resulting 
from the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis. Alongside his trial is that of his former 
youth minister Charles Blé Goudé. Much controversy surrounds the strategy of 
the ICC to try Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, in what the Office of the Prosecutor has 
defended as a “sequenced approach”. With this approach, the ICC would first 
focus on the alleged crimes of the pro-Gbagbo camp, and later those of the pro-
Ouattara camp.343 Defending the approach as legally impartial, the decision to 
begin the trials with only one side has been criticised by Gbagbo supporters, 
national and international human rights organisations, and representatives of 
the UN.344 Such criticisms highlight the risks of being locally seen as promoting 
asymmetrical justice, of reinforcing the national authorities, and of hampering 
national reconciliation between the two opposing sides.345  
Gbagbo supporters have reasonable grounds to perceive such bias. For 
one, as of March 2015, the BBC reported that over 75 Gbagbo supporters “had 
been tried domestically for crimes against state security”.346 By the time the 
former First Lady, Simone Gbagbo was called to trial in Abidjan, 82 loyalists 
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from Gbagbo’s regime were tried and received sentences ranging between 18 
months to 22 years.347 Although judicial summons were eventually issued for 
several former ComZones, to date they remain free, guaranteed to never be 
tried at the ICC,348 and have even received lucrative promotions after the 
mutinies of January and May 2017.349  
Second, although the frequency of attacks against Gbagbo supporters 
has been reduced in the past few years, the fear of persecution remains a 
significant deterrent for these individuals. This fear is heightened amongst 
those who have already identified themselves as ex-combatants. In the case of 
Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants, the label of ‘ex-combatant’ has more risk 
than it does reward. In a context of seemingly one-sided persecution, incentives 
to remain silent and to keep a low profile are heightened. The fear felt by 
Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants was captured by this research following the 
Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI) mutinies of January 2017.  
In late-December 2016, the gatekeeper for the Gbagbo-supporting ex-
combatants mentioned that for a temporary period, a small group of former FDS 
fighters had attempted to form an association. The primary characteristic of this 
association was that it was for ‘ex-combatants’. The individuals forming the 
association, as recounted by the gatekeeper, had been recruited into Gbagbo’s 
FDS in the final phases of the post-electoral crisis to bolster the number of 
soldiers on the ground. Upon the fall of Gbagbo and the transfer of political 
power to Ouattara, these individuals had lost their places in the army as it 
attempted to absorb the fighters of the north as the consolidated Forces 
Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), now called FACI. Conveniently, the 
gatekeeper possessed a list of names and contact details which were obtained 
through previous outreach programmes that he partially led. Originally having 
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waited until after Christmas and the New Year to organise a discussion session 
and to contact the listed ex-combatants, the plan was derailed by the first 
mutiny of January 2017 (see Chapter 6). To meet the members of the former 
association, multiple phone calls were made to set-up private one-on-one or 
group discussions at the liberty of the respondents. The calls were initially made 
a few days after the end of the mutiny, followed by a second wave a few weeks 
later. The gatekeeper was well known for his political affinities to Gbagbo’s FPI 
and would first ask respondents to verify their identity, to which most responded 
that it was indeed them. Upon hearing that they were being approached to 
discuss their association, however, they either denied that they were the 
individual sought, said it was the wrong number, or simply hung up. Questioning 
why this had happened, the gatekeeper explained that following the mutiny, 
there were a series of arrests made. According to him, those on the pro-Gbagbo 
side most likely feared that people were launching investigations and looking 
for a way to lay blame on somebody for the disruptions caused by the mutiny. 
The gatekeeper explained that this would help the regime signal its control to 
the local population and would further allow them to reduce the number of their 
adversaries.350 The gatekeeper explained that this was normal behaviour 
following contentious events with ex-combatants and that these groups likely 
thought that the authorities were looking for people to put in prison. Moreover, 
the gatekeeper explained that even amongst those on the list, many would have 
deliberately cut contact with their peers to quell any suspicions of organised 
rebellion against the Ouattara regime.351  
The above-mentioned examples brought up by Gbagbo supporters 
demonstrate how the ICC process and contentious political events have planted 
perceptions of lopsided justice and unwarranted persecution in the post-conflict 
period. These examples, despite not making direct reference to their individual 
wartime experiences, provide a partial explanation of why Gbagbo-supporting 
ex-combatants see less utility in leveraging their labels of ex-combatant. It is, 
however, important to note that just because Gbagbo supporters have refrained 
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from using the ‘ex-combatant’ label in a public claims-making way, it does not 
mean that they have divorced themselves of it entirely. As one respondent who 
worked in the national DDR programme and who had Gbagbo-loyalties 
explained, ex-combatant status was not abandoned indefinitely. 
The feeling of being ex-GAD [Auto Defence Group], of having 
participated, for the moment is placed to the side. For now, we 
say ‘bon, everything is calm, we are here in our corner.’ But some 
are waiting for a little spark/match, to unearth a bunch of things, 
but for the moment, each and every one is seated and trying to 
follow the different orders put forth by the different [political party] 
leaders.352  
In the above quotation, the label of ‘ex-combatant’ has been temporarily 
shelved. It reaffirms that the label is not seen as strategically important in the 
current political context, and yet, that it has not been discarded of entirely. The 
label has a political function. It is an internal claim to their political patrons, and 
not one to the larger society or to Ouattara regime. While the political context 
was generally deemed inopportune for Gbagbo supporters, there was a strong 
consensus amongst the respondents that it was very conducive for claims-
making for their FN-counterparts. The post-conflict context had a number of 
opportunities available to ex-combatants to earn a modest payment, develop a 
new set of skills, and be funded for a small revenue-generating project.  
The second frequently cited example of victor’s justice, while not entirely 
justice-related, is in relation to the integration opportunities available in post-
conflict states: the security sector and public service. To obtain stable 
employment is typically seen as one of the possible spoils of war. Recalling that 
the FDS were the official state forces under Gbagbo’s rule, this research first 
sought to establish whether Gbagbo’s loyalist soldiers were retained beyond 
his defeat. A previous official work-related visit, undertaken by the author, to 
the 3rd Battalion in Bouaké in 2015, revealed that tensions existed within the 
ranks of the top commanding officers of the base. When inquiring further into 
the hostile attitude of some, colleagues from the national armed forces, the 
unified FACI, explained that many commanders that held top positions during 
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the Gbagbo regime were now under the command of their former adversaries, 
the recently integrated FN. Not only were their weapons taken away, but so too 
was the sense of pride that would have accompanied an officer of senior 
rank.353 Citing this event during the interviews for this research elicited several 
answers the same scenario—officers who once held significant power were 
now subjected to the command of their adversaries. On this subject, one former 
FDS officer confirmed the situation described above.  
Yes, yes, yes. They are still in it. The FDS are still there. But 
today, they do not have a voice, they do not have the right to 
have a voice. They do not even have the right to bear arms. They 
don’t even have their own opinion to voice. They submit. They 
submit, they watch, they let it go, it’s like that.354  
For the FDS who remained beyond the crisis within the new national army, the 
Forces Républicaines Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI, became the FACI in 2016), stories 
arose over poor and degrading treatment from the new, FAFN-dominated 
leadership,355 stripping the former soldiers of the right to hold weapons and 
removing them from top commanding posts.356 In addition, it was lamented that 
the lingua franca of the army was no longer French, as many of the newly 
integrated did not have a solid grasp of the language. The inability of the 
soldiers to interact with a common language was described as further 
exacerbating annoyance amongst those FDS with long-standing careers in the 
armed forces.357 
The sentiment of northern domination in the post-conflict period also 
extended to employment in the public service. Although this topic was never 
brought up in the interviews, respondents sometimes felt it was necessary to 
extend their observations beyond the military. Numerous Gbagbo supporters, 
including those who obtained employment in the post-conflict recovery sector, 
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described that many of Gbagbo’s supporters lost their jobs once he lost power. 
Some respondents attributed this loss of employment to simple reprisal, based 
largely on the ethnic provenance of their names.358 Upon explaining the shift of 
demographics within state institutions, one young Gbagbo-supporter concluded 
the interview by saying, “It’s too bad for this country of ours. This country that 
belongs to Ivoirians but is today rule by foreigners.”359 Whether or not the 
statement is dramatised, conclusive remarks such as this were frequently used 
across discussions with respondents from the Gbagbo supporters group. 
 
Expecting Political Continuities 
 
For many Gbagbo supporters, the crisis is not over, it has merely taken 
on a different form. Political power imbalances and the associated suppression 
of dissent has historical roots dating back to the colonial rule of the French. The 
same southwestern populations that opposed the French eventually formed the 
support base of the FPI during the post-colonial period. Amongst the most 
prominent groups to resist Houphouët-Boigny’s policies were the Bété ethnic 
group, known for uprisings such as Kragbé Gnagbé’s October 26th, 1970 
declaration of the Independent State of Eburnie. Holding high prominence 
amongst the most recounted stories of the Bété, the attempted secession of 
Kragbé Gnagbé was violently suppressed, resulting in the group limiting its 
future willingness to vocalise dissent.360 Constraints around political opposition 
were similarly present during the Bédié years (1993-1999), as was evident 
through the curtailing of the freedom of the press (opposition-learning 
newspaper La Voie) all the way to Guéï’s one-year junta. Both Bédié and Guéï 
were known for actively silencing political opponents through allegations of 
criminal behaviour. The curtailing of political opposition was similarly used as a 
tactic during Gbagbo’s rule, with the justification of identifying and rooting out 
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possible FN infiltrators and influential FN supporters. Therefore, as all political 
parties that have come to power have used these tactics, it is reasonable to 
conclude that suppression of expression and dissent were more, and continue 
to be, a matter of political allegiance and ethnic belonging.361  
Beyond the history of political dissent and suppression, the expectation 
of clientelistic practices helps explain the passive stance of the Gbagbo 
supporters in light of the unfair treatment they perceive. In this sense, the 
incentives attached to ex-combatant status, including financial benefits and 
other revenue-generating opportunities, such as small projects and systematic 
integration into the security and public state sectors, were the natural spoils of 
the victors, as it was during their time in power. Such an expectation, this thesis 
argues, stems from past practices of governance, in which successive regimes 
employed practices of clientelism to consolidate their support bases and to co-
opt their rivals. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, salaried positions within both the 
security and public sector were used as goods of redistribution, according to 
the preferences of the regime of the day. The Gbagbo supporters’ reluctant 
acceptance of the distribution of post-conflict ‘spoils’ to their counterparts, 
suggests the continuation of, and even compliance with, this practice. More 
interestingly, it signals that should the tables turn, that this same group might 
find it justifiable to once again redistribute these goods for their gain. 
The above sections outline the general sentiments of defeat, with an 
overview of the examples most frequently cited during discussions with Gbagbo 
supporters. Feelings of defeat alone, however, are insufficient in predicting 
what a common political action or response would be. Building from the 
examples above, this section demonstrates how individuals’ expectations of 
clientelistic exchanges, as interest-maximising exchanges for resources and 
political support, are what ultimately influence their choice of political 
engagement.  
One of the essential features of clientelism is the asymmetric relationship 
between the parties. One party holding higher socio-political status than the 
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other, or ‘having friends in high places’, allows for a series of interactions over 
time, where trust and commitment become foundational.362 One respondent 
placed emphasis on the importance of having one’s own representatives in 
positions of power to produce satisfying results from claims-making. 
They cannot do it [make claims]. Because they lost the war. Me, 
how I see this: here we fought, and we lost. Who will we go make 
claims to? Our leaders/commanders are no longer there. The 
only ones that are there are the ones that we fought against. We 
don’t have a leader. Some are dead, others joined the victors, 
so, according to me, it’s all that together that makes it so that 
they stay calm and opt to continue the battle in the political 
arena… In general, the Ivoirian population, everybody is 
discontent. Economically, it is not going well. So, who will these 
youths make claims to? They have other concerns. Looking to 
make ends meet. Trying to advance the political battle because 
they don’t have the means to… they are not even listened to!363 
This statement suggests a strategy of opting-out of political engagement as 
they feel their demands would fall in deaf ears. However, not every respondent 
felt as inclined to opt-out.  
Going beyond the necessity of having “your own” in power, the youth 
leader from NACIP spoke about what resistance to the regime would entail. By 
placing emphasis on the need of financial and organisational capacity to form 
a strong and effective opposition, this respondent likened the weakened 
position of Gbagbo-supporting youths to that of an object becoming fragile. To 
put up an effective resistance, it was explained, one must have a representative 
in a position of power that has significant financial and organisational influence. 
To regain the strength to resist, the respondent listed the types of support that 
needed to be readily available. 
To bring resistance, you need the means. You need mentors 
who know how to apply pressure. Godfathers. Because 
everything requires organisation. There is a minimum threshold 
to attain before you can carry out a large-scale protest. It’s all 
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these things that are missing right now that render the youth in a 
position of weakness.364 
The above statement demonstrates the importance allotted to having an 
influential patron. Despite Affi and Sangaré each leading their own camps in 
the FPI, neither is seen to have entirely filled the void left by Laurent Gbagbo. 
Given the statement above, neither is equally seen as possessing the means 
to organise effective political space for their supporters. In this sense, the 
perceived prerequisite of loyalty to a strong leader is found wanting and is not 
enough for them to be able to engage in their own versions of claims-making 
for financial compensation tied to their wartime experiences.  
Alongside the consensus of needing a strong leader with resources, a 
minority of respondents also alluded to the potential physical threats that could 
occur should they take on a more active voice for political dissidence. For these 
respondents, the weakened position vis-à-vis those who wield political power 
was a natural consequence of the armed intervention that removed Gbagbo. 
Responses that emphasised the violent descent of the FN/FRCI into Abidjan 
often followed the following logic: the Ouattara regime had come to power in 
with the support of the international community and with weapons. As they are 
an electorate minority, any political resistance from the other groups would be 
a threat.365 Elaborating, one young adult explained the following. 
Today the youth cannot make claims, because they know who 
they are dealing with. They know that the current power did not 
come in a pacified way. It’s a rebellion that took control. And so, 
all the young militants of the FPI, today they cannot make claims 
because if they try, those that have luck will be put into prison, 
and in the worst cases, death. This is because we know that 
those we are confronted with do not engage in dialogue. They 
don’t like dialogue. They don’t like contradictory debate. So, the 
youth of the FPI, if they are quiet, it’s because the current power 
is a brutal power. They did not come in a pacified way, they did 
not come by elections, they came as a rebellion that took 
control.366  
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Ex-combatants from the Gbagbo supporters group have prioritised a 
political engagement strategy of national opposition politics. For the majority of 
the post-conflict period, individuals from this group refrained from leveraging 
their status as ex-combatant for financial gain or for integration into the state 
security forces, with one exception of an ex-combatant association that formed 
and rapidly disbanded itself for fear of persecution. The excerpts from interview 
and informal discussions reveal that much of the reluctance to advance their 
interests is rooted in feelings of defeat within the context of their opponent’s 
victory. Defeat, in their interpretation, is tied to an increased likelihood of 
political and violent physical suppression, as well as the loss of opportunities 
for socio-political advancement. The opportunities to engage in claims-making, 
and to advance one’s interests in the post-conflict period, are seen to belong to 
the victors—those who supported the FN northern rebellion and the post-
conflict ruling regime of Alassane Ouattara. 
Despite refraining from claims-making activities, ex-combatants from the 
Gbagbo supporters group have chosen to engage with the regime via political 
parties. Marches, demonstrations, or other forms of engagement were carried 
out under the banner of an, albeit divided, opposition political party and were 
well organised with a relatively large number of participants.367 Moreover, these 
demonstrations were always in response to political decisions or actions of the 
regime and were never observed to advance the economic interests of their 
distinct group. This type of political engagement, that of organised political 
opposition, prioritises the official politics of the state rather than individual 
interests, all the while allowing political dissidents to remain relatively 
anonymous when vocalising their grievances and demands. 
The October 2016 constitutional amendments serve as a case that 
exemplifies a typical institutional response, revealing the current powers and 
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larger than individual efforts of claim-making observed in other groups. 
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limits of the opposition, and more broadly, the defeated. While both camps of 
the FPI wield significant influence over their supporters, defining where action 
should be taken and where it should be restrained, the parties perceive 
themselves to be constrained under the heavy fist of Ouattara’s regime. For 
many observers, the degree of state control over public demonstrations fuelled 
perceptions amongst Gbagbo supporters that, even unified, there were limits to 
their voice being heard. With international organisations such as Human Rights 
Watch calling on the regime to “respect the freedom of expression and 
association of political parties opposing [the] draft constitution,”368 perceptions 
of political exclusion went beyond groups of ex-combatants.   
Despite the perceived constraints imposed on Gbagbo supporters, the 
unified efforts of political engagement demonstrate a certain degree of 
compliance with state institutions and processes. Although both the Affi and the 
Sangaré camps denied the legitimacy of the proposed Constitution and, more 
broadly, the legitimacy of the state authorities themselves, Affi’s camp opted to 
comply with state authority orders while Sangaré and the Front de Refus chose 
to act independently. Neither endorsed a violent response, nor called for the 
overhaul of the political system. Additionally, despite the differences in strategy 
for their respective marches, both camps maintained cohesion and loyalty 
amongst their respective supporters. Once the terms of the demonstration were 
determined and called for, supporters from each group acted in compliance with 
their political parties and rarely deviated from its calls.  
This chapter demonstrated how Gbabgo-supporting ex-combatants, the 
political opposition, is largely excluded from power in the post-conflict period. 
Despite this, their networks continue to function, leading to question whether 
there is more going on within the FPI than crude clientelism. As the FPI is not 
in power, there is a limited supply of resources and benefits that can be 
distributed amongst its support base. Responses from those interviewed, 
however, demonstrate that clientelism is at play and that supporters are 
hedging their bets for the long-run. In much of the responses, allusions were 
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made to the future, when their preferred party, and ideally Laurent Gbagbo 
himself, comes back to power. While this chapter recognises that for many, it is 
the simple victory of Gbagbo’s political ideology that would suffice, others 
voiced hope for future collective benefits. Clientelism, in this sense, manifests 
itself through the hope of future benefits, rather than an immediate gain.369 
Gbagbo supporters are invested in the long haul, which explains why their 
networks remain intact and their political engagement less obstructive.  
Gbagbo supporters, under the leadership of two distinct central political 
figures, are engaging within an established political system, however reluctant 
their support of it may be. The strategic acceptance of victor’s justice suggests 
a certain acceptance of the current political situation, in which individuals from 
the Gbagbo supporters feel weakened and constrained in their ability to engage 
in claims-making. Complementing this expectation, however, is the reference 
that respondents occasionally made to their return to political power. 
Expressions like “when our time comes” were used to predict a return to justice, 
to equity, and to Ivoirian rule. The hopeful change in political leadership would 
bring with it compensation to make up for lost post-conflict opportunities that 
Gbagbo supporters may have been reluctant, and possibly unable, to exploit. 
When questioned if Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants might similarly engage 
in the same types of claims-making should their own leaders be in power, the 
former member of the FDS said yes. 
For sure. For sure. Not necessarily to be in the army, but at least 
to receive the 800,000 F CFA resocialisation money [allotted to 
ex-combatants in the DDR programme], or to be integrated into 
the paramilitary structures. There are many structures that we 
can insert our youth [such as the] penitentiary guards, prefecture 
guards, etc... We can insert them somewhere, or group them 
together and then finance them to work, so that they can take 
control of their lives.370  
This commentator suggests that Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants would be 
able to engage in a similar type of claims-making for benefits typically tied to 
                                                          
369 Allen Hicken, “Clientelism,” The Annual Review of Political Science 14, (2011): 291. 
370 Leader of Abidjan-based Auto Defense Group and former FDS military officer, interview.  
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ex-combatant status. This sentiment reinforces arguments by Nicolas Van de 
Walle that maintaining a visible degree of political mobilisation within a party is 
a way of creating prospects for individuals to move from the outside of an active 
clientelist network to the inside once a new government, in this case this FPI, 
comes to power.371 Adding to the above statement, the same respondent 
reaffirmed his position. 
If ever the FPI came back into power, I am sure that they would 
acknowledge their youth and help them to take control of their 
livelihoods.372  
These statements are interesting, as they demonstrate that current Gbagbo-
supporting ex-combatants do not yet feel that they have a powerful enough 
leader to open the space required for them to engage in claims-making. Despite 
a politically active FPI, both leaders Affi and Sangaré do not seem strong 
enough to deliver the types of spoils that the FN-supporting peers are able to 
get from the ruling regime under Ouattara. As evident from the lack of impact 
FPI protesting has on the constitutional amendments, the FPI does not seem 
to have the political power or weight necessary to lend the impact they desire 
to their actions. As Ivoirian reggae artist Tiken Jah Fakoly recently commented 
in an article on the 20th of March, 2018 that appeared in Jeune Afrique, leaders 
of the FPI have placed overwhelming importance on the central figure of 
Laurent Gbagbo, in what Fakoly called a strategy of “Gbagbo où rien.” 
Accordingly, Fakoly comments on how the opposition has seemingly forgotten 
about the grievances of its population base, and of Ivoirians as a whole, and 
has placed all its political efforts into battles about the return of Laurent Gbagbo 
and his return to his rightful place within the FPI.373 Such comments further 
demonstrate the importance that both Sangaré and Affi both place on the 
central figure of Laurent Gbagbo, suggesting that he is still seen as the central 
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patron to which political appeals will most effectively be addressed. This is an 
important finding as it demonstrates that even amongst groups of ex-
combatants with significant reason for collective grievances, there is not an 
automatic response of using a history of violence to push through their desired 
outcomes. 
This chapter further demonstrated the differential way ex-combatants 
politically engage with the post-conflict state. While it may be unsurprising that 
those with sentiments of defeat refrain from staking financial claims, the case 
of the Gbagbo supporters further demonstrates how political terrain is not 
perceived as equal in the post-conflict period. This finding is important in that it 
challenges assumptions that liberal peacebuilding strategies flawlessly open 
windows of opportunity, and promote inclusivity, for all. With increasing calls 
amongst the academic literature to ‘bring politics back in’ to ex-combatant 
analysis, this chapter showed that despite being politically defeated, 
dissatisfied with the post-conflict order, and obtaining relatively less benefits 
than other groups of ex-combatants, Gbagbo supporters consistently choose 
to shelve the ex-combatant label. Instead, they chose to rally around Gbagbo’s 
political party, the FPI. This chapter, therefore, begins to introduce nuance 
around understandings of ex-combatant behaviours. 
In closing, Gbabgo-supporting ex-combatants lack a sense of 
empowerment to make their claims. The following explanation most aptly 
summarizes this point. 
There is always a sense of caution in Côte d’Ivoire. The youth of 
the FPI know who they are dealing with. They cannot make 
claims like their enemies. Look at the other camp: they protest 
and paralyze a city, but what do the state authorities do? The 
authorities discuss with them to say “no, you have your claims 
there, and some will be compensated, the president is listening, 
so we will see what he says.” They have a mutual understanding. 
The young rebels, they outnumber the youth of the FPI. They still 
have their zones. Today the youth of the FPI no longer have their 
zones, so how will they make claims? They can’t! So they are 
forced to accept it.374 
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The time for claims-making, and the obtaining of other social, political, and 
financial benefits are the natural spoils of the victors, to which this group does 
not belong. This perception is grounded in expectations of clientelistic political 
practices, in which interest-maximizing opportunities are dependent on the 
personal loyalties one has to those in power. Internally, however, loyalty 
continues unabated around the central figure of Laurent Gbagbo. In this sense, 
political support and loyalty are given not only for the crude ideological leanings 
of the party, but as a hope that eventually, their candidate will return to power 




Chapter 6: Ex-Forces Nouvelles as Integrated Victors 
 
This chapter shifts focus away from the defeated by introducing the 
political engagement activities of those who consider themselves as victors in 
the 11-year political crisis: the Forces Nouvelles (FN) supporters. This chapter, 
as well as the one that follows, analyse the claims-making activities and 
discourse of FN-affiliated ex-combatants in the post-conflict period. 
The following two chapters broadly categorise FN supporters as 
individuals who supported the northern FN rebellion through any of its three 
wings: military, economic, or political. Individuals who self-identify as FN 
supporters are those who are typically aligned to the former rebel leader, and 
current President of the National Assembly, Guillaume Soro.375 Amongst the 
FN supporters aligned with Soro, claims-making activities exist on a spectrum, 
which ranges from contentious actions such as military mutiny and protest, to 
more compliant strategies, including letter writing and forming associations. 
The claims put forth to the regime typically depend on the individual’s status in 
the post-conflict period. For those who were integrated into the armed forces, 
demands centre on additional payments. For those who were not integrated, 
the demobilised (Chapter 7), claims centred on military integration- either being 
integrated directly into the armed forces or receiving back pay equalling the 
salaries that would have been earned had the individual been integrated earlier. 
The staking of claims by the FN groups are inherently political when compared 
to the activities of Gbagbo supporters and Commando Invisibles, as they are 
made by one politically-affiliated group to their political patrons in power. This 
chapter, as well as the one that follows, demonstrate how calls for increased 
benefits create political instability and insecurity in the post-conflict state.  
As previously stated, within the broad category of FN supporters, two 
different groups can be identified in accordance to their post-conflict 
trajectories: those who obtained military integration, the Integrated FN; and 
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those who demobilised to civilian life, whether through a national demobilisation 
programme or on their own, the Demobilised FN. As a short-hand identity 
marker, this Chapter uses the term ‘Integrated FN’ to mean ‘FN individuals 
integrated into the state armed forces’. This chapter argues that for FN 
supporters with greater proximity to influential political actors, the integrated, 
political engagement occurs on a larger, more public, and disruptive scale - that 
of military mutiny. The data presented below demonstrates how, on multiple 
occasions since 2011, Ivoirian mutineers achieved at least part of their 
demands for greater pay. This chapter argues that the regime’s response to 
disruptive behaviour demonstrates continuities with past strategies of 
pacification: those of co-optation and pay-outs. It links these strategies with 
clientelism as they have only been effective for belligerents of one side- those 
who claim to have brought the Ouattara regime to power. For those at farther 
proximity from influential political actors, the demobilised, claims-making 
activities, while occasionally disruptive to society, happened on a much smaller 
scale and were met with little to no success. As Chapter 7 (Demobilised FN) 
will demonstrate, their actions failed to produce results due, partly, to their 
weaker links with those in power.  
Contrary to Chapter 5, in which Gbagbo supporters mobilised around the 
command and control of their political parties and the symbol of Laurent 
Gbagbo, this chapter reveals that the political actions of militarily active FN 
supporters are not embedded within party politics. Rather, they are embedded 
within a system of loyalty to a handful of influential actors, their former Zone 
Commanders and FN leadership, occupying senior positions within the national 
armed forces and government offices. Considered as the victors of the political 
crisis, from 2011 to 2017, Integrated FN combatants successfully made claims 
to the regime through a series of armed demonstrations and mutinies. The 
sections that follow examine the mutinies of January and May 2017 as cases 
of military politics in the post-conflict period, their effectiveness, and their impact 
on public perception. Additionally, this chapter traces the history of mutinies 
back to post-independence periods, demonstrating a degree of continuity in 
their usage and effectiveness.  
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The research techniques used for this chapter differ from those of other 
chapters in this thesis. First, this chapter draws mostly from local and 
international media coverage of the mutinies for reasons of security and 
restricted mobility. Second, the highly contentious nature of the mutinies meant 
that access to the mutineers was difficult to obtain. To verify the validity of 
multiple sources, this chapter triangulates public sources to examine the main 
argument: that claims-making is the most disruptive amongst those Ivoirian ex-
combatants who consider their own patrons to be in power and who have the 
strongest ties to people of influence. Their disruptive forms of political 
engagement, that of armed mutiny, are driven by their expectations of 
clientelistic governance, which they presume based on past successes, will 
continue in the post-conflict period. 
 
Actor Background: Forces Nouvelles 
 
The origins of what would become the Forces Nouvelles (FN) Northern 
rebellion pre-date the North’s official breakaway from the Ivoirian government 
in 2002. Stemming from years of discriminatory discourse and sporadic inter-
communal violence pitting ‘northerners’ against southern indigenous 
populations, those who went on to form the FN consolidated a collective 
northern identity that was used over the next nine years as justification for rebel 
rule.  
What became the collective ‘northern cause’ set the basis for the 
complete administrative, financial, and military separation of the northern 
territory from the southern-loyalist Ivoirian State, making it a nearly textbook 
example of rebel rule in sub-Saharan Africa. Its system of rebel-led governance, 
in sticking with Mampilly’s conception, involved to varying degrees the provision 
of public goods, whether through formal (bureaucratic), or informal (ad hoc) 
means.376 From 2004 onwards, the FN consolidated its system of governance 
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with the creation of three branches. The first, the Forces Armées des Forces 
Nouvelles (FAFN), was tasked with issues of security. The second, Le Cabinet 
Civil, was the political wing. The third, La Centrale, was the financial wing, 
managing different revenue streams to support the rebellion’s activities.377 La 
Centrale was one of the most regulated aspects of the rebellion, organised 
around a central office in the FN headquarter city of Bouaké. Described in 
several UN Group of Experts reports, La Centrale generated revenue in five 
main ways: a system of taxation on transported goods passing through 
checkpoints and roadblocks; taxation on major companies operating in the 
rebel-held zones; service charges for electricity and water bills; the extraction 
and export of natural resources such as gold and cocoa, smuggled from the 
south; and finally, revenues generated through ownership of taxation fuel 
depots.378 These various income streams financed and reinforced much of the 
FN organisation and helped consolidate its status as a parallel state within Côte 
d’Ivoire. 
Flowing from the central institutions of governance were the 10 different 
zones within the rebel-held territories. Each zone was headed by a leader, 
known locally as a Commandant de Zone (“ComZone”), accompanied by his 
respective combatants. Across the 10 zones, the degrees of governance varied 
greatly, producing a landscape of heterogeneous authority and control.379 
Within each zone, the ComZone oversaw highly localised wartime orders, 
drawing on very different forms of social, political, and economic power,380 and 
often allowed their methods of governance to be partially shaped by local 
cultural and religious practices.381 In addition to variations in governance across 
space, the rebellion’s method of governance also demonstrated change over 
time, keeping with Mampilly’s observation that rebel rule is not necessarily path-
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dependent.382 From the onset of the rebellion in 2002, the FN enjoyed moderate 
support across their territories, building on northern grievances from the 
mounting xenophobic discourse from the successive Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo 
governments. In some zones, however, relations with civilian populations 
began to deteriorate as accounts of indiscipline and economic predation by the 
foot soldiers of the rebellion became more frequent.383 In many cases beyond 
Côte d’Ivoire, economic predation has been linked with indiscriminate violence 
committed by insurgent groups for “short-term opportunities for enrichment”.384 
Jeremy Weinstein argues that, ‘opportunistic volunteers’ are likely to join 
insurgent groups when resources can be exploited, and whose presence can 
ultimately influence how battles are fought and how violence is used.385 Similar 
to this is the notion that political leaders could manipulate markets, especially 
around natural resources, to both control their rival’s access to economic 
opportunities all the while increasing their power.386 In this sense, predatory 
violence develops in contexts where patron-based politics interacts with local 
markets. While there is currently not enough detailed evidence from all rebel-
held zones in Côte d’Ivoire to determine when and how predatory tactics were 
used, what has been researched to date sheds partial light on a rebellion that 
was neither uniform across time nor space. Despite the variance in degrees of 
control over their designated territories, the ComZones effectively consolidated 
their personal power as military, political, and economic elites in their respective 
zones of influence. 
To date, case studies providing systematic analysis across zones of the 
rebellion are few. Two, however, stand out, providing differing accounts of the 
ways in which the FN interacted with local populations: Till Förster’s account 
from Korhogo, and Jeremy Speight’s account of Bouna. In Förster’s account, 
the FN shared responsibilities of security with the traditional hunting group, the 
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Dozo. While the Dozo provided security in the inner city, the FN controlled the 
outer limits and highways.387 As the Dozo were perceived to be emblematic of 
ethnic honesty and integrity amongst local populations, their incorporation into 
the security apparatus held legitimise the new security arrangements. 
Moreover, the incorporation of the Dozo demonstrated a certain degree of FN 
compliance with the localised social norms and values.388 In Speight’s account 
of Bouna, on the other hand, FN control was characterised by low levels of 
military discipline, allowing FN soldiers and supporters to engage in theft, 
economic racketeering, and occasional violence against civilians.389 Speight 
contends that large disparities existed between those who held positions of 
command within the rebellion and its foot soldiers. While many ComZones 
benefitted from the rebellion by taking control of natural resources and trade 
routes, low-ranking FN soldiers exerted their authority, sometimes illegally, to 
supplement their income.390 Much of this behaviour is thought to have resulted 
in a number of self-interested individuals making use of the rebellion for their 
personal gain.391 This observation supports the interview data presented in 
Chapter 7, in which Demobilised FN individuals with loose ties to the rebellion 
made use of the rebel status to extort cash from host communities and to live 
free of cost. These individuals later lamented how the demobilisation payment 
they received in the post-conflict period was insufficient to repay their debts.  
Complementing these studies are two additional accounts from 
respondents to this research, both of whom worked in the national weapons 
collection programmes. As civilians living under rebel rule, both wished to 
emphasise the minor impact rebel rule had on the daily lives of most civilians 
and combatants. For one respondent from Korhogo, rebel rule had a minimal 
impact on the lives of residents, with most carrying on with their daily activities 
uninhibited. According to this respondent, the biggest disruption to the lives of 
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FN affiliates came from attending a meeting roughly once a week for a couple 
of hours. After the meeting, participants mostly returned to their regular civilian 
lives. Rarely did these FN supporters live separately from their families, from 
their regular occupations, or from their daily routines. In some cases, they might 
have been sent elsewhere to assist with patrolling.392 The second account 
comes from the western part of the country, just slightly north of the city of Man 
and the demarcation line. Although this respondent’s village fell under rebel 
rule, most villagers remained loyal to the southern loyalist forces and to Laurent 
Gbagbo. This respondent reinforced that little had changed in the community’s 
daily activities. Throughout a lengthy discussion, this respondent also explained 
the villages’ consensus that the path of least resistance was simply to comply 
with the rebels, regardless of whether they supported the cause.393 Accounts 
such as these reveal the relatively low levels of sacrifice required to participate 
in the FN rebellion. These accounts also sit at odds with the standing 
assumption that armed group participation is, without question, a significant 
aberration to regular civilian life. While this thesis recognises that in other 
contexts civil war participation can be extreme and encompassing,394 the case 
of rebel rule in Côte d’Ivoire is a good reminder that participation can vary 
greatly, according to the context. As these accounts of the FN rebellion run 
counter to the raison d’être of the payments and bonuses the Integrated FN 
received, neither Ivoirian respondent from Korhogo or Man would allow 
quotations to be used in this thesis. 
With a relatively low threshold of what constituted participation in the 
rebellion, combined with the various civilian posts in the economic and political 
spheres, the volume and validity of individual claims of having participated in 
the FN rebellion are difficult to disprove. As stated repeatedly across interviews, 
FN claims-makers are often mixes of genuine ex-combatants and civilians. 
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When you really search, they are not all combatants, real 
combatants. There are real, but there are also fake. There are 
also those that helped combatants with tasks that were not 
necessarily combat-related.395 
The blurred lines between combatant and civilian wings of the rebellion made 
the task of identifying genuine FN rebels difficult. Moreover, it increased the 
ability of many individuals to use the ambiguous identities to their advantage. 
To identify FN supporters for integration and demobilisation benefits, the post-
conflict regime relied on the personal endorsement of individuals by those who 
held positions of command in the rebellion—the ComZones and their 
hierarchies. With endorsements, FN supporters were able to integrate into the 
state armed forces and civil service, with the distribution of posts ranging from 
high-ranking military officers and government officials, to rank-and-file soldiers 
in the FACI. Although the number of Integrated FN soldiers, as well as the total 
number of FACI soldiers has been kept confidential, the total FACI population 
was estimated at 25,000 troops for an Ivoirian population of approximately 24 
million.396  
For those not integrated, lists were generated by the ComZones 
indicating who was a verified combatant able to enter the national 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration programme. This was typically 
seen as the second best option, following salaried armed forces integration, as 
participation in the national programme granted the option of a revenue-
generating livelihood project. If an FN supporter was not a recipient of any of 
the above-mentioned posts, he/she was destined to navigate the post-conflict 
period on their own, financially unassisted. Therefore, through these different 
post-conflict options, FN supporters gained differing forms of financial support. 
As a result of their stratified post-conflict positions, they sat in differing degrees 
of proximity to actors of political influence. In a post-conflict context 
characterised as an insurgent victory, sentiments of ‘our time’ were observed 
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amongst FN individuals across all positions. Collectively, claims-making was 
their primary form of political engagement. Amongst the FN, however, those 
with the highest stature within the state apparatus’ have been the most 
disruptive to society and have been increasingly successful at advancing their 
interests in the post-conflict state. 
 
Integrated FN Political Engagement: Military Mutiny 
 
Over the past three decades, the use of military mutinies has become 
increasingly documented in Sub-Saharan Africa. A mutiny entails:  
a group of soldiers who remain within the state’s military 
structure and; use means of insubordination to express stated 
grievances and goals beyond the desire for political power to 
higher political and military offices.397  
 
Recent data from Maggie Dwyer collected from both the regions of West and 
Central Africa observed a spike in mutinies since the 1990s, which draws 
compelling links to the increased momentum of the democratisation 
movements of the time. The period of democratisation was marked by a decline 
in authoritarian political regimes, an increase in competitive elections, and the 
greater awareness of political rights of citizens. Moreover, it also signalled to 
local populations that it was a period of renewed hope and participation in the 
polity.398 Inversely, the same period was related to an increased incidence of 
coups and mutinies, as discourse of human rights and good governance 
disseminated amongst local populations and state forces alike. Military mutiny, 
as observed in 2017 CDI, was less about democratisation and gaining a voice, 
than of advancing financial pay. 
Over time, military mutinies in West and Central Africa shared several 
common grievances and exhibited a common set of tactics. The grievances 
observed centred mostly on pay and living conditions. Their tactics where 
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typically characterised by large gatherings in the streets, with mutinous soldiers 
firing into the air. Frequently, armouries were also broken into. Additionally, 
mutineers sought to control public or strategically important locations, such as 
military headquarters or active commercial districts. The longer the mutineers 
held these areas, the greater the public disruption was and the more they were 
able to pressure their targeted audience, which, in most cases, were their 
national governments. Alongside those tactics, mutineers frequently resorted 
to controlling transport infrastructure, such as checkpoints and roadblocks. 
Derived from a routine daily function for many soldiers, taking control of these 
posts is an unsurprising tactic, particularly if the soldiers manning them were 
sympathetic to the mutineers’ cause. Finally, mutineers were observed to often 
take control of national modes of communication, such as radio stations to 
disseminate their grievances across a larger audience.399 The combination of 
these tactics, without resorting to actual violent actions, suggests that military 
mutiny has been used in West and Central Africa primarily as a way of opening 
dialogue with the military and political leaders. Mutiny, therefore, can be seen 
as a tactic of communication, and by extension of political engagement, rather 
than simply an act of military insubordination.400 Similarly, as observed in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the threat of further violent action dissipated once negotiations with 
high-ranking government officials opened, thus allowing the mutineers to claim 
success. The following data presents the political engagement activity 
observed amongst Integrated FN soldiers- the mutinies of January and May 
2017. 
On the night of January 5th, 2017, soldiers from the Forces Armées de 
Côte d’Ivoire (FACI) launched a mutiny in and around military camps across the 
country. The claims behind the mutiny were being made on behalf of 8,400 
former FAFN soldiers who supported the northern rebellion and had allegedly 
not been granted all that they were promised. Amongst their claims were an 
overall payment of 12,000,000 F CFA (approximately ₤ 16,000), as well as 
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increased salaries, reduced time for military promotions, and an ECOMOG 
bonus payment.401 In early newspaper accounts, the granting of property rights 
for villas was also requested, although media coverage over the course of the 
mutiny eventually dropped this claim. An article appearing several months later, 
however, linked the claim of obtaining villas to a promise made by the 
ComZones leading into the 2011 post-electoral crisis, promising them 12 million 
F CFA and villas for removing Gbagbo from power.402 
The heart of this mutiny was in Bouaké, the former headquarters of the 
FN-rebellion. Over the course of three days, the mutineers fired intermittent 
shots into the air, vocalised their claims, and blocked multiple streets in the 
cities in which the mutinies took place. Most disruptive to the local populations 
was the blockage of the main highway entry and exit points to cities, as well as 
the closure of local shops and businesses.403 These tactics are consistent with 
Dwyer’s examination of armed mutinies in West and Central Africa. The local 
police, typically tasked with enforcing security amongst civilians, voiced 
concern about the mutiny and suggested that they were reluctant to counter the 
mutinous soldiers should they use their heavy weapons. As captured by a local 
journalist, a police officer that spoke anonymously stated that, “We are here, 
it’s true, but on alert. If there is firing of heavy weapons, we will go home. We 
are not trained to confront the military.”404  
In response to the mutiny, the government sent a delegation, which 
included the Minister of Defence, Alain Richard Donwahi, accompanied by 
former ComZone Issiaka Ouattara (alias “Wattao”), and the Archbishop of 
Bouaké, Mgr Paul-Siméon Ahouan, to address the restless soldiers.405 After 
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two days of stalemate and multiple discussions with the Minister of Defence, an 
agreement was reached in which each of the 8,400 Integrated FN soldiers 
would receive 12 million F FCA (approximately £16,000) in two instalments, as 
well as an improvement in their living conditions. Following the agreement, the 
mutinous soldiers continued to fire intermittent shots into the air, allegedly to 
keep the pressure on the regime to respond.406 While it is unlikely, and 
unconfirmed, that all 8.400 Integrated FN soldiers took to the streets, the pay-
outs would benefit them, under the precondition that they were derived from the 
FN rebellion. Non-mutinous soldiers typically derived from the former FDS 
structures did not participate or make any demands. The following excerpt, 
taken from an interview appearing online, shows a brief moment where the 
inclusion of former FDS soldiers was considered by the FN mutineers. The 
journalist questioned about the exclusivity of the demands.  
The beneficiaries are all ex-combatants who took part in the 
rebellion and who are today integrated into the military since the 
end of the post-electoral crisis. [Journalist interjects to verify it is 
only for the FN-derived soldiers. The soldier interviewed 
responds…] It is for all soldiers, only that for the rebel soldiers, it 
will be more obvious that they fought for the power in place [the 
Ouattara regime].407 
This quotation, although not completely excluding FDS soldiers, is 
consistent with the tenets of this thesis that the primary beneficiaries 
making claims have expectations of pay-outs based on their political 
loyalties their patrons who have come to power.  
Despite a return to calm after the agreement had been reached, a series 
of disgruntled comments emerged from the opposition and the civilian 
populations. The public service, under the leadership of two workers unions, La 
Plateforme Nationale des Organisations Professionnelles du Secteur Public de 
Côte d’Ivoire and the l’Intersyndicale des Fonctionnaires de Côte d’Ivoire, had 
undertaken a mass strike of their own on January 9th, 2017. Their claims 
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involved inter alia: amendments on the organisation of pension schemes; the 
payment of arrears estimated at 249.6 billion FCFA; the integration of public 
sector day labourers into the public service; and the respect for freedom of 
association for unions.408 Government interest in responding, however, was 
lagging, as their attention was focused on the mutinous soldiers. In its 
communiqué, which was disseminated over local media outlets, the 
Government highlighted the actions that it had already taken and would soon 
take to quell the dissatisfied public servants. Amongst the actions detailed were 
the completion of a workshop with union heads in late December 2016, two 
separate meetings between the Minister of Civil Service, Employment and 
Housing and the union leaders on 5th and 16th of January; an agreement to 
amend the pension system; the integration of public sector day labourers into 
the Public Service; respect of union liberty; and finally to consider revisions to 
the tax on wages and the national contribution.409 The response of the 
government involved a much longer bureaucratic arrangement that stood in 
stark contrast to the rapid payments of mutineers. Regardless of the length of 
time needed for systemic change, the union strikers were most enraged by the 
speed in which the mutineers were paid, while their own grievances spanned 
many months. 
The minimal interest in the worker’s union’s strikes, was highly criticised 
within the broader Ivoirian society, as it signalled to many that the government 
prioritised a strategy of rapid financial appeasement to a single demographic of 
the population wielding guns. Editorials, opinion pieces, and other articles also 
questioned the priorities of the government, further casting doubt on the validity 
of the mutineers’ claims, as though they were empty without weapons. The 
rapid pay-out of the mutineers demonstrated, in the eyes of many Ivoirians, an 
unspoken policy of appeasing the ruling regime’s own political and 
demographic base, thus further reinforcing the notion that political opportunities 
belonged to some, but not all, under the new post-conflict regime. The image 
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below, taken from Abidjan’s satirical weekly journal, captures the public 
perceptions of the mutineers and strikers. 
 
Image 6.1: Cover page of Gbich, weekly satirical magazine, January12-18, 2017. Source, Gbich 
newspaper, hard copy.410 
 
Although calm was eventually re-established, and the country resumed 
its normal daily functions, the peace was once again interrupted in May 2017. 
On May 11th, 2017, a member of the FACI, Sargent Fofana, addressed the 
nation, allegedly speaking on behalf of the 8,400 FN soldiers and those that 
participated in the mutinies. Over national television, Sargent Fofana 
announced that the mutineers would not resume their campaign and that they 
renounced their remaining payments. This proclamation took place during a 
ceremony involving the president Alassane Ouattara, with the alleged 
spokesperson surrounded by approximately 40 military peers.411 The following 
day, on the 12th of May, a segment of the FACI blocked entry and exit points of 
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Abidjan and Bouaké, fired intermittent shots, and demanded their outstanding 
payment as agreed in January. Of the 12 million F CFA agreed upon in the 
January deal, 5 million F CFA had already been paid, with 7 million remaining. 
In response to the new wave of disorder in Abidjan and Bouaké, the 
National Security Council, the highest office of national security, authorised the 
deployment of Special Forces and the Republican Guard to re-establish order. 
Additionally, the regime sent a delegation of high-ranking military officials, 
including four former ComZones to meet with representatives of the revived 
mutiny in Bouaké. The number of former ComZones appearing in negotiations 
had dramatically increased from the January mutiny, from one to four. The 
increased presence of the former ComZones further suggested that the 
government lacked the authority and influence necessary to negotiate with the 
mutineers. The increased presence of the ComZones at the negotiating table 
moreover suggested where authority and influence actually lay. Like the first 
mutiny, Issiaka Ouattara (“Wattao”) was present, this time accompanied by 
former ComZones Cherif Ousmane, Koné Zakaria, and Hervé Touré.412  
On the 13th of May, as a result of the popular public denunciation of the 
tactics of the mutineers, an sms circulated amongst Ivoirians calling for a 
civilian-led protest against the mutineers and their continued obstruction of daily 
economic activities. The protest was to start at 7:00 a.m. around a central 
roundabout in Bouaké. The mutineers, in turn, responded the following morning 
by firing warning shots into the air, eventually leading to the death of two 
civilians. In an additional spin of events, further adding to the complexity of the 
crisis, a new weapons cache was revealed, suspiciously at the same time as 
the ammunition stocks of the mutineers were running low. The cache was 
discovered on the 14th May, when the mutineers received an anonymous call 
explaining where they could replenish their stocks - the Bouaké residence of 
the Director of Protocol for President of the National Assembly, Guillaume 
Soro.413 Souleymane Kamagate Kone (alias “Soul to Soul”), was arrested 
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following the discovery to weapons, and proclaimed from jail. In an article 
appearing in Jeune Afrique, he stated “I am put into prison because of the 
weapons that put Alassane Ouattara into power.”414 This statement drew 
attention to the tensions between Ouattara and Guillaume Soro, the latter of 
which retained the loyalty of many of the ComZones, as well as individuals who 
self-described as FN supporters. To this day, questions surround the weapons 
cache, the most obvious being what they were doing at a government official’s 
private residence. Amongst the special forces deployed, international 
observers and locals alike described their passive stance towards the FN-
derived mutineers. While the mutineers fired shots into the air, the troops from 
the special forces remained reserved off to the sides. The passive stance was 
likely due to the high number of FN soldiers who made up the units of the 
special forces.415 The passive stance of the deployed troops combined with the 
reinforced arsenal of the mutineers tipped the scale in favour of the mutineers, 
with the Ouattara regime conceding with a vow to pay the balance of the 
payments that were promised in January. Following the five-day revolt, the 
Minister of Defence declared that the mutiny of May 2017 resulted in two 
fatalities and nine injuries.416 
While the second mutiny of May 2017 brought an end to the Integrated 
FN revolts, it left in its wake a series of secretive scandals and unconfirmed 
incidents typical of the Ivoirian conflict. For one, the weapons cache in the home 
of Guillaume Soro’s Director of Protocol was disconcerting, with investigations 
ongoing during the compilation of this thesis. Questions continue to surround 
the identity of the individual who informed the mutineers of the weapons cache 
and why such a heavy supply of arms and ammunition was found at all, let 
alone why it was found in the house of a prominent member of the post-conflict 
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regime.417  Second, is the apparent lack of cohesion between FN supporters 
who were integrated and those who were demobilised. Amongst the two 
fatalities, one was, surprisingly, a demobilised FN ex-combatant who took to 
the streets with a group of FN ex-combatants to make claims of their own. This 
demobilised FN ex-combatant was fired at by the mutinous soldiers. As 
justification for their actions, the mutineers accused the demobilised FN ex-
combatants of compromising and diluting their mutiny.418 The third and final 
question is in regard to the motivation behind Sargent Fofana’s renunciation the 
payments on the 11th of May. Some suggested it was a presidential ploy to halt 
the payments and to save face by forcing a spokesperson of the mutineers to 
read a script written by the ruling party.419 Regardless, the broadcasted 
message was reminiscent of Houphouët-Boigny’s faux plots and subsequent 
public shaming of the alleged instigators as they ask for pardon. 
Despite the emergence of the new scandals mentioned above, both the 
mutinies of January and May yielded several favourable outcomes for the 
mutineers and their patrons. On the one hand, the 8,400 mutineers, derived 
exclusively from the FN rebellion, successfully obtained their 12 million F CFA 
over two instalments, as stipulated in their first agreement with the regime in 
January. No other soldiers, notably those previously in the FDS, received 
payments. In addition, they were also promised an improvement in their living 
conditions. Of the former ComZones to integrate, at least two individuals were 
promoted. Issiaka Ouattara (Wattao) was promoted from Deputy Commander 
to Commander of the Republican Guard, an elite unit within the FACI and Cherif 
Ousmane was promoted from Second in Command of the Presidential Guard 
to Commander of the 1st Battalion of Commandos and Paratroopers. Of the 
eight former ComZones to be integrated into the state armed forces, all had 
been previously granted the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel, despite popular 
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recognition that not all possessed military knowledge or training before entering 
the rebellion.420 By many accounts, prior to the FN rebellion, ComZones who 
with military background served mostly as corporals, with the highest ranking 
being a Sargent.421 The Minister of Defence, Alain Richard Donwahi, was re-
named Minister of Water and Forests, after a reshuffling of top government 
posts on the 19th of July. It is believed that the reason for his sudden change of 
ministry are related to his inability to quell the mutineer’s disruptions. In turn, 
Hamed Bakayoko, a long-time ally of Alassane Ouattara was appointed 
Minister of Defence. FACI soldiers who did not engage in mutiny, notably those 
from FDS, remained in their same positions. The rapid promotions afforded to 
the former ComZones, combined with the sizeable pay-outs given to the 
integrated former FN soldiers is a clear demonstration of the regime’s continued 
appeasement towards its own support base and to secure loyal cadres amongst 
the recently integrated FN combatants.  
The phenomenon of regimes offering promotions and privileges to their 
supporters in the military is not exclusive to Côte d’Ivoire. In post-independence 
Zimbabwe, special privileges and bonuses have been well documented. In this 
case, ZANU-PF- aligned veterans secured provisions of land, vehicles, and 
automatic promotions to ensure their continued allegiance to the party and to 
prevent possible mutinies.422 Following contentious elections in 1997, in which 
the opposition was violently suppressed by state forces, large lump-sum 
payments were made to integrated liberation veterans as well as provisions for 
the monthly war service pensions. Norma Kriger documents this as one of the 
periods in which alliances between the military and the ruling ZANU-PF party 
were reinforced, resulting in a situation in which the military became a critical 
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resource for retaining political power.423 The promotions and privileges for war 
veterans, alongside the restrictions in their retirement before periods of 
elections was, in the case of Zimbabwe, one of the ways that the ZANU-PF 
effectively secured party loyalty and their political power.424 Observations 
beyond Zimbabwe similarly indicated that there had been trend of ‘privatisation’ 
of military units, loyal to individual political leaders, rather than to the larger state 
forces or to the state itself.425  
An emerging body of research that speaks of comparable trends is that 
of ‘coup-proofing’. Coup-proofing involves a series of strategies employed by 
political leaders to diminish the risks of a potential coup.426 One such strategy 
is to build a separate branch of the military with a separate command structure, 
that remains loyal to the political leader. The creation of what is commonly 
known as a paramilitary would, in theory, add an additional obstacle to the 
planning and coordination of a coup, as coup-plotters must consider a 
confrontation with the paramilitary as well.427 Whether or not strategies of coup-
proofing have the desired or inverse effect, coup-proofing “is based on the 
assumption that leaders will intentionally and knowingly undermine the good of 
their state in order to increase their chances of retaining their leadership 
role.”428 Without concrete data to document the numbers of new ‘loyalist’ 
recruits, arguments of coup-proofing in Côte d’Ivoire are difficult to substantiate. 
Due to a lack of firm numerical data for Côte d’Ivoire, this thesis is more inclined 
to associate the trend with patron-client exchanges, as the data provided below 
demonstrates that soldiers expected a specific return for their involvement in 
the rebellion, rather than simply being nominated to protect a political leader. In 
keeping with the analytical lens of patron-client exchanges, this chapter builds 
                                                          
423 Norma Kriger, ”War Veterans: Continuities Between the Past and the Present,” African Studies Quarterly 7, no. 2-
3 (2003): 3-4. 
424 Kriger, “War Veterans,” 3-4. 
425 Dwyer, “Borrowed Scripts,” 99. 
426 Jun Koga Sudduth, “Coup risk, coup-proofing and leadership survival,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 1, 
(2017): 3. 
427 Tobias Böhmelt and Ulrich Pilster, “The Impact of Institutional Coup-proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup 
Outcomes,” International Interactions 41 (2015): 158. 




on long-established research such Bratton and Van de Walle’s. Their research 
documents similar trends across the continent and observes how the military 
has gained prominence in countries characterised by patron-client exchanges, 
granting it privileged positions within ruling regimes. 
To keep the soldiers content and under some semblance of 
civilian control, rulers granted to individual officers and the 
military units a generous array of perks, privileges, and rewards, 
including access to rents and commercial ventures.429 
 
The privileges offered to the select military officers and the elite were usually 
proportionate to their importance in the previous regimes. In other words, “[t]he 
more that a ruler relied on coercion, the higher the price the military exacted for 
its support.”430 
What is crucial to reinforce in these recent waves of mutiny in Côte 
d’Ivoire is that the soldiers making claims were representative of only one side 
of the 11-year crisis. Although FACI is composed of both soldiers from the 
former FDS structures under Gbagbo’s rule and the integrated soldiers of the 
northern FN rebellion, the claims put forth came only from those aligned to the 
FN supporters. As explained in a number of interviews with the mutineers 
appearing in local newspapers, the mutinous soldiers said that they believed 
they were entitled to a series of arcane promises made by the leadership of the 
FN rebellion to bolster support for its political victory.431 These promises have 
never been made public to Ivoirians and traces of their existence have been 
seen by only a handful of international observers, making the validity of the 
claims nearly impossible to prove. Those from the ranks of the FDS, therefore, 
have watched the mutiny from the side-lines, rather than taking part and 
demanding similar payments.432 Appeasements by financial gain and elite 
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promotions exclusively for those who supported the FN rebellion further 
reinforced the notion that opportunities for pay-outs were reserved for those 
who supported the Ouattara regime. In this sense, political loyalty to the post-
conflict regime became seen as an adequate reason to receive these bonuses, 
which in turn, influenced whether or not it was worthwhile to engage in the 
mutinies at all. 
 
Reactions and Replications 
 
Following the financial success of the mutineers, a series of smaller, yet 
similar revolts happened across the country. Some of them were to show 
disapproval of the mutinies, while others attempted to replicate them in the 
hopes of obtaining similar outcomes. Mutinies in Côte d’Ivoire, especially since 
the end of hostilities in 2011, have been met with increasing resentment and 
denunciation from civilian populations from both sides of the political divide. To 
counter the concessions granted to the mutineers, uprisings took place on 
several levels. This section provides brief descriptions of each of the reactions 
that followed the mutinies. It examines the outcry voiced by members of civil 
society, civilian counter-protests in Bouaké, and a revolt from armed corps with 
traditional loyalties to both Gbagbo. Finally, it also examines the revolt from FN 
supporters who were integrated into other branches of the armed forces, but 
who were not taken into consideration for the pay-outs.    
In one of the more prominent reactions to the mutinies, civil society 
questioned the regime’s response, highlighting that the payments made had 
not been planned in any of the legal frameworks surrounding military 
integration, and questioned the government’s priorities in adapting budget lines 
to accommodate these payments.433 In an interview appearing in national news 
outlets, the leader of a national human rights NGO questioned the rapid 
monetary appeasement, explaining that there was no specific budgetary line 
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for the payment of mutineers and that the issue of bonus payments and 
compensation should be handled more equitably.  
Bring five million CFA francs from the state coffers today, the 
problem of good governance arises. In the budget that was 
voted, there is no line that says we have to pay the rebels. Where 
does the money come from? These are questions. We want the 
executive to tell us where the money came from. Even if we had 
to pay them, we could stagger this over several years, we would 
not feel all this wave of discontent.434 
 
Opposition further encompassed groups of civilians across the country, the 
most notable being in Bouaké, the former headquarters of the FN rebellion. On 
13th of January 2017, civilians in Bouaké launched a counter-protest to the 
mutineers, denouncing their aggressions, the insecurity it caused, and the halt 
of economic activities in the second biggest city next to Abidjan. These protests 
were broken up briefly in the morning by state security forces when they fired 
shots into the air.435 The forces, however, were quickly overpowered by 
between 300-500 civilians shouting slogans such as “Liberez Bouaké!” “On a 
faim, on veut travailler!” Within hours, state forces bolstered their presence, 
putting an official end to the protest and emptying all streets.436 As captured by 
a local journalist present at Bouaké, one community member stated the 
following: “We must bring the revolts of soldiers to an end. We are tired of their 
disturbances.”437  
 
Beyond these events, daily conversations surrounding the mutinies were 
fairly resentful, many of which advanced the local stereotypes of the Integrated 
FN soldiers as illiterate and illogical. This demonstrated a public sentiment that 
the soldiers had ‘mercenary motives’ rather than genuine concern for the 
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country at heart.438 Amongst Gbagbo supporters who remained in the military, 
the former FDS, significant frustration was expressed about the ex-FN officers 
when asked about claims-making in general. Prior to the mutinies of 2017, an 
interview was held with a former FDS soldier who retired with the fall of Gbagbo. 
In a conversation that pre-dates the mutinies by approximately three months, 
the respondent gave several explanations as to why the FDS were disgruntled 
and the FN affiliated ex-combatants, integrated and demobilised, engaged in 
so much claims-making. His answers ranged from the former FDS not having 
enough capacity, remaining FDS being stripped of weapons following the crisis, 
only to regain them gradually over the years,439 to a general lack of 
understanding amongst the ‘illiterates’ of the north. Above all, this respondent 
wished to emphasize the ‘clan-like’ nature of the army, resulting in the 
reluctance of ex-FDS soldiers to engage in claims-making the way the 
Integrated FN did in 2014.  
We [ex-FDS], we see a clan-like army. It is a clan-like army. That 
means that the army is a clan. Voila! We see that it is not a real 
army, it’s a militia that was made official, like a national army. 
That’s all that we see. So us, the ex-FDS, we don’t… we see 
them in another light. We acknowledge them not as the national 
army, but just as those that are there. We accept this, but we 
know that it is spoiled. All the corps have been spoiled because 
they just dumped all those guys in all the corps. In the army, in 
the gendarmerie, in the police. All those [FN] youth were just 
dumped into the corps.440 
As previously mentioned above, both the numbers of those integrated, as well 
as the total numbers of the FACI have deliberately been kept confidential, 
making statements such as this difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the 
importance of the statement lays in how the Integrated FN are viewed amongst 
those whose military service pre-dates the crisis. Although this Chapter 
generally argues against comparisons with coup-proofing, this is one case in 
which a comparison seems more likely. In some ways, it may reflect local views 
                                                          
438 Gbagbo supporter gatekeeper, interview with the author in Abidjan-Cocody, January 10, 2017, in-person. Similar 
sentiments were expressed in many informal discussions with Ivoirians from both the public and private sectors.  
439 Ivoirian Gendarme, informal discussion with the author, August 25, 2018, online messaging. 
440 Leader of Abidjan-based Auto Defense Group and former FDS military officer, interview.  
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that the government is taking action to coup-proof—taking actions to prevent a 
coup.441 As outlined above, theories developed around coup-proofing have 
mainly focused on how to diminish the capacity of armed forces to coordinate 
and plot,442 while others looked into how to diminish the military’s willingness to 
engage in coups (“spoiling”).443 Some of the broad strategies identified to 
diminish the threat of a coup include: the establishment of paramilitary 
organisations under a different command structure (to serve as rivals and as 
an additional obstacle should a coup be planned), the frequent rotation of 
commanders (to ensure one does not get too powerful), and the division of the 
military into rival branches.444 Linking the literature on coup-proofing with the 
Ivoirian case, the statement above could be seen as a local interpretation of 
one of the coup-proofing strategies—that of creating a parallel structure staked 
with loyalists to prevent a coup. The former FDS officer cited above made use 
of the words ‘militia’ to describe the newly integrated FN fighters, which is 
interesting given that the term “militia” in the Ivoirian case is usually applied to 
Gbagbo’s parallel forces in the south. The respondent, as a critic of Ouattara 
and the post-conflict regime, chose to describe the FN as Ouattara’s militia. 
Following this logic, the mass integration of the FN into the national army could, 
very well, be seen as the creation of a paramilitary structure to protect against 
any future waves of revolt against the post-conflict regime. As demonstrated by 
the mutinies, however, revolt came from those considered to be loyalists. If the 
integration of the FN was a form of coup-proofing, it is proven to have backfired. 
While the statement provided above could be seen as a local interpretation of 
staking a military with loyal supporters to prevent a coup, this thesis is more 
inclined to see it as providing your support base with a facilitated entry into a 
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salaried position regardless of whether they buy-in to the concept of national 
state security. 
In the same conversation, the former FDS respondent explained his 
belief that the high-risk claims-making behaviour of the Integrated FN officers 
was due to a lack of training and comprehension. 
They received some training, but it was never fully realised. They 
always told themselves that the pro-Gbagbos would come and 
attack, overthrow them. So they didn’t really have the time to fully 
train them. And, it’s the FDS that have to train them. So you see 
how the training will go—you, my enemy of yesterday, now I 
have to train you. Voila! That’s what it is!445  
Explaining further, a key representative from the FPI party (Affi camp), who 
served many years alongside Gbagbo, described the new national army as the 
regime’s attempt to empower rebels coming from outside Côte d’Ivoire and who 
did not have much formal education. In his explanation, they turned into the 
veritable “spinal cord” of the current armed force structures.446 For this 
respondent, many northerners did not originally have interest in participating in 
the rebellion, so incentives had to be introduced to prompt even those from 
neighbouring countries to participate.447 The incentives, in this explanation, 
were eventual citizenship and guarantee salary from integration into the Ivoirian 
armed forces.448 
In addition to the public backlash, was also a series of smaller revolts 
triggered amongst various armed corps, both in opposition to the pay-outs and 
for the extension of them. One such incident occurred on the 17th of January 
2017, when several gendarmes fired shots into the air in the cities of Daloa, 
Man, and Yamoussoukro, the first two of which are traditional strongholds of 
Gbagbo. The reactionary revolt centred on the Zambakro barracks, located just 
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outside of the symbolic government capital of Yamoussoukro, and involved 
disgruntled soldiers and gendarmes not from the FN, who did not benefit from 
the pay-outs. These uniformed personnel drove around in pick-up trucks and 
disturbed local populations by firing shots into the air, and, by some accounts, 
harassed civilian populations and stole from vehicles.449 The incident was 
reported to have started only hours after the government began to pay the first 
instalment of compensation money to the 8,400 integrated FN mutineers.450 In 
one account given by an FN mutineer who had gone to the bank to collect his 
pay-out, the gendarmes were trying to intimidate the former FN. The following 
quotation, taken from a local newspaper, gives significant insight into the 
tensions between those who received a pay-out and those who did not. 
 
We [integrated FN] were in the bank to take out money and they 
[gendarmes] come to shoot everywhere and scare people. The 
banks closed while everyone [former FN] has not yet been paid. 
[…] Until we get paid, whoever fires a shot in the air will find us 
on his way back.451 
 
In a second local newspaper article appearing on the same day, those firing the 
shots were not considered to be FN supporters and were revolting against the 
favourable treatment given to former FAFN fighters. They too, wanted 
compensation for their efforts made during the crisis.452 The successes of the 
mutinies in getting their pay-outs was a significant event that, consequently, 
triggered small copy-cat events. 
Beyond opposition to the pay-outs, other small-scale revolts occurred 
amongst those who wanted to make similar claims. On the 19th of January 
2017, for instance, a small group of Integrated FN penitentiary guards started 
their own revolt inside of the main prison in Bouaké, La Maison d’Arret et de 
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Correction de Bouaké.453 The guards were in revolt on account of their 
exclusion from the financial deal won by the 8,400 Integrated FN soldiers who 
launched their mutiny shortly before. To quell the revolt, the military was sent 
in, resulting in a clash that left three guards wounded and allowed three 
prisoners to escape. Additionally, accusations were made by the penitentiary 
guards that six heavy weapons belonging to them were seized and two guards 
were taken by the military. The spokesperson for the penitentiary guards of 
Bouaké stated this in a newspaper article reported by AFP. 
We are frustrated to have not been taken into account in this deal 
as we have fought in the post-electoral crisis of 2011 as much as 
those who have been taken into account. […] After the war, we 
accepted to be demobilised and to be reinserted into different 
corps, including into Customs, the Penitentiary, Water and 
Forests, the Police, and into the Gendarmerie, so we do not 
understand this situation of double standards.454  
According to the spokesperson, an additional 5,500 individuals should have 
received the same compensation as the mutinous soldiers did, if one were to 
take into account the true number of integrated FN across the different armed 
corps.455 
Following the wave of copy-cat claims-making actions amongst those in 
the Ivoirian armed forces, the Government felt compelled to explain their 
position. In a public statement made on 18 January 2017, the spokesperson for 
the government, Bruno Koné, explained that the payment was strictly for those 
ex-FAFN fighters who were involved in securing the north and the exit from 
crisis between the dates of 2007 – 2011. These soldiers, he explained, had not 
received salaries or bonuses during their service to the northern rebellion. To 
reassure the rest of the corps, the spokesperson assured that measures were 
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in place to improve their living conditions, without going into details of when and 
how living conditions would be improved.456  
 
As this section demonstrates, the success of the mutinies consequently 
resulted in a counter-protest by outraged civilians and a series of copy-cat 
revolts by members of the armed forces, resulting in brief episodes of instability. 
The levels of outrage over the mutinies and their pay-outs can be linked to the 
precedence of their continued use as a tactic. The following section outlines the 
historical patterns of mutiny and demonstrates how the appeasement of each 
likely contributed to its continued use in the post-conflict period.  
 
 
Historical Continuities in Mutiny 
 
Dating back to the final years of Houphouët-Boigny’s rule to the 2017 
mutinies, Ivoirian armed forces have repeatedly used mutiny as a form of 
political engagement to advance their financial and material interests. The 
analysis of the last 30 years of mutiny further demonstrates that tactics were 
repeated while demands increased exponentially.  
 
For soldiers with ties to the FN rebellion, the mutinies of January and 
May 2017 were not the first. During the 1980’s and 1990’s, mutineer demands 
were appeased by Houphouët-Boigny in a context of economic austerity 
measures, cuts in military spending, and redefined bilateral defence agreement 
with France that placed responsibility to quell domestic unrest on the Ivoirian 
state.457 In May 1990, a relatively small group of approximately 100 soldiers 
demanded to meet with the President while attempting to take over a state-run 
radio station. In response, Houphouët-Boigny promised higher salaries and an 
improvement in living conditions. Shortly after, similar demands were raised by 
members of the Air Force, who increased the stakes by making use of semi-
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automatic weapons to take control over the national airport’s tower and terminal 
building.458 
 
On 4-5 July 2000, soldiers at the Akouédo camp in Abidjan, generally 
thought to be those that would go on to form the FN,459 took to the streets to 
demand back pay, firing intermittent shots into the air. This back pay was 
allegedly for their roles during the December 1999 coup that brought General 
Robert Guéï to power.460 After two days of mutiny, the soldiers returned to their 
barracks with the promise of obtaining 6 million F CFA (approximately ₤ 8,000 
in 1999 rates), to be released before the end of the transitional government. 
Similarly, on the 18th of November 2014, soldiers with the same FN allegiance 
raised barricades and blocked streets in several main cities to protest against 
unpaid benefits relating to their roles in the FN rebellion.461 They made claims 
that totalled 5 million F CFA (approximately ₤ 6,700) in back-pay for their roles 
in supporting the FN rebellion between the 1st of January 2009 and June 
2011.462 Interestingly, the revolting soldiers insisted that the episode was not a 
mutiny but a practice of “revendication”, which roughly translates into ‘claims-
making.’463 In response, then Minister of the Interior, and recently promoted 
Minister of Defence following the 2017 mutinies, Hamed Bakayoko, welcomed 
the nuance specified by the claims-makers, all the while reassuring them that 
they were heard and that their concerns would be addressed. In an interview 
appearing in national newspapers, Hamed Bakayoko expressed the following. 
What do I want to say to young people? You spoke, the President 
understood, he gave instructions to parliament to solve your 
problem. As we say here in Africa: when you're right, do not spoil 
your reason. I ask them to stay as they have been: reasonable. 
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We have started specific discussions on the implementation 
modalities.464 
 
Unofficial sources confirm that those staking claims each received a pay-out of 
several million F CFA. As observed in 2017, despite the same claims of service 
to the FN, the demands for financial and material compensation increased since 
the previous waves of claims elaborated above. In addition to the payment of 
larger bonuses, villa houses, and demands for quicker military promotions, the 
mutineers of 2017 made claims for an ECOMOG bonus, allegedly for the roles 
that the FN soldiers played in removing Gbagbo from power, in the place of the 
ECOMOG forces that otherwise would have been deployed. The explanation, 
while unfounded, was generally presented to the Ivoirian population in similar 
ways to the one below. 
The soldiers are saying that during the post-electoral crisis, it 
was announced that the forces of ECOWAS would arrive to 
remove Gbagbo. And finally, these forces did not come, making 
it them that did the work. They are making claims for the money 
that, according to them, would have been given to the soldiers of 
ECOMOG.465 
Allegedly having performed the work of ECOMOG, the 8,400 soldiers asked 
that they be paid the salaries that would have otherwise been given by the 
Ivoirian state to the regional troops.  
As evident across time, dating back to the final years of Houphouët-
Boigny’s rule, to the 2017 mutinies, Ivoirian armed forces have successfully 
utilised mutiny as a form of political engagement to advance their financial and 
material interests. The analysis of the last 30 years of mutiny further 
demonstrates that tactics were repeated while demands increased 
exponentially. From 2000 onwards, mutinies were carried out nearly exclusively 
by the FN supporters who went on to launch the rebellion, become ComZones, 
and most recently, use their elite positions within the armed forces to negotiate 
a deal with new waves of FN-derived mutineers. This indicates that there is a 
sizeable faction within the military, with political affinities to the Ouattara regime, 
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that is prepared to use mutiny to make demands for their own welfare, 
regardless of whether their peers are considered. It equally demonstrates that 
this group has historically gained concessions from the government following 
the onset of instability in Côte d’Ivoire in the early 2000s. 
 
Military Integration: A ‘Good’ for Continued Redistribution 
 
As demonstrated above, the FN supporters who have been integrated 
into the armed forces have prioritised the method of mutiny as political 
engagement. This thesis posits that, having been integrated into the formal 
state structures, their proximity and continued allegiance to the former 
ComZones, and powerful political figures such as Guillaume Soro and 
Ouattara, greatly increases their bargaining power. While it would be simple to 
argue that mere access to weapons and military knowledge increased their 
chances of success, what is exceptional about the post-conflict Ivoirian military 
is that only a certain group with specific political loyalties used these means. 
Both the mutinies of January and May 2017 serve as examples of political 
engagement activities for those who consider themselves to be victors and who 
have the closest proximity to individuals of influence. In both cases, just as in 
2014, the ruling regime chose a strategy of appeasement, paying out those who 
presented the biggest threat to post-conflict peace and security. Despite the 
terms of the deal being relatively clear to civilian audiences, past claims-making 
activities such as the one of 2014 and those prior to the 11-year political crisis 
have been masked and kept undisclosed from the rest of society. 
The arcane deals that resulted from revolting military personnel in Côte 
d’Ivoire have repeatedly tipped the scales in their favour, creating a negative 
image of the Ivoirian military amongst civilian populations. As previously 
mentioned, many have come to see a large portion of the armed forces, 
particularly those who were involved in the FN rebellion, as undisciplined, 
illogical, and primarily concerned with their own monetary gain rather than with 
the protection of the state. The local perception of these ex-FN soldiers and 
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officers as mercenaries has subsequently nurtured a feeling of resentment and 
annoyance whenever there is a revolt for more pay-outs. These feelings are 
further compounded by the widespread belief that most of those who benefitted 
from the FN-integration may not have played as significant roles in the conflict 
as they have claimed. In numerous interviews with ex-demobilised FN fighters, 
Gbagbo supporters, university professors, and community youth, there is an 
overwhelming belief that many had used their personal relations or had paid a 
bribe to be part of the mass integration that followed the post-electoral crisis in 
2011. In a group interview with two individuals who consider themselves FN-
trained ex-combatants from the EFA sub-group (discussed in Chapter 7) but 
had not benefitted from integration, two paths to incorporation in the military 
were believed to exist: personal connections and bribes. For these individuals, 
personal connections, whether familial or through friendship were the primary 
way of getting integrated, allowing individuals to buy their way in at a lower price 
and through instalments. The second way was that of the “payment de poche”, 
which was reserved for those who did not have the right friends of family 
members in positions of authority.466  
The belief that after the crisis, familial ties played a significant role in 
integration is widespread. A young security guard who wanted to enter the 
armed forces but had been unsuccessful explained the following. 
It’s the government that determines the number of recruits each 
year. But it’s not as simple as that to enter, because you need to 
know the right people—somebody who is already there and who 
can put your name on the list of those who will enter. Even more 
in Côte d’Ivoire, there is corruption. If you don’t have money 
today, you cannot enter the army, or even get a job, despite the 
qualifications you have.467 
When asked if he believed that this applied only to army integration or if it held 
true for integration into the other corps, he exclaimed that all areas have an 
element of corruption to them. 
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Yes! It’s the same with the gendarmerie today. If you don’t have 
1 - 2 million [F CFA, approximately ₤1,300 – 2,600], you can’t. 
You can’t enter the gendarmerie. For the police, at least 1.5 
million. Customs—don’t even bother—it’s reserved. You need 
your father to work here or that he has a connection at the very 
least. All the examinations have become rigged, it’s difficult. 
Today, if you are the son of a poor man, you are destined to 
become a simple guard or somebody who sells SIM cards just to 
feed your family.468  
Similarly, in a long discussion with an Ivoirian professor, a snapshot was 
presented of how he saw the whole integration process unfolding. 
Let me explain to you how it works in Côte d’Ivoire. It’s simple. 
Here, when you are a Chief, and you need to do a recruitment, 
first, there is corruption. So, what does he do? First, he takes 
some of his friends that fought with him. Then those who were 
not taken into account start to complain that [the Chief] has taken 
his parents, friends, those who were here, those who went to 
school with him, there is your opportunity to enter into the army. 
So, we leave behind, in Bouaké, in Korhogo [northern FN 
centres], we leave them behind and take friends, so it’s a mix. 
There are, at the same time, those who really fought, and those 
who did not. There were those that were in school here when the 
regime changed, and if they had a cousin who was Minister of 
Defence, who signs him up, who integrates him, n’est-ce pas? 
So, when you look at them [claims-makers], you should not 
confuse those that fought with those that did not. You must 
consider the context as well—a country exiting a crisis with high 
unemployment.469 
 
In the above quotation, the professor brought up an important point. That is, in 
the larger context of unemployment, military integration takes on a broader 
meaning amongst much of the local population. For many, particularly youth 
who are unemployed or unsatisfied with their work, military integration 
represents a way of getting a good salary and the occasional large pay-out. In 
a context of significant youth unemployment, where the most accessible 
employment opportunities are provided through the informal economy, earning 
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a stable and sufficient wage for one’s family is a daunting task for both recently 
graduated and non-educated youth alike. In a discussion with the same guard 
mentioned above and who worked seven days a week, 24-hours a day,470 for 
roughly 10,000 F CFA a week (approximately ₤13), the topic of armed forces 
integration came up. Repeatedly, the young man made personal pleas that he 
connected to officials from the Etat Major, in the hopes that he could convince 
them to recruit him. This young man laid out a condition that was not only his 
situation, but also reminiscent of the professor’s opinion, and rings true for 
many youths trying to earn a living. 
It’s that here, in Côte d’Ivoire, it’s difficult to gain employment. In 
Côte d’Ivoire, here, if you don’t already have means or a good 
connection, it’s very very difficult, even [if you are university 
educated], to get work. This is what makes many of them go to 
the army, to become a military to try and earn your bread. 
Imagine that you a family of five. The first one, maybe because 
of small funds, was able to go to school, and got a BPC. The 
father can no longer afford to pay the tuition, so he must drop out 
and try to succeed in the [integration examinations for military, 
public service, each year]. To get in, you need connections.471 
Further elaborating, this young respondent brought up the competition for spots 
in prestigious post-secondary programmes against those with means. In his 
view, the integration into the armed forces was the only alternative. 
The exam for ENAP [National administration Programme]. 
Perhaps each year they take a dozen students in Côte d’Ivoire? 
What will that do? There are how many Ministers with children? 
So, it makes [a situation] where the spots are already reserved. 
So, this is another factor that makes it difficult for youth in Côte 
d’Ivoire to get jobs. Everybody has understood that at least you 
can try to enter into the army.472 
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The discussion held with the security guard was then raised again with the 
Ivoirian professor who shed light on the guard’s plight by presenting a 
hypothetical situation. 
So, he does the training, and he enters as a non-commissioned 
officer at the very least. He gets a salary, voila ! He gets the good 
treatment, n’est-ce pas? He gets a living allowance, a salary, 
voila! As he explained to you, he is poor. His parents are in the 
village and he is in Abidjan. Now he wants to take care of himself 
so that his parents can breathe a bit. And often, he is not alone, 
he has many younger brothers and sisters that come. As we say 
here, ‘take care of yourself, find yourself a job, and take control 
of your life.’ So, as he has difficulty finding a job, he hopes to go 
into the army, hoping that with all his qualifications [bachelor 
degree in geography], he will become an Officer at the very 
least.473  
For many, integration into the armed forces was less about a lifelong 
commitment to the interests of the state, to a life of discipline and personal 
sacrifice, but was rather about earning a stable income. This carries an 
undercurrent that suggests that for many, the biggest obstacles were due to 
their limited financial means and social networks. The technical skill level 
required, and the obligations of uniformed service hardly ever factored in to the 
majority of the respondent’s explanations, unless prompted. 
The emphasis placed on monetary and social connections leads into the 
next theme to emerge often in the interviews conducted during this research—
the seemingly low standards believed to be applied to post-conflict recruits and 
integration. This topic was directly brought up in a group discussion with five 
FN supporters who benefitted neither from integration nor from demobilisation, 
yet who wore bits and pieces of FACI fatigues and were squatting in a military 
office that had yet to be repurposed by the state. Amongst the individuals 
present, there was a loose consensus that military integration had been 
degraded further since the end of the crisis, with members of the regime 
                                                          




receiving bribes and applying lax standards of integration to those who should 
not have benefitted.  
Before the crisis, to enter the army you would go and sign up at 
the town hall. You would do two years of training, and you would 
constantly be under tests to be retained or let go. After the crisis, 
anything seems to go.474 
This individual further explained that before the crisis, there were a certain set 
of standards applied both to recruitment and to retention in the various corps. 
For individuals wishing to serve, tests were completed, training was 
administered, and, in the event that a soldier exhibited poor performance over 
a number of years, would eventually be forced into retirement.475  
Further highlighting the perception that recruitment is now not 
meritocratic was the third group interview held with six demobilised former FN 
youth. Throughout the discussion, the youth would bring up, at differing times, 
statements that reflected their thoughts on integration. At one point, one youth 
argued the opposite of what the previous group said, explaining that integration 
recruitment started as open to everyone, but that as time went on a minimum 
standard of education was enforced. For this individual, this standard resulted 
in many youths being left out of the army, that should have been integrated 
because of their military know-how acquired during the conflict.476 As the 
explanation continued, the group of youths began to describe a wartime 
situation that was neither factual or reflective of what had happened. 
Collectively, they described a war with large amounts of bloodshed, with 
endless combat, and recruitment styles that are more reflective of more 
extreme cases of civil war in West Africa which frequently forced the recruitment 
of child soldiers. Their narrative could not have been true. For one, their ages 
meant that they would have been between eight and ten years old at the time 
of the FN rebellion. They also lived in Abidjan, making it unlikely that they 
participated in the northern rebellion north of the demarcation line. Furthermore, 
they were residents of a neighbourhood that had not experienced much 
                                                          
474 FN-loyalists/Jeunes Associés, group interview with the author Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 27, 2016, in-person. 
475 FN-loyalists/Jeunes Associés, group interview with the author Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 27, 2016, in-person. 
476 Demobilised FN youth, group discussion with the author in Abidjan-Port Bouët, December 28, 2016, in-person. 
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violence in the post-electoral crisis, nor was it targeted during the many inter-
ethnic confrontations between 2000-2011. Furthermore, education systems 
remained in-tact in the south. Despite these facts, one of the youths in the group 
went on to explain that during the 11-year crisis, it was impossible to get an 
education, because the country was at war—a statement that runs counter to 
previous descriptions of the crisis from both academic and first-hand accounts. 
These youths continued to describe a conflict that left the country in tatters and 
described ex-combatant experiences more in tune with experiences in Sierra 
Leone and Liberia.477 The issue of unemployment and the precarious situation 
of Ivoirian youth was raised several times in daily conversations. In one 
discussion, the Ivoirian professor frequently consulted discussed the possible 
appeal of integration amongst FN-sympathising youth who find themselves in 
precarious financial situations. Although describing the situation of FN youth in 
particular, the analysis extends to youth in general, despite calls for open 
integration coming exclusively from the FN-affiliated groups. 
Amongst the FN, there are many illiterates. They did not go to 
school. To them, the army is a way of earning money. They earn 
a salary, they are fed in the camp, they get medical treatment 
when they are sick, and they have a bit of pocket money. On the 
streets, he is a little bandit, he might get one euro a day to eat, 
but in the army, he earns 100,000 F FCA. Therefore, the army is 
a form of social mobility. If he is a rank and file soldier, if he is 
strong, and rigorous, he might get noticed and tomorrow become 
the guard of a Minister. Things change. He will be with the 
Minister all the time, things change. He is no longer a rank-and-
file, n’est-ce-pas? He will sometimes get bonuses, have 
facilitated entry. So, the army is then a form of social promotion 
for those willing to work. It’s unemployment that creates this 
situation [mass appeal of army integration amongst financially 
unstable].478 
                                                          
477 Demobilised FN youth, group discussion with the author in Abidjan-Port Bouët, December 28, 2016, in-person. 
Themes such as these were used by the group of youth to reinforce the notion that they had been left behind and did 
not posses the power that they believed they would obtain with their official ex-combatant status cards. This topic is 
explored in Chapter 7. 




The reasons presented above describe the appeal that army integration has for 
the unemployed or for youth with a bleak financial future. The perceive an 
easier lifestyle, combined with the ability to make significant financial gains 
through mutiny or other forms of claims-making arguably showcases armed 
force integration an efficient and effective vehicle to advance one’s stature in 
society. Rather than being seen as an institution where all activities operate 
under a single command, where the place of residence is the same as work, 
where individuals are largely separated from society, and live collectively a 
formally administered and enclosed life,479 obtaining a military post is seen 
more as a good to be distributed to those who demonstrate political loyalty to 
the regime—not the state. This finding reflects the ways in which recruitment 
occurred under the successive regimes of Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo leading 
into the crisis, and further demonstrates how Ivoirians have come to expect the 
continuation of similar policies. Furthermore, traditional conceptions of military 
service demand that the personal political preferences of soldiers are kept 
private and their actions devoid of political leanings.480 In the interpretation of 
many disenfranchised youth, it was the opposite- it was a good of distribution 
that was dependent on political allegiance.  
 
Conclusion: Reinforcing Expectations 
 
As the mutinies of January and May 2017 demonstrate, military 
integration carries with it strong bargaining power. As a result of integration, 
individuals are seen to be closer to the ‘inside track’, holding official positions 
within the state institutions that are capable of distributing resources. Moreover, 
it formalises the ties between the integrated and their former patrons, the 
ComZones, many of whom also gained high-ranking posts in the armed forces 
                                                          
479 Godfrey Maringira and Lorena Nunez Carrasco, “‘Once a Solider, a Soldier Forever’: Exiled Zimbabwean Soldiers 
in South Africa,” Medical Anthropology 34, no. 4 (2015): 323. 
480 Maringira, “Politics, Privileges, and Loyalty in the Zimbabwean National Army,” 95. Maringira refers to Samuel 
Huntington’s 1957 conception of professional military corps, as appearing in Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and 




and in the government. While cases such as Zimbabwe demonstrate how ruling 
parties have effectively ‘captured’ the military with privileges and promotions for 
their political alignment, Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates that although observing the 
same trend of promotion, it is rather military-driven than initiated from political 
elites. This finding reinforces Dwyer’s argument that mutiny is an effective form 
of communication with political and military superiors. As such, this thesis 
classifies it within the realms of political engagement. 
The proximity to former, and perhaps current, patrons was best 
demonstrated by the presence of the former ComZones at the negotiating table 
while the mutineers and the Minister of Defence were discussing the terms of 
an agreement. The presence of the former ComZones illustrates how significant 
their influence continues to be on the integrated FN fighters, with the regime 
deeming it appropriate to bring them into the negotiations to bridge the gaps 
between the government and the mutineers. In this sense, the former 
ComZones still wield a significant amount of influence over the integrated FN, 
despite the latter falling under slightly altered chains of command within an 
integrated military apparatus.481 The presence of the ComZones may have also 
demonstrated the weak degrees of authority that the Minister himself held over 
the mutineers. Contrary to the Gbabgo supporters, the loyalties of the 
integrated FN fighters are not to a sole individual through national level political 
party identities. The Integrated FN made their pleas directly to the president, 
Alassane Ouattara, and were pacified by their former ComZone commanders. 
The demands made, reinforce this thesis’ main argument that clientelistic 
practices prevail in such situations. In this situation, actors from one political 
tendence had to engage directly with their political support base, based solely 
on past promises of favourable treatment in exchange for their loyalty. The 
practices of clientelism in this in the case of the integrated FN, has been driven 
both from the top as it has from the bottom; while the regime has been 
distributing opportunities and concessions to the military with favouritism for ex-
FN soldiers and other well-connected individuals who could pay their way in, 
                                                          
481 Aline Leboeuf, “Com’Zones et Armée en Côte d’Ivoire,” Afrique Contemporaine 3, no. 263-264 (2017): 258. 
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clientelism was equally driven from the bottom-up, through the expectations of 
rewards and payments for continued loyalty. 
As the preceding sections have demonstrated, the Ivoirian armed forces 
have repeatedly resorted to mutiny and similar revolts, violent and non-violent, 
to advance their interests. While earlier documentation of mutinies from the 
1990s suggests that mutinies were carried out devoid of political inclinations,482 
more recent instances provide strong evidence of mutiny as increasingly 
political. Following the 2011 post-electoral crisis, mutineers derived almost 
exclusively from one political bloc, that of the FN rebellion. By staking claims 
exclusively to the political elites that they consider to be ‘their own’, and by 
influencing the distribution of state funds and military promotions to those who 
demonstrated past and continued loyalty to the regime, the mutinies of 2017 
are inherently political. This trend runs parallel to similar claims of African 
militaries in the post-colonial period becoming political actors,483 although in 
slightly different ways than those seen in Zimbabwe, where integrated liberation 
veterans are used by political elite to maintain political domination. 
Establishing that the integrated FN are highly active and effective in their 
methods of political engagement, builds on evolving research on ex-
combatants as political actors, as outlined in Chapter 2.484 The political 
participation of ex-combatants in post-conflict states, however, does not 
necessarily imply compliance with democratic ideals. Political engagement can 
also include participation with undemocratic traits such as corruption, 
authoritarianism, and patrimonial governance. Political engagement of 
integrated combatants, in this sense, is in some ways mainstreamed if it 
                                                          
482 Past records of these early mutinies do not mention any dynamics that could make them politically-driven. Due to 
the basic descriptions provided of past mutinies, it is possible that political dynamics were overlooked. 
483 Maringira, “Politics, Privileges, and Loyalty in the Zimbabwean National Army,” 93. 
484 For literature on rebel group transitions into political parties see: Terrence Lyons, “Victorious rebels and postwar 
politics,” Civil Wars 18, no.2, (2016): 160-174; Johanna Söderström, “The Resilient, the Remobilised, and the 
Removed: Party Mobilisation among Former M19 Combatants,” Civil Wars 18, no. 2, (2016): 214-233; Gyda Marås 
Sindre and Johanna Söderström, “Understanding Armed Groups and Party Politics,” Civil Wars 18, no.2, (2016): 109-
117; Terrence Lyons, “The Importance of Winning: Victorious Insurgent Groups and Authoritative Politics,” 
Comparative Politics 48, no.2 (2016): 167-184; Jeremy Speight and Katrin Wittig, “Pathways from Rebellion: Rebel-
Party Configurations in Côte d’Ivoire and Burundi,” African Affairs 117, no. 466 (2017): 21-43. 
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operates on the same terms as the larger polity, for better or for worse.485 This 
chapter extends this analysis to include recently integrated FN combatants, by 
demonstrating that their claims to their patrons displays clientelistic tendencies, 
in which claims are made distinctly to elites perceived as ‘their own’ and often 
through former direct loyalties to influential individuals such as the Zone 
Commanders (ComZones). These exchanges reflect both past and current 
trends in the larger Ivoirian polity. 
Perhaps the most important thing that the mutinies of January and May 
2017 demonstrate is that the most destabilising spoilers in the post-conflict 
period were not those excluded from political power, but rather, those most 
proximate to it. The continued practice of clientelistic governance, in which 
mutineer clients make bold and highly disruptive demands of their regime 
patrons, may in and of itself be a mobilising factor for political engagement 
amongst ex-combatants. In this sense, ex-combatants may consider that it is 
their time to advance their interests as their own are now in power. The irony is 
this is that those considered to be the victors, to have had their political desires 
satisfied, are also those that pose the greatest threat to society. Interestingly, 
unlike under Gbagbo’s rule where Ivoirian supporters came together to 
voluntarily support the cause, under the present government it appears to be 
quite the opposite.486 Under the current government, the integrated FN soldiers 
need to be constantly rewarded with material goods or job placements in 
exchange for their support.487 Individuals from this group have effectively 
leveraged their wartime labels and experiences to call on the president to grant 
them compensation that they felt due. Nonetheless, the successes of the 
integrated FN fighters have not been without consequence. Backlash from both 
their Gbagbo-supporting counterparts in the armed forces as well as from the 
                                                          
485 Johanna Söderström “The Political Consequences of Reintegration Programmes in Current Peace-Building: A 
Framework for Analysis,” Conflict, Security & Development 13, no. 1 (2013): 92. 
486 This point was often mentioned in passing by Gbagbo supporters to make clear the differences in origin between 
Gbagbo supporters and FN affiliated individuals. While Gbagbo built his initial base through the allure of his political 
ideas (multi-party elections, socialism), popular support built over the years. The FN, on the other hand, as argued by 
Gbagbo supporters, used promises of material rewards for participation.  
487 FPI Youth Leader (Affi), discussion with the author in Abidjan, June 26, 2017, in-person. 
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broader public demonstrates that popular support for their causes is waning. 
With every public disruption, militarily-integrated formers FN soldiers get 
increasingly branded as mercenaries and as illiterates with little regard or 
concern for Ivoirian national interests. 
These observations challenge simplistic perceptions of all ex-
combatants to be disgruntled and high-risk individuals if left idle with 
grievances. As demonstrated above, those combatants derived from the ranks 
of the FN and who were integrated into the Ivoirian armed forces, have in many 
ways been the most disruptive to society. The increased disruption caused by, 
and hostility faced by, the Integrated FN demonstrates that political, economic, 
and social instability can also be derived from those in relatively more stable 
conditions, that of salaried employment. This finding further opens questions as 
to whether strong clientelistic ties, act as a catalyst for political claims-making, 
and in cases where proximity to power is close, to instability. Much of this, 
however, hinges on the observation that mutineers require military or political 
leadership that is willing to respond to their grievances.488 In the case of the 
integrated FN fighters, three armed revolts have taken place since 2011, the 
most recent two of which resulted in civilian casualties, injuries, and a halted 
economy. This behaviour has already sparked a wave of similar behaviour 
through reactionary revolts, more of which is elaborated in Chapter 7, and as it 
has proven to be a very successful strategy, it is not unlikely that it will continue 
to be employed in the future, the full implications of which are yet to be realised. 
  
                                                          
488 Dwyer, “Borrowed Scripts,” 113. While this point was made in specific relation to democratic regimes, which are 
arguably more likely to willingly listen, the data presented in this chapter argues that willing listeners are also present 
within clientelistic relations, in which there is a mutual dependency exchange between client and patron. 
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Chapter 7: Ex-Forces Nouvelles as Demobilised Hopefuls 
 
 
If those with political patrons in power are more likely to engage in 
disruptive claims-making, as the previous chapter demonstrated, then this 
chapter adds further nuance by demonstrating that victors on the fringes of 
power enjoy less success. This chapter marks the second part of an 
examination into the political engagement activities of those who consider 
themselves as ‘victors’ to the 11-year political crisis: the Forces Nouvelles (FN) 
supporters. This chapter, therefore, examines the various forms of claims-
making used by FN supporters who were demobilised, and who consider 
themselves to be ex-combatants regardless of whether they benefitted from a 
national DDR programme. The term ‘demobilised’ alludes to Ivoirians who refer 
to themselves as ex-combatants and are no longer members of any armed 
group but have instead returned to civilian life, with or without compensation. 
Their demobilisation may have been through formal channels, such as the 
national DDR programme, or by their own will. The term Demobilised FN, in this 
chapter, is reserved for those individuals who supported the northern FN 
rebellion through any of its three wings: military, economic, or political and who 
self-identify as an ex-combatant from the FN rebellion.  
Like the previous chapter, the political engagement activities examined 
below are those carried out by individuals who are typically aligned to the former 
rebel leader, and current President of the National Assembly, Guillaume Soro. 
FN supporters who broke off from the rebellion to follow rival FN leader Ibrahim 
Coulibaly (alias “IB”), have a unique political trajectory that is examined in 
Chapter 8. Demobilised FN, therefore, is used as a short-hand indicator of 
those FN ex-combatants who were demobilised, through an official programme 
or on their own, and who identify under the pro-Soro wing of the FN. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, over time, FN supporters aligned with Soro were 
observed to engage in claims-making activities, which included mutiny, 
association-forming, protesting, and individual letter-writing. The claims put 
forward to the regime centre on military integration, whether being integrated 
directly into the armed force structures, or for back pay equalling the salaries 
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that would have been earned had the individual been integrated. Like the FN 
Integrated, whose political engagement occurred on a much larger, public, and 
disruptive scale—that of armed mutiny—demobilised FN ex-combatants 
anticipated favourable treatment from the regime, based on political loyalties 
professed to Ouattara and the FN rebellion. Unlike the Integrated FN, however, 
amongst the demobilised, claims-making activities, while occasionally 
disruptive to society, happened on a smaller scale and were met with little to no 
success. An ongoing belief that there would eventually be rewards for their 
political support encouraged the formation and re-formation of claims based on 
what was perceived to gain the most traction with the regime. Through the data 
presented below, demobilised FN have organised and participated in various 
political engagement activities, including protests, association-forming, and 
individual letter-writing to advance their interests and obtain financial 
assistance in the post-conflict period. This chapter demonstrates that although 
the demobilised FN do not have the highest degrees of access to political actors 
of influence, their political allegiance to the regime and their sense of loyalty to 
the President nurtured a sense of opportunity for the staking of claims to the 
post-conflict regime. While less disruptive than the activities of the mutineers, 
demobilised FN demonstrated continuous efforts to engage with the regime and 
had a moderate capacity to disrupt peace and stability. Despite sharing the 
same political loyalties and history of rebellion as those who were granted large 
concessions, demobilised FN claims-making was rarely successful. This 
chapter proposes that this lack of success was on account of two primary 
reasons: a lack of support from their successful integrated peers, and an 
increasing degree of scepticism from the regime of who fought, who offered 
support, and who has opportunistic motives.  
This chapter looks more deeply into the post-conflict political trajectories 
of the demobilised FN ex-combatants, while complementing the work 
presented in the previous chapter. Together, both Chapters 6 and 7 on the FN 
supporters demonstrate that those who consider themselves the victors, and 
who are in closer proximity to state actors and institutions of influence, are more 
politically active than those who consider themselves to have fallen out of 
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grace, such as the Commando Invisibles (Chapter 8), and those who are in 
opposition, such as Gbagbo supporters (Chapter 5). This chapter reinforces the 
thesis’s primary argument that claims making is highest amongst Ivoirian ex-
combatants who consider ‘their own’ patrons to be in power and who have the 
strongest ties to people of influence. Their disruptive forms of political 
engagement, therefore, are driven in part by their expectations of clientelistic 
practices of governance to continue in the post-conflict period. This chapter 
draws from individual and group interviews, documents provided by the 
respondents themselves, as well as local and international media coverage.  
 
 
Actor Background: Demobilised FN 
 
Originating from the FN northern rebellion, the demobilised FN are 
individuals who supported the presidential candidacy of Alassane Ouattara and 
are largely believed to fall under the pro-Guillaume Soro branch of the rebellion. 
Amongst those making up the demobilised FN groups, identities related to the 
conflict centre mostly around participation in the civilian or armed wing of the 
FN during the territorial split of the country, or during the post-electoral crisis, 
either through direct battle in Abidjan or in any of the smaller battles in the 
southwest of the country as the FN descended to take control of Abidjan. For 
the most part, combatants from this group self-identify as FN supporters, while 
a handful of sub-groups have also been identified. More importantly are the 
blurred categories that surround the various sub-groups below. This 
“murkiness” makes the identities and the claims of participation in the FN 
rebellion difficult to verify. Oftentimes, respondents will start a discussion 
pledging membership in one sub-group, while finishing the conversation in a 
different sub-group. ‘Membership’489 in many of these sub-groups is likely to be 
fluid, with individuals moving from one group to another. Of importance is their 
                                                          
489 ‘Membership’ in this chapter is to be understood as a vague and fluid sense of belonging in a group. There were 
no strict or enforced terms of membership observed within this group during the compilation of this project. 
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broad allegiance to the FN and to Ouattara’s regime, and the loose criteria of 
what participation in the broader FN rebellion was like.  
Two additional groups with specific wartime identity claims within the 
demobilised FN are the Jeunes Associés and the Ecole des Forces Armées 
(EFA) fighters. The Jeunes Associés is the government-given name for 
individuals who were loosely affiliated to the Forces Républicaines de Côte 
d’Ivoire (FRCI)490, hoping for integration into the unified state military and 
paramilitary forces. In one telling, the FRCI and their “Associés” supported 
official FN fighters, volunteering their support to establish security in Abidjan by 
filling the void left by Gbagbo’s defeated loyalist forces. Between 2011 and 
2015, many of the military camps in Abidjan that were previously used as 
specialised units under Gbagbo’s security apparatus were subsequently 
inhabited by groups of Associés. For others, such as individuals who claim to 
be from the Commando Invisibles, the origins of the Jeunes Associés are 
unclear, with some respondents describing them as the friends and families of 
the former ComZones who dwelled in several abandoned military state 
premises during the post-electoral crisis up until 2015.491 Regardless of origin, 
participation amongst the Associés was described by self-identifying claimants 
to have included anything from voluntarily accompanying soldiers on official 
missions, voluntary informant services, cleaning communal dwellings,  
organising other Associés, and cleaning weapons. In one interview, one self-
proclaimed leader of one of the Jeunes Associés groups described how the 
Associés would collect conflict-related equipment to convince the authorities of 
their legitimacy. During the post-electoral crisis, these individuals observed how 
the attire was to be worn and began to replicate the styles of legitimate state 
security authorities,492 a practice more attuned to mimicking behaviour than to 
actual participation in the rebellion. Following the post-electoral crisis of 2011, 
                                                          
490 Recall- the initial FRCI was the name chosen by the FN fighters as they descended to take control of Abidjan in 
2011. This then became the official name of the Ivoirian armed forces, replacing the FDS title under Gbagbo’s rule. In 
2016, the FRCI state forces changed their name to Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FACI). 
491 EFA fighter 3, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person.Similar events were 
described informally by an Abidjan-based analyst in early 2017. 
492 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, July 26, 2017, in-person. 
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Jeunes Associés were still observed to be wearing pieces of army attire as they 
continued to occupy abandoned state barracks. These efforts, however, were 
not entirely in vain. In June 2015, the national authorities for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation, and Reintegration and the FRCI conducted special 
disarmament and demobilisation operations to remove the Jeunes Associés 
from their camps to reclaim the buildings for their own forces. For their 
departure, the Jeunes Associés were offered entrance into the national DDR 
programme in lieu of integration into the state forces that officials explained was 
already at capacity.493 
The second sub-group to arise during the fieldwork is that of the EFA 
fighters. Leading into the 2010 crisis, a group of Abidjan fighters were allegedly 
trained in Bouaké at the Ecole des Forces Armées (EFA), in support of 
Guillaume Soro’s wing of FN loyalists. According to interviews with two of these 
self-identifying individuals, participants in the EFA group were trained in tactics 
such as ambush, as well as in the use of both small arms and heavy 
weapons.494 These select fighters, it was explained, would be used as Abidjan-
based reinforcements in the instance that Gbagbo refused to step down from 
power following the contested 2010 presidential elections.495 During interviews, 
respondents from the EFA sub-group maintained that they had launched the 
attacks at PK 18, a notorious battlefield during the 2010-11 crisis. Other 
respondents, however, countered these claims, describing an ‘EFA project’ that 
was never fully realised, with most of the people involved sent home without 
completing their military training. This alternate version stresses that EFA 
fighters, having limited and unrealised knowledge of combat, returned to 
Abidjan and took on roles as infiltrators to the Commando Invisibles.496 
                                                          
493 Fraternité Matin, ‘‘Libération des sites privés et publics: l’armée ivoirienne lance l’opération ‘bonheur’,” Abidjan.net, 
April 21, 2015, http://news.abidjan.net/h/549626.html; Vincent Duhem,‘‘Côte d’Ivoire: présentez… armes! (et 
déposez-les !),” Jeune Afrique, June 29, 2015, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/241347/politique/cote-divoire-
presentez-armes-et-deposez-les/  
494 EFA fighter 1, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
495 Police Commissioner- Centre National de Sécurité, interview with the author in Abidjan-Plateau, October 25, 2016, 
in-person. 
496 The term ‘infiltrators’ was used by original members of the Commando Invisibles, and was supported by stories 
told informally by international practitioners. While it is possible that these individuals were simply ‘hanging-on’ to the 
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Allegations such as these, presented by self-identifying Commando Invisibles 
and in informal discussions with international practitioners, elucidate a 
successful group of infiltrators spying on the activities of IB and his fighters and 
fleeing from outbreaks of violence. The infiltrators, in this version, are believed 
to be the same individuals who later, in the post-conflict period, presented 
themselves as the individuals who opened the Abidjan battlefield for the FN 
rebels to take control of Abidjan—the very role that the Commando Invisibles 
are widely acknowledged to have played in the post-electoral crisis by most 
Ivoirian and international observers.497 EFA group fighters were reported to 
have been mostly integrated into the state forces, whether by recruitment or 
bribes, as explained by one EFA fighter who was not integrated but had kept 
records of those that were.498 The remaining EFA fighters, this respondent 
explained, refrained from the national DDR programme with the expectation 
that Ouattara’s government would rectify the uneven distribution of military 
posts and would integrate those left out. Should the regime no longer be able 
to integrate them, the respondent hoped that Ouattara would provide monetary 
compensation that exceeded the amount given to ex-combatants through the 
DDR programme.499 The claims of EFA fighters paying their way into the armed 
forces could not be verified, but remains consistent with popular opinion 
amongst Ivoirians considered to be Gbagbo supporters, Commando Invisibles, 
demobilised FN, and regular civilians. That said, there is likely an element of 
truth in these allegations, which are frequently used to justify the multiple 
attempts of demobilised FN ex-combatants to make claims.  
Over the course of the conflict, many individuals sought to attach 
themselves to armed forces both loyal to the northern rebellion and to Gbagbo’s 
state forces, as described in the interviews and in a handful of academic 
                                                          
Commando Invisibles, this thesis uses the terminology of ‘infiltrator’ as it is consistent with wartime narratives 
presented in Chapter 8 (Commando Invisibles). 
497 Commando Invisibles (Original), group discussion with the author in Abidjan Abobo, October 1, 2016, in-person. 
498 EFA fighter 1, interview with the author in Abobo-Abidjan, September 26, 2016, in-person. This EFA ex-
combatant also provided a list of former EFA fighters, each with a letter next to their name indicating which armed 
forces structure they were integrated into. The EFA fighter explained and made small marks next to the names of 
those who allegedly paid state officials to be integrated. 
499 EFA fighter 1, interview with the author in Abobo-Abidjan, September 26, 2016, in-person. 
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articles500. These individual ‘volunteers’ may or may not have been armed with 
weapons left behind after a violent confrontation, or with weapons that were 
donated to the individuals in an informal way. These individuals also collected 
an array of military attire to ‘play the part’, and in some cases, received basic 
military training out of the goodwill of a trained security sector officer. 501 Like 
the case of the Jeunes Associés, these individuals often wore partial military 
attire, attempting to replicate the look of the armed forces as best as they could.  
In controlled settings, and in some civil wars, access to military attire is 
controlled, even by militias and other non-state forces seeking to enforce their 
own orders. The allowance of attire to be collected and worn by individuals with 
loose ties to the official structures indicates a degree, even if only marginal, of 
tacit acceptance. In this sense, recipients of these pieces of attire might have 
been tacitly accepted into the broader structure or the broader movement. The 
giving of pieces could also be seen as a way of helping those in need. Knowing 
that financial support and other benefits would likely to be available in the post-
conflict period, the act of gifting, or simply allowing, an individual to ‘own’ 
symbols of combat could be seen as a form of distribution, or a chance of 
distribution to those in need. This second scenario resonates with an 
explanation given by a Gbagbo supporter of how the ComZones likely used the 
national DDR programme as a way of helping those in need.502 While it may 
seem unlikely that pieces of attire would be handed out voluntarily, this thesis 
argues that it is possible. What this demonstrates, and is of essence for this 
chapter, is that what constitutes an FN fighter is much broader than a traditional 
‘ex-combatant’ with battle-hardened experience. 
Adding to these descriptions are those provided by respondents from the 
État Major and with self-identifying Jeunes Associés on the phenomenon of 
civilian “rattisage” (or sweeping) of the streets for any remnants of the war such 
as loose pieces of ammunition, weapons magazines, or other bits of lose 
                                                          
500 The most detailed reference to the phenomena of volunteers and their tactics of assimilation are provided in: Karel 
Arnaut, “Corps habillés, Nouchis and subaltern bigmanity in Côte d'Ivoire,” African conflicts and informal power: Big 
men and networks, ed. Mats Utas (London: Zed Books, 2012), 78-97. 
501 Arnaut, “Corps habillés, Nouchis and subaltern bigmanity in Côte d'Ivoire,” 87.  
502 Gbagbo supporter, interview with the author in Abidjan, June 24, 2017, in-person. 
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pieces.503 According to these respondents, the logic behind actions of ratissage 
was that possession of this equipment would hold value in the post-conflict 
period by opening doors that were reserved for those who fought, such as the 
army integration or the national DDR programme. Should possession of these 
objects not be rewarded, they could, at the very least, be sold off on the local 
markets.504 Several Jeunes Associés interviewed alleged that regular civilians, 
with basic knowledge of the crisis, had begun making use of the ‘ex-combatant’ 
label in anticipation of the financial compensation thought to be accorded to 
them.505  
The variation across stories and identities listed above is undoubtedly 
difficult to decipher. The most important consideration, however, is that the lines 
between regular civilian and FN supporter, whether through the military, 
political, or economic wings, are blurred. It is these blurred identities and claims 
of participation in the conflict that promoted an underlying belief that there were 
ample opportunities for claims-making under the ruling regime, and that 
different groups’ political loyalty, and particularly to the President Alassane 
Ouattara would be compensated. 
 
Post-Conflict Political Engagement: Claims-Making 
 
Amongst the groups mentioned above, claims-making is visible in a 
variety of forms and is largely dependent on where an individual is located in 
terms of proximity to influential political actors. For those who benefitted from 
the national DDR programme and were granted official demobilisation cards 
and ex-combatant status, claims-making predominantly took the form of 
protests and association-forming, leveraging the label of ‘ex-combatant’ to 
advocate for additional financial support matching the salaries of army-
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integrated individuals. For ex-combatants from the FN who were demobilised, 
through the national DDR programme or on their own, claims-making was 
observed to consist of written pleas addressed to the President and the First 
Lady. FN supporters who gained employment in the post-conflict recovery 
sector also used the ‘ex-combatant’ label to continue using state resources in 
the post-conflict period. When their contracts ended, however, they lost their 
access to state resources and attempted to use the label and continued 
professions of loyalty to Ouattara, the former ComZones, and to those closest 
to Soro to lobby for facilitated recruitment. The following sections examine the 
range of practices and tactics used demobilised FN use to make claims for 




Between 2011 and 2018, multiple protests were carried out by groups of 
ex-combatants. Initially, grievances were raised by those who were registered 
in the national DDR programme and revolved around tardy payment 
schedules.506 Multiple protests took place between 2014-2016 focused on the 
operational challenges of the national DDR programme, demanding swifter 
delivery of entitlements. However, after the national DDR programme closed, 
ex-combatant protests continued and expanded to include demobilised FN 
fighters who did not participate and did not receive official ex-combatant status. 
The grievances of the post-DDR period reflect the broader trends of political 
engagement by FN supporters for either armed force integration or payments 
to match the salaries they would have earned if they had been integrated. The 
claims made by FN supporters in the post-DDR period were made directly to 
the regime, and often evoked memories of participation in the FN and their role 
in bringing Ouattara to power. This thesis considers these claims to be 
inherently political as they are voiced by a specific group of supporters to their 
political patrons and evoke sentiments of a mutually beneficial exchange. 
Because the FN brought Ouattara to power, FN supporters argue that they must 
                                                          
506 Ivoirian Former ADDR staff, interview with the author in Abidjan-Cocody, November 17, 2016, in-person. 
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now be compensated. To illustrate this point, this Chapter focuses on FN 
claims-making activities that took place after the close of the DDR programme, 
with particular emphasis on those that took place alongside the mutinies of 
2017. 
At the same time as the May 2017 mutiny, a ‘demobilised fighters’ protest 
was organised at the same site as the mutiny in Bouaké, although it received 
considerably less media attention.507 On the 8th of May 2017, after mutinous 
soldiers succeeded in receiving their payments, which totalled 12 million F CFA, 
ex-combatants from the most recently formed “Cellule 39”, blocked access to 
Bouaké, making claims for integration into the army as well as a payment of 
18,000,000 F CFA (approximately ₤24,000).508 “Cellule 39” is named after the 
first wave of demobilised soldiers who received a registration number with the 
prefix ‘39’; and whose participation in the FN rebellion dates back to 2002.509 
Subsequent waves of demobilisation can be identified by the first two numbers 
of their registration documents. While many staked claims for well above the 12 
million received by the mutinous soldiers months earlier, other ex-combatants 
at the scene sought to use the high-profile event to remind the authorities of 
their own plight. The protests centred in Bouaké, with a relatively small turn out 
in Abidjan and Korhogo of approximately 50 people each. In a local newspaper, 
one demobilised protestor from Korhogo stated: “Like the mutinous militaries, 
we are making claims to president Ouattara for our (rebellion) wartime 
bonuses.”510 Looking for a similar response from the regime that the mutineers 
received in both January and May, demobilised protestors stated repeatedly 
across media outlets that they would not stop protesting unless the President, 
the Minister of Defence, Alain-Richard Donwahi, or the Military Chief of Staff, 
                                                          
507 Small numbers of demobilised fighters were also present in other cities alongside the mutinies, however, due to 
the size and historical importance of Bouaké, media focused attention on the events in Bouake. 
508 Claire Rainfroy, “Côte d’Ivoire: des démobilisés endeuillés réclament à leur tour des primes, “ Jeune Afrique, May 
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509 Kamina Dialla, “La Cellule 39 en Côte d’Ivoire: Processus d’Identification et de Mobilisation d’un Groupe d’Ex-
Combattants,” Afrique Contemporaine 3, no. 263-264 (2017) : 178. 




Touré Sekou, responded directly to their claims.511 None of the sought 
authorities responded to the demobilised FN, focusing their efforts rather on the 
mutineers. 
Despite common grievances and origins, the mutinous integrated FN 
soldiers did not universally welcome the presence of demobilised ex-
combatants. As the mutinous soldiers held their positions mid-May, clashes 
occurred between them and the demobilised fighters. The peak of clashes 
resulted in the mutinous soldiers firing on ex-combatants to remove them and 
disassociate their own version of claims-making. The presence of protesting 
ex-combatants alongside the mutineers, it was believed by some soldiers, 
risked diluting the legitimacy of claims made by the soldiers themselves.512 As 
a result, one demobilised claims-maker succumbed to his injuries and passed 
away on the 14th May. Following the death of the ex-combatant, military Chief 
of Staff, Sekou Touré, travelled to Bouaké and asked for forgiveness from the 
ex-combatants for the poor behaviour of the FACI soldiers.513 
Nevertheless, once again on the 22nd of May, ex-combatants took to the 
streets, briefly occupying the highway access point outside of Abidjan and in 
Korhogo. This time, the protest was addressed by the Minister of Solidarity, 
Mariatou Koné. To appease the disgruntled demobilised combatants, the 
minister delivered a speech in which she pledged, on behalf of President 
Ouattara and his government, more funds for projects for the demobilised FN 
ex-combatants. The Minister’s speech made no mention of their claims for 
greater sums of bonus payments than those received by the mutineers, nor did 
it address any of the additional claims raised by past groups of demobilised 
FN.514 Following the minister’s speech and departure, morale among the 
demobilised FN present on site remained sceptical, with one protestor stating: 
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“How do you pay 17 million [F CFA to mutineers]—12 million this year and 5 
million in 2014 to the mutineers and to us you talk about projects!”515  
The presence of ex-combatants at the site of the May mutiny had 
particular significance to this research. For many weeks an interview was 
sought with a specific ex-combatant who had allegedly played a key role in the 
founding of an ex-combatant association in Bouaké. News returned, by way of 
the gatekeeper, that the individual sought was planning a ‘sensitive’ activity and 
was unlikely to be available in the coming weeks. Within days of receiving this 
news, the second mutiny in May broke out, with groups of ex-combatants 
protesting alongside it to also benefit from the pay-outs. The demobilised FN 
ex-combatants, while maintaining weak links with the mutineers, hoped to also 
benefit from the media presence and to engage in negotiations with the 
government officials that would come and quell the uprisings. Three days after 
the mutiny ended, the FN gatekeeper informed me through a phone call that 
many of the ex-combatants demonstrating had been arrested. The gatekeeper, 
himself an ex-combatant who easily moved between different sub-groups of 
FN, theatrically described the injustice of the events. In his telling, none of the 
demobilised FN protesters were armed, nor did they organise any strike or 
protest; they simply took to the streets to bring attention to their grievances. 
Evoking themes of injustice, the gatekeeper drew on the events as proof that 
the mutinous soldiers who took up arms had “got to sit around a table with the 
Minister, while the ex-combatants are now in prison.”516 Injustice, he explained, 
was the way the government responded and treated different post-conflict 
groups with the same origins and wartime experiences. As they were all from 
the FN, brought Ouattara to power, and continued to pledge political loyalty to 
him, they should be accounted for equally. This story is insightful for two 
reasons. First, it suggests that there might have been a degree of information-
sharing between the demobilised FN and those who would go on to form the 
mutinies, although this remains unconfirmed. Second, echoing the statements 
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of the gatekeeper, the pay-outs to the mutineers and the subsequent arrests 
and of the ex-combatants further reinforced the perception that claims-making 
through violence elicits the best responses.517 
While the protest above was the most notable organised demonstration 
by ex-combatants, protests have been the primary form of claims-making. Prior 
to this, various gatherings were held at several points in the post-crisis period, 
once the national DDR programme had ended. As mentioned in Chapter 1 
(Introduction), a demobilised FN supporter threatened to undertake a hunger 
strike to stake claims for similar compensation.518 In most cases, the protests 
elicited monetary compensation or military integration from the regime, and the 
protestors often made pleas personal by addressing the president himself. In 
addition to mounting their own public protests and demonstrations for more 
compensation, the ex-combatants are suspected of having captured more 
mainstream public protests. For instance, the protest against the Compagnie 
Ivoirienne d’électricité (CIE) in Bouaké on the 22nd of July 2016 was a civilian-
led protest about the rising price of electricity. The confrontation, resulted in one 
death, tens of injured, and between 44-50 arrests, many of which are rumoured 
to be demobilised FN ex-combatants.519 The ex-combatants believed to have 
been present allegedly infiltrated the civilian protest to “show authorities they 
are still there”.520 Following the protest, the FN gatekeeper informed me that 
some of the ex-combatants were being detained by the authorities for further 
investigation over what their real motives were.521 This information could not be 
confirmed, but if true, demonstrates the willingness of the demobilised FN to 
seize protest opportunities that are not originally their own. 
What is still puzzling about the protests, is that despite their repeated 
use amongst the demobilised FN, they have yielded few positive results. In 
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most cases described above, they were more likely to wield negative outcomes 
such as detainment and suspicion from the regime. For protest to be considered 
a viable option, there should either be signs that it will generate the desired 
outcome, or precedence in which protest yielded positive results. Braithwaite et 
al. explain that the “onset of protest requires an additional catalyst for 
mobilisation, namely, examples elsewhere that show mobilisation is 
possible.”522 This chapter, therefore, advances the likelihood that the 
demobilised FN drew inspiration, and motivation, for continuing protests when 
they saw that the integrated FN had successfully received pay-outs for similar 
claims in 2014, and again in 2017. This would explain why they continued to 
highlight their roles in the FN, their contribution to bringing Ouattara to power, 
and their expectations for the same types of bonuses given to those who were 
integrated. It equally helps explain why the demobilised FN sometimes 
infiltrated civilian protests and sought to ‘remind authorities’ that they were still 
active. In this sense, the suggestion that they could sow insecurity even through 
protests that were not their own, gives the idea that they could also be a source 




Since 2011, ex-combatant associations in Côte d’Ivoire have taken on 
many different names and compositions, making it difficult to identify a stable 
group with fixed membership and a significant lifespan.  
Much of the early academic literature about ex-combatants argued that 
the act of retaining wartime social networks was a sign of failed demobilisation.  
Recently, however, researchers have begun to see the merits of maintaining 
wartime social connections to facilitate social and economic transitions in 
civilian life. One such study is that from South Sudan’s DDR process. This study 
called into question the assumption that “demobilisation” and “reintegration” 
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were realistic, or even desirable.523 It also made compelling arguments that 
both structures and societies emerging from war are not necessarily 
homogeneous—that is, uniformly willing or unwilling to reintegrate ex-
combatants. In such societies, opinions of the war and the perceptions of the 
fighters may vary, thus refuting the assumption that the best way to peace and 
security is to reintegrate combatants back into their communities.524 Moreover, 
in the post-conflict period, these command structures may take on news forms, 
providing camaraderie and economic opportunities for advancement, such as 
grouping together for access to limited land.525 Several examples of positive 
outcomes for ex-combatants who retain their networks are also found in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Sierra Leone.  In the DRC, a World 
Bank study shed light on the willingness of ex-combatants to pool their 
resources to increase their chances of building a sustainable livelihood. In these 
cases, associations were formed around trades of interest, such as local 
mechanics associations.526  In Sierra Leone, motorcycle associations flourished 
in the post-conflict period as ex-combatants found a niche employment area 
that they could further develop. The success of the motorcycle-taxi services, 
within which prominent workers associations can be found, have also become 
useful for students and youth wishing to make quick money.527 In both cases, 
despite their wartime hierarchies largely remaining in-tact, the maintained 
connections made the post-conflict period more conducive for ex-combatant 
reintegration. 
Association-forming in Côte d’Ivoire is not a new phenomenon. As 
previously mentioned in Chapter 2, under the one-party state of Houphouët-
Boigny, political appointments were restrictive as they were based on top-down 
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appointments. As a way of getting around the perceived obstacles, indigenous 
elites took interest in association-forming in their respective territories.528 The 
creation of associations was frequently formed in accordance with different 
trades, who acted as political pressure groups. Despite being built around a 
specific trade of specialisation, the associations effectively communicated 
citizen demands upwards to Houphouët-Boigny’s central government—a 
structure that was often out of reach for regular citizens. This led to the creation 
of various local development associations, each of which, like the trades 
associations, represented the interests of local communities as they related to 
their given areas.529 As a result of their growth from the bottom-up, associations 
inevitably developed ethnic identities. Dwayne Woods explains that “these 
associations were formed to promote the economic and cultural development 
of a given area, with the historically predominant ethnic community as the main 
basis of identification.”530 To better integrate these associations into his political 
apparatus, the PDCI transformed these ‘ethnic’ associations into party 
subcommittees, as a vehicle for communication with local populations, 
collecting dues, and passing down PDCI directions across ethnic groups and 
languages.531 In 1963 and 1964, however, only a few years after officially 
coming to power, Houphouët-Boigny launched a political offensive against the 
committees, resulting in the banning of ethnic subcommittees and bringing all 
political activities into tighter control under the PDCI. From then on, only 
associations with socio-professional lines were recognised and required the 
endorsement of the State.532 An example of an association restricted to socio-
professional lines is the Transporter’s Association in the south of Côte d’Ivoire, 
that effectively bridged ethnic divides between northern migrant communities, 
who were traditionally commerce and transport-oriented, with southern 
populations. A detailed study of the association revealed that the organisation 
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effectively bridged gaps by allowing “transporters [to] consciously seek to 
preserve the functionally specific nature of concerns and goals in the face of 
traditional factors dividing members.”533  In this sense, the association 
“illustrate[d] how formal political structure interacts with the definition and 
articulation of citizen demands.”534 It also illustrated the reluctance of many 
associations to disclaim that they are specifically catered to one ethnicity or one 
voting bloc over the other. 
In post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire, association-forming took on a different 
dimension. The majority of ex-combatant associations were composed of FN-
supporting ex-combatants that were not integrated into the army. Internally, 
their members may or may not have benefitted from the national DDR 
programme, and according to their claims, seemed almost irrelevant if they had. 
The claims put forth by the ex-combatant associations focused almost 
exclusively on financial compensation and integration into a salaried position, 
the most sought after being a post in the state armed forces. The most 
prominent associations to have arisen include the Association des Démobilisés 
de Côte d’Ivoire (ADCI) and the Collectif des Ex-Combattants et Représentants 
des ADS (Le Collectif). The ADCI, for instance, was created in 2008 in the 
Bouaké, the heart of the FN rebellion. Research conducted by Moussa Fofana 
described how the primary goal of the ADCI was to develop favourable relations 
with the FN hierarchy and the Prime Minister of the time, Guillaume Soro.535 
Although their base was in Bouaké, they had several offices across the country. 
In the post-conflict period, the ADCI was most active during the time of the 
national DDR process, and often supported national DDR authorities with 
community outreach. The ADCI was commonly known to have been involved 
in fraudulent activities such as granting ex-combatant status to non-ex-
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combatants and for making demands for financial pay-outs.536 By the time of 
fieldwork in 2016, the ADCI had seemed to be disbanded, the reasons for which 
are unknown. It is likely that some of their leaders were arrested and the 
association crumbled. Due to the sensitive security environment at the time of 
data collection, with many state-led crackdowns on associations of this nature 
to identify individuals disturbing the peace, this section focuses on the 
association Le Collectif, as data was less restricted. Le Collectif is an example 
of a highly structured association that followed an explicit mandate of advancing 
ex-combatant interests, and of professing unabated loyalty to the president of 
the ruling regime, Alassane Ouattara. 
Le Collectif, is an example of an association with a robust structure and 
a lengthy list of requests for both material and moral support from the ruling 
regime. The key posts within the association include a President, Vice-
President, Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General, Treasurer General, 
and auditors.537 Although the exact number of members remains 
undocumented, the association claims to have designated 22 delegates in 
Bouaké alone, with similar representation across the Ivoirian territory. The 
association is bound by 13 articles, which stipulate the conditions for 
membership such as having an apolitical stance, the use of majority voting 
rules, compliance, as well as establishes the grounds for banishment. 538 The 
initial pages of its foundational document give semblance of an organisation 
that is well defined and highly structured.539 The one discrepancy between its 
conditions and reality, however, is that its members are associated with the FN 
rebellion and have openly professed loyalty to Ouattara in the pages that follow. 
Consistent with many associations, Le Collectif has a number of 
objectives it hopes to achieve, and, therefore, has adapted its foundational 
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document to both government and international audiences, in the hopes that 
these actors would recognise the validity of their claims and lobby in support of 
them.540 Amongst the priority demands laid out in the document are to register 
ex-combatants in the DDR programme (which they achieved), monthly family 
soap allowances,541 army integration for those between 35-40 years of age, the 
payment of all school fees for dependents of those between 41-55 years of age, 
and finally, national recognition for wartime contribution and sacrifices for those 
ex-combatants between 55-60 years of age.542 Beyond these requests, Le 
Collectif developed a number of proposals in which they could support the state. 
One such suggestion was the proposal to launch their own disarmament 
operations, identifying all “veritable” ex-combatants through a self-created 
honour code, which required all participants to adhere to the internal code of 
the association. To finance and support the operations, funds would be sought 
from the UN and the European Union.543 It is important to note that the offer to 
disarm and regroup the ex-combatants, dated for 8th of July 2016, came just 
over a year after the official close of the national DDR programme on the 30th 
of June 2015, suggesting that the association knew of additional ex-combatants 
that still needed to be disarmed. The proposal of working alongside the national 
programmes, in support of them, and on a voluntary basis, was likely an attempt 
to demonstrate their professional capacities and to be absorbed into the official 
state structures as employees.  
The second proposal falls in line with what was recorded by multiple 
international observers as “volunteer” and mimicking military behaviour 
amongst ex-combatants seeking integration into the state armed forces. Article 
13 of the statute states: 
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Every member of [Le Collectif] must make themselves available 
to participate in a possible security operation under the 
supervision of a state authorities of defence and security. This 
will show the willingness of the members of the ADS and Le 
Collectif of ex-combatants to integrate into the armed forces.544 
The voluntarily accompaniment of young FN soldiers mirrors the experiences 
that groups such as the Jeunes Associés had during and following the post-
electoral crisis of 2011.This passage builds on Arnaut’s research of Gbabgo 
supporters’ mimicking behaviour, by extending it to groups of FN supporters as 
well.545 In Arnaut’s study, young Gbagbo supporters that were often not 
affiliated to any of the established militia groups would group around a ‘leader’ 
in an attempt to prove their status as auto-defence groups and eventually 
benefit from post-war recovery benefits (integration or DDR). In one case, a 
group occupied an abandoned hotel on the Abidjan-Bassam route, claiming it 
was their ‘base’ until they were disbanded by the authorities and the hotel was 
reclaimed by the owner.546 These attempts mirror efforts by the Jeunes 
Associés, who also inhabited abandoned buildings, voluntarily escorted 
ComZones and other state forces. While the Gbagbo supporters mentioned 
were made to leave the building immediately following the post-electoral crisis, 
the Jeunes Associés remained in their makeshift residences until 2015, 
eventually benefitting from national DDR funds. The excerpt from Le Collectif 
evokes the same images, and perhaps, displays their hope that should they 
also accompany armed forces on a voluntary basis, they will be compensated, 
or at least have additional grounds to base their claims-making from. Together, 
the research demonstrates how association with wartime experiences during 
the 11-year crisis was highly desirable amongst many Ivoirians from both sides, 
resulting in a bottom-up method of self-recruitment to obtain post-conflict 
livelihood options. 
Beyond providing context and justification for their claims, the core 
documents of the association drew on allusions of dangerous and high-risk ex-
                                                          
544 “Statut et Règlement Intérieur du Collectif des Ex-combattants et les Représentants des ADS du 19 Septembre 
2002 – 2010 – 2015”: 9. 
545 Arnaut, “Corps habillés, Nouchis and subaltern bigmanity in Côte d'Ivoire,” 85, 90. 
546 Arnaut, “Corps habillés, Nouchis and subaltern bigmanity in Côte d'Ivoire,” 90. 
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combatants to buttress its pleas. Ex-combatants, within many post-conflict 
contexts, have often been conceptualised as a problem to be dealt with for fear 
of the return to violence as the primary justification for financial assistance.547 
Within the official documents of Le Collectif, the discourse is constructed 
around themes of peace and compliance with the post-crisis State, rather than 
the assumed default option of danger and havoc. Statements such as the 
following suggest a willingness of members of Le Collectif to promote an image 
of stereotypical dangerous combatants. Although they explicitly reject the 
violent means, the excerpt is written in a way that reminds its audience of its 
violent potential, and that it has since reformed into a passive group embracing 
peaceful means: 
Following the crisis, we were a source of terror for many. […] We 
are not of savage character, without brains, without pity, and 
primitive. […] We do not want to destroy anymore, much less 
destabilise our country.548  
This reveals that many demobilised FN have opted for the association method 
of claims-making to play on assumptions of ex-combatants as ruthless thugs, 
terrorising populations through both physical violence and the destruction of 
property. While clearly showing a willingness to behave as law-abiding citizens, 
the allusions to what they consider to be public opinion of ex-combatants as 
ruthless combatants equally serves as a reminder of the destruction and 
destabilisation that they could inflict should their grievances go unanswered. 
Similar wording also present near the end of the document, with Le Collectif 
drawing on the events of the 11-year crisis to remind the regime of their 
contributions to victory. For example, the document declares:  
We dare remind the State of the decisive role we played to re-
establish peace. These efforts need to be recognised and 
encouraged.549  
                                                          
547 Sukanya Podder, “Ex-combatant agency and re-recruitment,” Critical Studies on Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 145. 
548 “Statut et Règlement Intérieur du Collectif des Ex-combattants et les Représentants des ADS du 19 Septembre 
2002 – 2010 – 2015”: 1, 11. 
549 “Statut et Règlement Intérieur du Collectif des Ex-combattants et les Représentants des ADS du 19 Septembre 
2002 – 2010 – 2015” : 13.  
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In this statement, members of Le Collectif invoke reminders of the post-electoral 
crisis, and the ‘decisive’ role they played, with a disregard for the decisive role 
played by IB’s Commando Invisibles in Abidjan, or of the atrocities attributed to 
the FN as they descended from the north to take Abidjan.550 The phenomenon 
of multiple groups competing for recognition in the FN-victory, and sometimes 
claiming the successes of the Commando Invisibles as their own is examined 
in Chapter 8. 
While association-forming has been prevalent amongst groups of 
demobilised FN ex-combatants, it was recorded to have occurred once 
amongst the Gbagbo supporters as well, albeit only developing to a nascent 
phase, as already discussed in Chapter 5. In this instance, young members of 
the FDS were allegedly enlisted into Gbagbo’s state army in the wake of the 
2010-11 post-electoral crisis only to be dismissed from the post-crisis unified 
army under the ruling regime of Alassane Ouattara. In turn, they formed an 
association to voice their demands. However, no incidents or public events 
were associated with this group during interviews with those familiar with its 
existence. Having largely refrained from claims-making, they were collectively 
approached by members of the national DDR programme to join, and at the 
very least, benefit from the financial allotments provided to ex-combatants. In 
the end, the members declined the offer, insisting that they were soldiers rather 
than ‘ex-combatants’.551 When attempting to contact the group for this research, 
members typically denied their membership and disconnected calls. The 
gatekeeper to the group suggested that this behaviour was due to their 
persistent fear of persecution by state authorities loyal to the Ouattara 
government. Despite having formed an association, which has likely now 
ceased to exist, the behaviour of its members stands in stark contrast to that of 
the Demobilised FN ex-combatant associations. At no time during the fieldwork, 
                                                          
550 An Interview with the former UNOCI engineering employee based in the southwest office during the time of the 
Duékoué massacres confidently stated that the numbers of FN were inflated. He mused that it was “just a few” who 
swept through the southwest. At the time of writing, it was virtually impossible to find the actual numbers of FN 
participants that came down south. While it is possible that this informant exaggerated his claims, it is important to 
note that there is still uncertainty over the number of FN participants in the post-electoral crisis. 
551Internal office report of sensitization mission carried out with said association, Autorité de Désarmement, 
Démobilisation, Réintégration Côte d’Ivoire, Abidjan, no date - source estimates 2014. 
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or in local newspaper articles were there any mentions of public statements 
being made, individuals taking to the streets, or producing official documents to 
reveal their identities to the state authorities. Much of their reluctance to be 
public likely stems from the same fears and concerns of Gbagbo supporters, as 
discussed in Chapter 5. While this thesis was not able to collect substantial data 
on the Gbabgo-supporting association, this lack of evidence confirms that the 
association did not seek to publicly leverage their status as former fighters to 
make claims.  
While associations have been deemed useful to the above-mentioned 
Demobilised FN groups, many individuals have opted to refrain from large 
organised gatherings altogether. Association-forming, explained by a 
demobilised FN who refrained from it, requires a certain degree of trust among 
members. That is, confidence that there are no infiltrators, as well as confidence 
that the grievances of the group outweigh those of the individual.552  This 
opinion was shared in the DRC when questioned why some individual ex-
combatants had refrained from collective trades work, or for those that did 
participate in the associations, as a challenge they frequently were faced 
with.553 For other Ivoirians who have official ex-combatant status from the DDR 
programme, association-forming was likely to draw unwanted attention so they 
did not employ it as a tactic. Describing their strategy of refraining from groups 
bigger than four to five people in public, these respondents spoke of their fears 
of looking suspicious to the state armed forces, thus bringing about 
unnecessary questioning in the wake of mutiny and national fatigue of ex-
combatant protests.554 
 
Claims-Making at the Margins 
 
Alongside collective attempts at claims-making by leveraging labels of 
ex-combatant and wartime experiences, several individual efforts were also 
                                                          
552 EFA fighter 3, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
553 Lemasle, “From Conflict to Resilience,” 8.  
554 FN-loyalists/Jeunes Associés, group interview with the author Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 27, 2016, in-person. 
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observed, primarily in the form of individual letter-writing to high-ranking 
government officials, informal and loosely-structured networks, and attempts to 
create employment opportunities linked to post-conflict programming. The 
methods of claims-making observed were frequently used by individuals who 
sat at the margins of clientelistic connections, but who nevertheless self-
identified as demobilised FN ex-combatants, whether through the national DDR 
programme or through a self-demobilisation. 
 For those who wrote letters, they were typically addressed to elites within 
the regime, most commonly to the President of the Republic, to the First Lady, 
to relevant ministers, and to the Director of related programmes such as the 
national DDR programme. Claims-making through letters was less common 
and public than both the protests and association-forming, however, was a 
method that participants frequently described as a last-ditch effort. Although a 
handful of respondents vocalised that they would write letters directly to 
President Ouattara should their plight be ignored, only one of the respondents 
had actually written to him, multiple times.  
In August 2016, at a small table in Abobo, one self-identifying EFA ex-
combatant displayed a series of letters he had written to the President, the First 
Lady, and the Director of the national DDR programme. In addition to the letters 
were supporting documents listing names of EFA fighters who had been 
integrated into the state armed forces, including the military, penitentiary 
guards, and special forces, with hand-written notes of who had allegedly paid 
a bribe to integrate and who had not. The interviewee who authored the letters 
explained that the majority of the names listed had paid their way into the army, 
while the remaining were waiting the support of the President for their 
integration.555 Only a handful of individuals remained without having 
successfully integrated. The fighter who had written the letters was one person 
who still wanted to be included. The first letter the fighter shared was addressed 
to president Ouattara, dated back to 2014, and spoke mostly of the plight of the 
remaining EFA fighters in the post-crisis period. The letter was received by the 
                                                          
555Copy of supporting documents for letters, “Liste Elements EFA Abidjan- 1er, 2em, 3eme,4e, e Vagues,” no date. 
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President’s office, with a stamp and signature of the receiving officer. 
Approximately two years later, in 2016, a similar letter was sent and addressed 
to the First Lady, highlighting the failure of the first round of correspondence, a 
slightly more personal touch, and a reminder of expectations of victory. This 
particular letter stated the following, suggesting the expectation of ‘their own’ to 
solve their outstanding problems:  
We imagined that re-election of Mr. President of the Republic to 
the greatest seat (“magistrature suprême”), would solve 
definitively the issue of the EFA fighters.556  
In the last letter provided, which was dated 31st March 2016 and was addressed 
to the President, the author highlighted that he was told that the President would 
meet with him after his re-election in November 2015. At the time of writing this 
thesis, five months have already elapsed without any follow-up.557 The method 
of letter-writing was used only by this respondent. The reasons for this is likely 
due to the low literacy rates amongst the demobilised FN, as well as a 
somewhat unique personal willingness to officially put into his grievances into 
writing. The willingness to attach his name and contact details, all the while 
keeping his set of claims separate (but related to) the more general claims of 
the FN for general integration, suggests a certain degree of validity. 
Aside from letter writing, for others at the margins of claims-making, 
informal and loosely-structured networks of ex-combatants were created 
following the post-electoral crisis, by individuals with similar situations—a 
shared FN experience and a willingness to advance their interests. These 
informal structures often designated a focal person to track information of 
relevance to the community. Upon doing an interview with one FN supporter 
from this type of organisation, the focal person was described as being tasked 
with maintaining a political and security situational awareness, as well as 
identifying opportunities for claims-making that would advance the interests of 
the individuals who chose to participate in their structure. In the same 
                                                          
556 Copy of correspondence letter addressed to Mme la Premiere Dame, by a representative of EFA in Abidjan, 
February 29, 2016. 
557 Original correspondence, letter addressed to the President of the Republic, by a representative of EFA in Abidjan, 
March 31, 2016. 
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discussion, the members of the structure described selecting one individual 
they had met while in re-socialisation camp to collect relevant information and 
disseminate it to any ex-combatant interested. Mid-interview, the selected 
individual joined the discussion, and described the ways that information flowed 
in their network. Rather than a formal association, recipients of the information 
saw it more as a delegation of responsibility, in which the selected individual 
could communicate relevant news to the group and disseminate any further 
information regarding possible political engagement initiatives. They did not 
have any formal meetings, opting to discuss their information and potential 
courses of action amongst themselves when they casually met up instead. 
Some of the previous political engagement initiatives carried out by this group 
included letter-writing and requesting meetings with the state authorities. Their 
claims focused on requests for employment to match their post-crisis training, 
as well as financial compensation for those who are unemployed.558  
Additional efforts recorded amongst individuals from the Demobilised FN 
group included propagating discourses of instability in an effort to keep post-
conflict recovery programmes running and to maintain their employment within 
them. As observed repeatedly amongst Demobilised FN ex-combatants who 
had obtained employment in any of the post-conflict recovery programs, both 
international and domestic, frequent warnings were given to their hierarchies 
about the alleged presence of weapons in circulation. Conversely, Gbagbo-
aligned ex-combatants often dismissed such claims as FN affiliates trying to 
prolong their earnings.559 Dire warnings such as these were most heavily 
pushed by two separate demobilised FN individuals, both local staff employed 
by the national DDR programme: one as a mobile weapons collector, and the 
other as the former head of office at the commune-level. During the initial post-
conflict phase, benefits were allotted through government-funded programmes 
to these staff working in post-conflict programming. Such benefits and 
entitlements included a special ‘laissez-passez’ marker on their vehicles to pass 
                                                          
558 FN-loyalists/Jeunes Associés, group interview with the author Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 27, 2016, in-person. 
559 Multiple informal discussions with Gbagbo-supporting ex-combatants and civilians held with the author in various 
public and private spaces, including UN peacekeeping Headquarters, national ADDR offices, and in local bars and 
restaurants in Abidjan, August 2016 - February 2017. 
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easily through check-points and get optimal parking spots, fuel allowances, 
monthly salaries, and a certain proximity to state authorities overseeing the 
programme and holding influential posts within the post-conflict government. 
While the benefits mentioned above can be discussed at length, it suffices to 
examine the case of specific vehicle markers allotted to one of the individuals: 
the black licence plate.  
The black licence plate holds significant prestige in Côte d’Ivoire. When 
obtained through the proper channels, the plate is used to facilitate movement 
across the country and through checkpoints, and to access sensitive security 
zones. The symbolic value that it demonstrated to the general public was that 
the driver and passengers of the vehicle were defence sector VIPs, or within 
the VIP’s spheres of influence. Moreover, the plates signified that the vehicle 
had received the highest level of security clearance and was permitted to move 
across the country uninspected, possibly carrying dangerous goods such as 
weapons, and signalling to checkpoints that it had received authorisation to do 
so. Not only were these vehicles theoretically government vehicles but they 
were also used for official missions and specific tasks for national security. Only 
a handful of black licence plates could be assigned to select individuals by the 
designated state authorities.560  
In one incident on the 8th of August 2016, approximately 13 months after 
the close of the national DDR programme for which the plate’s use was justified 
by the individual possessing it, the demobilised FN respondent was told to 
remove the plates and return them to the state authorities. The reasons given 
to the respondent included the need to gain more control over cross-border 
crime and the smuggling of illegal goods—activities the plates would facilitate 
with little scrutiny.561 After bringing the topic up with a national authority from 
the Ministry of Defence who directly oversaw the operations of the plate-holder 
while he was employed, the response was slightly different than the version the 
holder had given. In his response, the state authority explained with frustration 
that the Demobilised FN respondent should never have obtained the plates. He 
                                                          
560 Captain at Ministry of Defence, interview with the author in Abidjan-Plateau, September 19, 2016, in-person. 
561 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Cocody, August 8, 2016, in-person. 
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went on to explain how during the crisis, ‘small guys’ would collect random 
scraps, or sometimes even steal high-value items such as the plates, and would 
then use them as if it had been given to them legitimately. When asked why the 
individual was permitted to use the plates for so long while employed in a post-
crisis recovery programme, the authority further explained that it was only 
recently that the issuing-authorities re-organised themselves and their 
institutional structures and had the capacity to take stock of all the licence 
plates. Taking stock of the plates was not the priority of the institution, who 
underwent an entire re-structuring following the crisis. Now that the issuing 
authority was operational again, it closely inspected the use of the licence 
plates, recalling those that were obtained through unofficial channels.562 When 
the plates were finally removed, the Demobilised FN individual lamented the 
lack of regard granted to him despite his involvement in the struggle. The plate, 
for this individual, seemed to be more a good of redistribution under a system 
of patronage, than as a tool of state security and control over the movement of 
goods. Stories such as these are common across groups of Demobilised FN 
that were not integrated into the army. As mentioned above, it was common 
practice for these individuals to collect fallen items and pieces of equipment, 
using them either immediately to demonstrate authority, or holding on to them 
in the hopes of future benefits. 
 
 
Motivations for Claims-Making 
 
When directly asking Demobilised FN why they felt compelled to be 
highly engaged in claims-making, the responses were consistent: unfulfilled 
promises for participation in the FN rebellion, personal debts accrued during 
the rebellion, and finally, civilians (illegitimately) receiving benefits through 
networks of patronage.  
                                                          
562 Captain at Ministry of Defence, interview with the author in Abidjan-Plateau, September 19, 2016, in-person. 
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When discussing the issue of unfulfilled promises, demobilised FN 
consistently insisted that promises were made by the FN leadership about 
compensation that would be provided in the post-crisis period, which has not 
yet been received by these individuals. The exact promises remain 
undisclosed, with claims-makers stipulating their nature in public 
demonstrations of claims-making. Often, the Ouagadougou Peace Agreements 
of 2007, the peace agreements that vaguely laid out the necessity of military 
integration and demobilisation, were brought up as supporting evidence that 
promises were left unfulfilled. Demobilised FN claims-makers often argued that 
the Ouagadougou agreements had specific provisions for them, sometimes 
citing financial sums, promises of integration into employment, and housing—
figures that were not mentioned in the agreements. References to the “Ouaga 
4”, which locally refers to the Fourth Supplementary Agreement, was brought 
up several times across interviews with Demobilised FN, in newspaper 
interviews with FN Integrated mutineers, but never with Gbagbo supporters, 
who had equal stakes in the Ouagadougou agreements. However, when 
examining the Ouagadougou agreement and its four supplementary 
agreements, it makes no such promises or provisions for participants of the 11-
year political crisis. When asked about the peace deal that the mutinous 
soldiers often referred to, the head of the national human rights organisation 
responded the following. 
Nowhere has this been foreseen by the Ouagadougou 
agreements, maybe they are secret agreements, which are 
different from those we know. What we do know is that we had 
to take men from ex-FDS and ex-FAFN to form a homogeneous 
army to secure the electoral process. Nowhere did we see that 
we had to pay money to soldiers. We are amazed that today we 
are hearing about the Ouagadougou agreement.563  
The frequent reference to the Ouagadougou agreements, demonstrate that 
demobilised FN fighters generally had an unclear understanding of the 
agreements. It is likely that they heard about the agreements through informal 
                                                          
563Pierre Adjoumani Kouamé, Président of la Ligue ivoirienne des droits de l’Homme (Lidho), in an interview made 
public on January 22, 2017; “Côte d’Ivoire: Les primes versées aux militaires ne sont pas ‘prévues dans les accords 
de Ouagadougou’,” Responsable ONG ITW, January 22, 2017, http://news.abidjan.net/h/608251.html. 
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communication channels, perhaps amongst friends or through their informal 
networks, and used it as justification to push their claims forward. With the 
undisclosed nature of the promises made to FN supporters during the time of 
rebellion, much speculation and inconsistency surrounds the claims put forth 
by these individuals. Self-proclaimed EFA fighters, for instance, maintain that 
they were told that their training had made them into “unconditional military 
[recruits], regardless of education.”564 Promises allegedly made to these 
fighters include: army integration with official rank, a vehicle, a house, and 
30,000,000 F CFA (approximately ₤ 40,500).565 These respondents vividly 
recount being sent back to Abidjan during the post-electoral crisis, in support of 
the EFA project without weapons and told to ‘figure it out’. To do so, they stole 
weapons from police—a story that is consistent with the popular legend that 
surrounds the Commando Invisibles. To date, these respondents have not 
received any promised compensation.566 Similarly, a different self-proclaimed 
EFA fighter, explained during separate interview, that he was promised 
unconditional army integration as a non-commissioned officer, a vehicle, 
300,000 F CFA (approximately ₤400.00), and a house.567 In this particular 
account, the 300,000 F CFA was the sum that was to be paid for each 
ECOMOG soldier, had the FN rebellion paid ECOMOG forces to take down 
Gbagbo.  In lieu of paying for ECOMOG forces, this account pledges that the 
FN leadership opted rather to ‘keep it local’ and pay the same sums to their 
own FN-supporting residents. Finally, a third self-proclaimed EFA fighter listed 
the promises he had received, including 300,000 F CFA, a house, guaranteed 
personal security following the crisis, and medical attention.568 Across all three 
accounts, all from individuals proclaiming to have come from the EFA group at 
relatively similar times, the variation in what was promised to each individual is 
notable. While the promises allegedly made during the rebellion were largely 
consistent across different groups of FN supporters, significant discrepancies 
                                                          
564EFA Fighter, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, September 26, 2016, in-person. 
565EFA Fighter, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, September 26, 2016, in-person. 
566 EFA Fighter, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, September 26, 2016, in-person. 
567 EFA Fighter 2, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
568 EFA Fighter 3, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
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existed in the sum of financial compensation and the justification for its 
payment, as evident from the examples above. In the second example given, 
the ECOMOG bonus, the claims came only a few weeks before the first mutiny 
in which the mutineers made the same claims. What is clear from these 
accounts is that the basis for claims-making consistently evoked their 
participation and pay-outs to our integrated peers, while the details gave 
sufficient room for variation at the individual level. The demands of the 
mutineers could have easily been picked up through local media outlets, except 
that these individuals spoke of these claims days before the first mutiny of 2017 
took place. What is more likely, is that information of a looming mutiny was 
communicated to somebody outside the FACI, who then shared the information 
with their networks. This would help explain why the main lines of argument 
remain the same, but the details became skewed. While this research was 
limited in its ability to collect more information on the possible flow of information 
between mutineers and individuals seeking compensation, the idea of networks 
and communication through vertical linkages of ex-combatants is an intriguing 
area of research to be further developed. 
For the respondents interviewed above, claims-making became a 
legitimate course of action when they began to see inconsistencies in the way 
promises were being fulfilled, sometimes with friends and family taking the 
place of veritable fighters. For some FN supporters however, the pursuit of their 
financial compensation was motivated beyond reasons of outstanding 
promises. Over the course of multiple interviews and discussions, one 
demobilised FN respondent detailed the personal debts that he had amassed 
during the rebellion and was now being harassed to honour. This respondent 
described the ways in which debts accumulated for those aligning themselves 
to the rebellion, whether to support the northern cause or simply for personal 
profit. In the following excerpt, the respondent describes a hypothetical case of 
an individual aligned to the FN rebel governance, one that he deemed 
representative of this plight. 
Here is somebody that spent years in the rebellion, without a 
salary. He has family. In Africa, the big family is the mother, the 
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father, the wife, the kids, the cousins. There is all of that, so there 
is responsibility. He spent all these years possibly looting to feed 
them, swindling to feed them. Stealing to feed them. He might 
have been living in a house that he didn’t pay for, imposing 
himself in the house of others. And yeah, he didn’t pay the 
electricity, the water, all the while the civilian who was not a rebel 
had to pay. So, it led to more people profiting that were not 
rebels. Those fooling around evidently don’t need to pay. But the 
civilian has to pay taxes. Voila! So, it created a frustration 
between the rebels and those who lived in the zones of the 
rebellion. Civilians didn’t like the rebels. Those with rebel parents 
would go and loot the one without rebel parents to go feed his 
family. We saw it, we heard of cases like this. Because a rebel 
has a weapon, [and he can demand ‘presents’ “donne-moi 200, 
c’est cadeau”]. [The civilian] is obligated to give it to him.569 
Elaborating further, the same respondent then discussed why the 800,000 F 
CFA (approximately ₤1,000), the sum allotted to those registered in the national 
DDR programme as ‘ex-combatant,’ simply did not suffice:  
Today we are nearing the end of the job, and we free everyone 
with the 800,000 F CFA. Everybody now feels like they are on 
the same level. The one that I commanded yesterday, that I 
insulted, that I humiliated, that couldn’t talk back because I had 
my Kalash in hand. Today he knows that I no longer have my 
Kalash and that we can speak as equals, and that I slept in his 
house for years, he will tell me “pay for my house! If you don’t I 
will kick you out!” He has a point. Or even “you took my bag that 
day!” and you go to the gendarmerie to explain and you say “yes, 
but I was a rebel” and they tell you that you are not above the 
law and you have to pay it back. Is it with the 800,000 that you 
will pay it back?570 
The same respondent then went into personal details, signifying that this story 
was possibly based on his own experiences. 
The third common motivation emerging across interviews with both FN 
supporters and their opponents was that of civilians gaining post-crisis benefits 
typically reserved for ex-combatants. Individuals highlighted the need for 
friends in influential places when discussing this matter—an issue more closely 
                                                          
569 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, September 30, 2016, in-person. 
570 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, September 30, 2016, in-person. 
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related to the expectation of clientelistic governance than of a fair distribution. 
Across all interviews in which it was discussed, was the perception that many 
individuals were profiting from the ‘ex-combatant’ status despite never having 
participated or having been associated with the northern rebellion. Allegations 
typically cited examples of army integration, in which respondents claimed that 
friends and family of the ruling government were integrated into key posts, to 
the detriment of veritable fighters whom those posts were reserved for. In these 
explanations, regular civilians are presumed to have either paid their way into 
these positions or to have benefited from personal relationships with influential 
authorities. One individual with significant insight into the issue of civilians 
taking ex-combatant status commented in the following way: 
This person did not suffer, did not participate, then lied, then got 
the same benefits as the combatants got. Maybe he had money 
and he bought a weapon. He informed himself [on the details of 
the conflict], he came and lied to the [authorities], and he won. 
He did not fight, but he found a hole to enter the programmes 
and to benefit from the things a combatant got. [The combatant] 
suffered and deserves it. He [the civilian] 
did not suffer, therefore, does not deserve it.571 
This individual’s comments mirrored the feelings expressed by many 
respondents throughout this research that false claims were being made to gain 
financial benefits. To add a bit more context to this quotation, however, the 
respondent was a Jeune Associés who is also known to have found ways to 
extend financial benefits for ex-combatants to civilian friends and contacts, all 
the while taking a cut of the money they would eventually gain. This individual, 
therefore, benefitted himself from the very situation he laments. Furthermore, 
as illustrated in the previous paragraph’s quotation from the respondent, not 
only have civilians taken advantage of the post-conflict situation financially, but 
civilians themselves were taken advantage of and might feel entitled to some 
reciprocity. In this logic, it might be difficult to see fraudulent claims of 
combatant status gaining financial benefits, while they were not involved. Yet, 
it is very difficult to draw any stark conclusions. As mentioned earlier, 
involvement in the FN rebellion was not restricted to armed conflict. For the 
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most part, it operated as a parallel government with financial and administrative 
branches. The difference between civilian and combatant, within the FN, is, for 
the most part difficult to trace, as described in Chapters 4 and 6. This means 
that identities were complex and somewhat fluid and that some individuals 
managed to move between multiple identities, often to their own financial 
benefit. Nevertheless, this third possible motivation—that of civilians taking ex-
combatant labels to benefit financially—stands in contrast to the two previous 
reasons and shows considerable degrees of extortion. The third motivation, 
however, was the one most frequently identified by respondents from the 
Gbagbo and FN groups, as well as civilian Ivoirians approached during this 
research.  
 
Positioning and Re-positioning 
 
The act of positioning and re-positioning was observed frequently with 
demobilised FN ex-combatants. The practice, often to increase chances of 
survival and to improve livelihoods, however, is common. Similar observations 
were made in Guinea-Bissau by anthropologist Henrik Vigh, who conceived of 
similar patterns as “social navigation”. Vigh’s concept of social navigation is 
closely linked to the term “dubriagem”, which in the Guinean-Bissau context 
means “the act of making the most of a situation and making things work to 
one’s advantage.”572 As such, it implies the ability, and willingness of individuals 
to tacitly navigate spaces of opportunity created in contexts of war, or opened 
by other people, in an effort to improve their livelihoods.573 It is mainly used to 
describe the efforts that youth have put into surviving and trying to forge a future 
for themselves in wartime situations.574 More broadly, the act of positioning and 
re-positioning resonates with Vigh’s concept more broadly. 
We simultaneously act and react in relation to our current 
position within a social terrain, in response to current constraints, 
                                                          
572 Henrik Vigh, “Youth Mobilisation as Social Navigation. Reflections on the Concept of Dubriagem,” Cadernos de 
Estudos Africanos 18, no. 9 (2010): 150. 
573 Vigh, “Youth Mobilisation as Social Navigation. Reflections on the Concept of Dubriagem,” 153. 
574 Vigh, “Youth Mobilisation as Social Navigation. Reflections on the Concept of Dubriagem,” 142. 
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possibilities and configurations of power, as well as in relation to 
our perception of the future terrain and its unfolding.575 
The quotation above explains that acts of positioning and re-positioning are 
fairly mundane and common to a variety of situations. In the post-conflict 
context of Côte d’Ivoire, in one of the most compelling interviews, a respondent 
offered a long and emotional description of their frustration with the post-crisis 
distribution of resources and his attempts to position and re-position themselves 
within the situation. Rooted in perceptions of inconsistent integration of veritable 
fighters and the practices of clientelistic transactions, claims-making beyond 
this demobilised FN’s national DDR allotment was completely justified. This 
interview is significant because the respondent represents another thread of 
shape-shifting behaviour that was observed amongst a handful of ex-
combatants on the margins.  
To better understand this phenomenon of positioning and re-positioning, 
it is necessary to explain the history of the respondent. The individual was a 
strong supporter of the FN, spending much of his time in the northern-controlled 
territories and volunteering to support the ComZones in the area. The exact 
role of the respondent during the FN rebellion is unclear, with varied accounts 
over the year suggesting that he was likely one of the opportunistic volunteers 
previously described. During the initial years of the post-conflict period, this 
individual resided amongst groups of Jeunes Associés, claiming to have 
assisted the ComZones stabilise Abidjan after the crisis. From there, the 
individual gained employment in a national post-crisis recovery programme for 
between two-to-three years and was soon to complete their contract. While 
conducting interviews in his personal residence, pieces of FRCI military uniform 
were hung over the doorway in a way to display and signal to the community 
that they had military ties.576 By triangulating different accounts from both this 
individual and his colleagues, this trajectory best matches that of the Jeune 
                                                          
575 Vigh, “Youth Mobilisation as Social Navigation. Reflections on the Concept of Dubriagem,” 159. 
576 Field notes and multiple interviews with Ivoirian Former ADDR staff in Yopougon-Abidjan, multiple dates between 
July 2016 - June 2017. 
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Associés who volunteered themselves as attachés to the FRCI, collecting 
pieces of uniform in the hopes of being integrated.  
Over the course of the year in which data collection took place, this 
respondent had positioned and re-positioned himself based on his perception 
of where the best access to compensation was. This respondent, across 
multiple interviews, suggested that they were an original member of the 
rebellion before 2002, that they controlled highway entry and exit points within 
the northern-held areas, that they were the commander of the Jeune Associés, 
and finally, that they were considered one of the real Commando Invisibles. 
During discussions after that, he became an EFA fighter. Towards the end of 
our discussions, he then revealed that he was a Jeunes Associés, residing in 
one of the abandoned buildings of Yopougon. This last identity was cross-
checked with international practitioners familiar with his case, who said he likely 
was a Jeunes Associés. This individual reasoned that any civilian could make 
claims reserved for veritable ex-combatants such as army integration of 
financial compensation, on account of the allegations of civilian friends and 
family benefitting, either through bribes or through personal connections. 
Simply stated, if any civilian was allowed to benefit, even if in non-disclosed 
ways, from integration and other benefits, then claims-making under the title of 
‘ex-combatant’ was a legitimate course of action for the whole of the FN 
rebellion. This argument was further stretched to blur the boundaries between 
those who were identified as ex-combatants but were allegedly too old or 
physically unfit to integrate the army. In their case, those individuals would also 
be able to lay claim for increased financial compensation since they had only 
received the benefits allotted to ex-combatants, when, according to the 
respondent, they should be entitled to the same pay and benefits as integrated 
combatants. 
While the blurred lines between combatant and civilian are undeniable 
in the case of the FN rebellion, one can easily see that some claims-makers 
from the Demobilised FN group can, and have, easily shifted from one identity 
to the next. While the claims they put forth are similar, inconsistencies in 
wartime accounts and identities were observed to be the defining characteristic 
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of individuals from this category of FN supporter. Perhaps more interesting than 
the repositioning, was one response in which a respondent explained when 
they deemed a public event opportune for staking claims. When asked how this 
respondent chose which demonstrations to attend and which claims to align 
themselves to, they responded that it all depended on which were about to 
make breakthroughs. As it was too risky to be seen at all demonstrations, 
across all claims-making ex-combatant groups, they ran the risk of being 
identified by state authorities as a trouble-maker. Rather, this individual chose 
to sit back and to watch which claims were advancing, and to join them and 
their script at a ripe time.577 When observing that the claims by their most recent 
closest group, the Cellule 39 were not gaining traction, this respondent shifted 
blame to international and government actors. According to him, both the 
international and government actions were colluding to fill their pockets with 
friend-based favours to the detriment of genuine local ex-combatants.578 
According to them, all employed in the programme, except for this person, were 
complicit in taking money away from the real combatants. Only three months 
prior, when this Jeunes Associés believed that they would obtain an extension 
in employment, they aggressively defended the national authorities and 
international partners, stating that any financial compensation at all, should be 
seen as a bonus that was nobody was obligated to give. During this time of 
alignment with the post-conflict recovery programmes, the respondent praised 
the national authorities and the international community, stating that all 
instances of claims-making were well handled and that those staking claims 
lacked substantial reasons and proof.579 The positioning and re-positioning of 
this individual further supports both claims of opportunistic individuals within the 
ranks of the Demobilised FN, but also demonstrates a resource-driven 
motivation for political engagement rather than satisfaction that the northern 
cause had ultimately prevailed. This stands in contrast to the Gbagbo 
supporters and their approach in the post-conflict period, where groups largely 
retrained from making claims and stand in solidarity politically.  For many of the 
                                                          
577 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, May 25, 2017, in-person. 
578 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in in Abidjan-Cocody, January 11, 2017, in-person. 
579 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Cocody, October 25, 2016, in-person. 
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Demobilised FN interviewed, it seemed as though their motivations for claims-
making stemmed more from access to resources than from the northern cause.  
 
Recreating Systems of Patronage 
 
Over the course of the year, various respondents voiced similar 
sentiments about the post-crisis distribution of army posts. Perceptions of posts 
being distributed along lines of loyalty were echoed across groups of university 
students, community members, and professors. These perceptions were, 
unsurprisingly, present across the ex-combatant groups as well, and when 
combined, these perceptions illustrate the continued re-establishment of 
systems of patronage. A telling example lending much credence to the above-
mentioned perceptions is that of an Abidjan-based strongman who is believed 
to have significantly influenced the recruitment processes of integration for the 
armed forces, particularly for the recruitment of penitentiary guards, ‘4x4’.580 
After the assassination of IB, ruling authorities aligning themselves to the Soro 
camp sometimes insisted that 4x4 was the actual leader of Commando 
Invisibles, and therefore, knew of all the actual fighters in the 2010-11 post-
electoral crisis in Abidjan.581 In this telling, 4x4 was the rightful creator of ex-
combatant lists for the Abidjan area. Allegations against 4x4, however, put forth 
by a number of individuals, describe a process in which lists of ex-combatants 
were filled with the names of relatives and friends, to the detriment of the now 
protesting ex-combatants. Shedding light on the process, the gatekeeper of the 
FN supporters declared with a slight grimace: 
And 4x4, who represented Abidjan and around, he put them into 
the customs, into waters and forests, as penitentiary guards, 
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ONPC, so his guys left like that! They never fought a single day. 
No. For the most part, they didn’t do a thing.582 
Elaborating further, this individual extended the allegations beyond 4x4, 
describing how commanders would be approached by individuals asking to be 
on the list, giving money, and then getting validated through legitimate 
channels. While largely refraining from the issue of paying to make the list, the 
perception of friends and family being integrated by 4x4 was echoed across 
individuals from the Gbagbo-loyalist group.583  
Linking the process of patronage with the continued protests by ex-
combatants from the Demobilised FN group, one respondent from the Gbagbo 
supporters, a former FDS and leader of an Abidjan-based militia, lamented the 
placement of non-combatants into the military.  
Unfortunately, those that really fought, it is not all of them that 
are in the army. But when they came to power, they started to 
take their [personal] relations, friends over here, there, that did 
not even participate. And why not? They did not participate, they 
were not there when they were needed. But now that your 
brother is an authority… so it’s like that. So, this is why they 
continue to protest, to organise themselves, because many were 
not compensated.”584 
Such statements suggesting similar phenomena were made across all 
interviews regardless of political affinity, with particular emphasis on those who 
are currently making the most claims, the FN supporters. Beyond the ex-
combatants integrated into the armed forces through regular post-conflict 
integration channels, the practice of individuals falsely claiming ex-combatant 
status extended to EFA fighters and to the Jeunes Associés, with one EFA 
respondent describing how there were many “dishonest people” within the EFA 
group who took the names of veritable ex-combatants to get rich.585 For the 
Jeunes Associés, interviews consistently remarked how the possibility of 
regular civilians entering signalled to others that it was a way of getting money. 
                                                          
582 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, September 30, 2016, in-person. 
583 Gbagbo-supporter, Interview with the author in Edinburgh, October 31, 2015, in-person. 
584 NL, interview with the author in Abidjan - II Plateaux, August 18, 2016, in-person. 
585 EFA Fighter 2, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
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In their view, those who most likely fought stayed home, while those who did 
not presented themselves as genuine beneficiaries. In other words, “Il y a 
toujours des trucages!”, or, “there are always tricks”.586 For many respondents 
with questionable ties to the armed crisis, the mere perception of civilian 
individuals benefitting from the programmes was justification for on-going 
protests. In this sense, a payment to one inevitably opens the door to all. 
In a conflict that saw very little armed confrontation and mass civilian 
support for their preferred political cause, the lines between combatant-support 
and regular civilian support were undoubtedly blurred. Many civilians with very 
little knowledge of the crisis or of the actors also fancied themselves 
combatants, as made evident by a series of interviews with civilians who 
showed no hesitation in framing themselves as ‘ex-combatants’ when 
prompted. These individuals considered their experiences of living through the 
crisis alone as sufficient grounds to be considered an ‘ex-combatant’. Two 
examples of this come are of a traditional healer with northern Ivoirian roots, as 
well as an Imam who worked in Abobo, the ethnic stronghold of the northern 
rebellion in Abidjan. For the former, benefits should be given to him, as a self-
identifying ex-combatant, as he had morally supported the northern cause. 
Yes, I supported. […]. If you wrote my name amongst the 
combatants, there would not be a problem! I supported them, I 
was behind them […]. I would love to enter [the FACI army]!587  
In the case of the latter, the Imam explained that his role is promoting themes 
of reconciliation and unity within his mosque constituted veritable ‘ex-
combatant’ experience.  
Me, I consider myself a veritable ex-combatant. Why? Because 
when you speak of atomic bombs, all of that, all of that is less 
soothing than prayer. Prayer is the first soother. Because when 
you fire on someone, the bullet could [penetrate] or not, but the 
prayer will for sure [penetrate]. So, it’s because of our prayer that 
peace and social cohesion have returned. This is our role as 
                                                          
586 Jeunes Associés, Group interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 27, 2016, in-person. 
587 Dozo Traditional Healer, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, August 10, 2016, in-person. 
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religious emissaries. Blessings, prayer, sacrifice, therefore, I 
consider myself to be a veritable ex-combatant.588 
These statements illustrate the ways in which civilian perceptions of ‘ex-
combatant’ labels are highly flexible and applicable to a multitude of 
experiences. More importantly, they are valuable and desirable. This is 
especially of note as there is ample academic research has demonstrated the 
stigma that can be attached to the label of ‘ex-combatant’ in both civil wars. In 
Sierra Leone, for instance, early research demonstrated that ex-combatants 
were reluctant to participate in a DDR programme because of the fear of 
discrimination and targeting that their status could bring.589 The case of 
Demobilised FN in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrates the exact opposite—that it is a 
desirable and useful label to advance one’s financial interests in the post-
conflict period. 
While most claims above relate directly or indirectly to integration into the 
state security forces, the label of ex-combatant was observed to hold 
expectations of power and respect for individuals who aligned to it. Interviewing 
several groups of young FN supporters, respondents expressed 
disappointment that their official “ex-combatant” status, obtained through the 
national DDR programme, was not meeting their expectations. One group of 
respondents, in their early 20s, felt frustration over the lack of respect they were 
getting from state armed forces, particularly the military and gendarmes. In 
addition to granting respect, the label should have helped them to get jobs. The 
respondents described approaching military and gendarme personnel on the 
streets, telling them that they were also ex-combatants, only to get laughed at 
and called useless rather than being an equal.590 In this sense, the FN-
supporting youth felt that it became a handicap. One youth explained that, “the 
disarmament card (ex-combatant ID) serves what purpose today? It’s like a 
drug we took. I don’t even see the importance in it anymore.”591 The label of 
‘ex-combatant’ was similarly expected to hold a certain degree of recognition 
                                                          
588 Imam, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, August 10, 2016, in-person. 
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590 FN-loyalist youth, group discussion 3 with the author in Port Bouët-Abidjan, December 28, 2016, in-person. 
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amongst older respondents. Similarly, one ex-combatant explained the 
following.  
When two people to go the police, when one presents his ex-
combatant papers, he will be taken more into consideration. But 
that alone is not sufficient, we are expecting more.592  
The respondent further explained that the title of ex-combatant and the 800,000 
F CFA received gives them more rights and legitimacy to engage in claims-
making. The voice of those individuals who had no role in the conflict, but now 
have ‘the papers’ will be carried louder and further. For this respondent, the 
label of ‘ex-combatant’ was a source of pride, as he now feels that he has more 
of a platform to address the authorities.593 
One possible further explanation for the embrace of the ex-combatant 
label amongst the Demobilised FN is that there was relatively little armed 
conflict with relatively few human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, when 
compared to most cases of armed conflict in the west African region. In this 
sense, there was less stigma associated with the label, as there was generally 
little bad behaviour attached to it. This finding suggests that the willingness of 
civilians to use the label of ‘ex-combatant’ is dependent, at least in part, on the 
amount of atrocities and damage caused by armed actors. In cases where 
levels of violence were low, the label may be seen more a political affiliation 




FN supporters who have been demobilised either through official DDR 
channels or entirely by themselves have prioritised various methods of group 
and individual claims-making as political engagement. Aligning themselves with 
those who currently are in power, this thesis posits that their relative proximity 
to state institutions and their continued allegiance to high-ranking political 
actors, greatly increases their bargaining power. The examination of the 
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demobilised protests at the time of the integrated FN mutiny in May 2017, Le 
Collectif association, and the various individual attempts at maintaining 
awareness of opportunities for claims-making serve as telling examples of 
political engagement activities for those who consider themselves to be victors 
and who are within relatively closer proximity to institutions and individuals of 
influence than their Gbagbo-supporting counterparts and the Commando 
Invisibles. By mapping the claims-making activities of demobilised FN fighters, 
this chapter articulated and analysed why people choose one tactic over 
another, and why and when they choose collective action or individual actions. 
Despite their multiple attempts, the self-identifying ex-combatants from 
the Demobilised FN categories have received little recognition from the ruling 
regime. Their political engagement activities have also been met with little 
success. This chapter proposes that the failure of the Demobilised FN to make 
gains is due to two primary reasons: a lack of support from their successful 
integrated peers, and an increasing degree of scepticism from the regime of 
who fought, who offered support, and who has opportunistic motives. The first 
conclusion is drawn from the example of the demobilised FN protest that 
occurred alongside the FN Integrated mutiny. Although making claims for 
essentially the same things and for the same reasons, the mutineers did not 
support their demobilised peers. Worse yet, they were hostile to them, resulting 
in a death of a demobilised FN at the hands of a mutineer who thought that the 
protesters were diluting their mutiny. Although the mutineers claimed to be 
making the demands on behalf of the 8,400 FN soldiers who integrated the 
military, they made no mention of both those FN who integrated other armed 
corps, as well as those FN who were demobilised. This first reason indicates a 
lack of cohesion amongst the ex-combatants of the FN. The second reason put 
forth by this chapter is that the authorities themselves might have been 
sceptical of claims from ex-combatants. As demonstrated in the later part of this 
chapter, the status of ex-combatant became very loose and some individuals 
inhabited identities when it seemed to their benefit. In the Ivoirian context, 
individuals could have joined the conflict for a few days, or a few years. They 
could have actively fought or could have attended a weekly meeting pledging 
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support for the movements. This finding is also articulated by Chelpi Den Hamer 
in her description of Gbagbo supporters,594 and was further applied to groups 
of FN, particularly those from the Jeunes Associés and the EFA subgroups. 
The status is further confounded by allegations that friends and family 
benefitted from concessions reserved for ‘combatants’ of both sides. Taking the 
already blurred categories of FN supporters through its armed, financial, and 
administrative wings, it becomes nearly impossible to prove or disprove 
anybody’s status, despite the low levels of violence incurred in the total 11-year 
crisis. It is important to recall the allegations of corruption in the integration 
process for the integrated FACI forces. Should these allegations be true, then 
it is highly likely that true, battle-hardened FN combatants were left out. The 
numbers of people that fall into this category, however, is impossible to know, 
and further confounded by the claims of opportunistic individuals seeking 
financial compensation as well. This chapter, therefore, seeks to shed light on 
the blurred boundaries of ex-combatant and civilian, in the context of post-
conflict Côte d’Ivoire, that has led to a proliferation of opportunists claiming 
different FN-affiliated identities, in accordance with which one makes the 
greatest gains. For many Ivoirians, the experience of having lived through the 
crisis alone was sufficient grounds for claiming ex-combatant status and 
making-claims for financial benefits. This phenomenon is further explored in 
Chapter 8, where demobilised FN specifically makes claims for the Commando 
Invisibles status. 
Furthermore, despite their low success rate, the demobilised FN fighters 
continued to make claims to their political leaders, causing mild disruptions to 
post-conflict peace and security. If anything, this chapter demonstrates that the 
perceived right to make claims is not the same as being heard. While this thesis 
argues that ex-combatants aligned to the former FN rebellion engage more 
frequently and abrasively in claims-making due to their expectations of 
clientelistic rewards, that alone does not suffice in receiving pay-outs. It 
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recognises that facilitated opportunities alone are catalyst enough for continued 
mobilisation—particularly if the group experiences mild set-backs every time 
they engage.595 This chapter proposes that one of the factors that prompts the 
FN to continue to engage is that they see their military-integrated peers achieve 
success with the same basis as demobilised FN fighters. This argument follows 
Braithwaite et al. in that it recognises the power of successful examples 
elsewhere to show that mobilisation is possible and that it can produce positive 
outcomes.”596   
As demonstrated by the passages above, the unique status attributed to 
the label of ‘ex-combatant’ has remarkably different meaning across groups of 
ex-combatants in Côte d’Ivoire. While the previous discussions in Chapter 5 
revealed the Gbagbo supporter’s reluctance to leverage the label, this chapter 
on Demobilised FN demonstrates the contrary, suggesting that reminders of 
allegiance and related wartime experience serve as powerful tools to advance 
financial and professional interests. This chapter has shown that the label of 
ex-combatant is desired and useful in contexts such as this. Moreover, it 
demonstrated that the variation in methods of claims-making are largely 
dependent on where an individual finds themselves after the post-crisis 
distribution of posts. Taken together, these methods of claims-making, draw on 
reminders to the authorities that they supported them. This in turn, reinforces 
the perception of post-crisis governance shared with the Gbagbo supporters: 
that patron-client expectations remain largely intact and have influenced the 
way in which post-crisis stability has unfolded. As demonstrated by Chapters 6 
and 7, it is likely the proximity of FN fighters that makes the difference in if their 
claims are successful or not. It would be most simple to say that the mere fact 
that the Integrated had access to weapons from within the armed forces made 
them a bigger threat, and, therefore, elicited an immediate response from the 
regime. This scenario, however, neglects the fact that former ComZones were 
called to participate in the negotiations, rather than simply their military and 
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government chains of command. Moreover, it neglects the fact that no soldiers 
who supported Gbagbo took to the streets. The proximity of the Integrated to 
these former rebel commanders, who now hold prominent positions in the state 
apparatus, grants them an inside track. This inside track is likely also the reason 
that many were integrated in the first place if we are to believe the many claims 
of demobilised FN that friends and family benefitted. The Demobilised FN, on 
the other hand, continue to sit at the margins of power. Regardless of the 
number of times they organise themselves, plan their claims, mirror the same 
claims as the Integrated, they seem unable to break through and generate the 
same response of their Integrated peers. This said, this thesis identifies the 
proximity of former FN fighters as the main factor in determining who has 
success and who does not. Finally, the frequent reference to the Ouagadougou 
agreements by Demobilised FN, despite a questionable grasp of its content, 
opens interesting avenues for future research. Such research could explore 
what ex-combatants understand, perceive, and expect from such agreements 











While many observers consider the Commando Invisibles as part of the 
broader northern rebellion, this thesis recognises them as a distinct group with 
a unique post-conflict political trajectory. The Commando Invisibles fought in 
support of Alassane Ouattara and shared political affinities with the FN rebels. 
Despite this, the group’s post-conflict political trajectory stands in stark contrast 
to the victors group, the FN supporters. Unlike the FN supporters, members of 
Commando Invisibles have not engaged in claims-making and have chosen 
rather to disengage from the political sphere altogether.  
This chapter argues that the Commando Invisibles’ choice of active 
political disengagement stems from their continued loyalty to a fallen ex-FN 
leader, Ibrahim Coulibaly (alias “IB”). Their FN counterparts, on the other hand, 
remained aligned and loyal to the eventual FN leader Guillaume Soro, who went 
on to become the President of the National Assembly. Accordingly, members 
of the Commando Invisibles have both observed and continue to expect that 
opportunities in the post-conflict period will be more easily accessed by those 
aligned with the victorious pro-Soro camp in the FN rebellion. The case of the 
Commando Invisibles reveals that political loyalties to Ouattara alone did not 
suffice. Rather, it was the loyalties to the fractured leadership within the FN 
rebellion that shaped post-conflict political trajectories. This finding reinforces 
the central argument of both clientelism and proximity to those in power as a 
driving force behind ex-combatant political engagement. This chapter also 
reinforces the argument that ex-combatants with favourable outcomes and 
access to concessions, rather than the most battle-hardened and 
disenfranchised, posed the greatest threat to post-conflict stability. Despite the 
Commando Invisibles being the most battle-hardened group in Côte d’Ivoire, 
they have been largely side-lined by the post-conflict regime and face constant 
fears of reprisal.  
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Throughout this chapter, the Commando Invisibles are presented 
through a series of narratives captured during fieldwork. Narratives originating 
from the remaining commanders of the Commando Invisibles and their closest 
ex-combatants are referred to as “original”. The identification of “original” 
Commando Invisibles was made possible through connections made by 
international practitioners who worked directly with the group upon the return of 
the remaining commanders from exile in 2015. Their identities were further 
cross-checked with early photos of the rebellion and post-electoral crisis, as 
well as with senior officers from the Ivoirian armed forces. Alternative claims 
about the status of the Commando Invisibles have the designation “alternative 
narrative” in order to signal a version of history derived from government 
officials and other groups of ex-combatants. This chapter also makes frequent 
use of the word ‘allegedly’, as much of the information surrounding the 
Commando Invisibles and the early exploits of the coup-makers from 1999 
onwards is yet to be publicly confirmed. While this thesis cannot confirm nor 
deny the Commando Invisibles leader’s role in the turmoil described below, 
public perception of his involvement has significantly influenced how ex-
combatants self-identify in the post-conflict period. This chapter equally reveals 
that individuals who are willing to use the Commando Invisibles identity as a 
vehicle of claims-making, while the original members refrain, do so with the 
knowledge that they do not have any ties to the violence committed by the 
group, and, therefore, are unlikely to face heavy reprisals from the regime. 
 
 
Actor Background: Commando Invisibles 
 
Under the leadership of the former leader of the FN rebellion, Ibrahim 
Coulibaly (“IB”), the Commando Invisibles emerged as an armed group in 
Abidjan during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011.  They are known for their 
covert armed attacks against Gbagbo’s state forces and are unique because 
their combatants have managed to remain mostly anonymous within their host 
community of Abobo. While most Commando Invisibles fighters were 
231 
 
predominantly active during the post-electoral crisis, the formation of the group 
is rooted in the political rupture of the FN rebellion in 2004, which pitted 
followers of the military leader IB against the spokesperson and eventual 
rebellion leader, Guillaume Soro.597  
Speculation around the membership and the activities of these 
combatants during the early years of the rebellion are exemplified around a 
handful of key events. In June 2004, for instance, unknown assailants launched 
an attack on the convoy of Guillaume Soro, alongside an attack on two military 
barracks in the northern town of Korhogo.598 Although much speculation 
surrounds these events, the perpetrators are generally understood to originate 
from the IB camp of the rebellion and are said to have suffered harsh 
punishment within the FN for their alleged actions. Two events related to the 
alleged reprisals they faced within the FN are the lynching of former IB-affiliated 
commander Kassoum Bamba (alias “Kass”), as well as 231 other deaths, 60 of 
which suffocated to death while locked in a shipping container in the northern 
zone of Korhogo.599 Tensions flared between the rival camps again in 2007, 
when there was an attempted attack on an aircraft carrying Soro. The attack 
was declared an assassination attempt by IB and his followers to regain control 
of the rebellion.600 Following these events, and the eventual departure of IB 
from the rebel-controlled territories, multiple accounts of IB`s whereabouts 
circulated. Some people spoke of his arrests in France, others of his exile in 
Burkina Faso or in Ghana, while others insist on Benin. The next time IB publicly 
re-emerged was in 2010 as the leader of the mysterious Abidjan-based 
Commando Invisibles. 
                                                          
597International DDR practitioner, interview with the author in Abidjan-II Plateaux, February 16, 2015, in-person; Marie 
Miran-Guyon, Guerres mystique en Côte d’Ivoire: Religion, patriotisme, violence (2010- 2013) (Paris: Karthala, 
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598 Mike McGovern, Making war in Côte d'Ivoire, (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), 21. 
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600 International DDR practitioner, interview with the author, February 16, 2016, in person. 
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Leading into the post-electoral crisis, the Commando Invisibles formed 
its base in the northern-dominated Abidjan commune of Abobo, where it shared 
the same broad ‘northern’ ethnic identity and held general support for the 
northern cause. During the post-electoral crisis, the original Commando 
Invisibles describe carrying out their attacks exclusively in Abobo, due to their 
limited capacity both in terms of manpower and weaponry. Consequently, they 
lacked the resources necessary to extend their operations to neighbouring 
communes.601 During the same discussion, the original Commando Invisibles 
further explained that throughout its existence, the group had a clear hierarchy 
and military structure, and led a group of disciplined fighters who carried out 
targeted attacks against the state forces that were loyal to Gbagbo.602 Their 
discretion was their strength, and it played into popular depictions of them as 
an “invisible” force. Alongside their attacks against key military installations, the 
Commando Invisibles are commonly known to have employed the tactic of 
ambush, where they lured in state security forces to relatively remote locations 
within the commune to attack them, taking their weapons and ammunition. The 
tactic of ambush is said to be one of the ways the group first acquired and 
subsequently replenished their weapon and ammunition stocks over the course 
of the post-electoral crisis.603 As a result of these attacks, the group effectively 
destabilised Gbagbo’s forces, opening space for the commanders of the 
FN/FRCI604 to descend into Abidjan and complete the transfer of political power 
from Gbagbo to Ouattara. 
Over the course of the post-electoral crisis from November 2010 to April 
2011, the Commando Invisibles waged an urban battle that played an important 
role in the victory of the FN. Although Ouattara`s electoral victory and 
subsequent protection were internationally endorsed during the early months 
                                                          
601 Commando Invisibles, group discussion with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, October 10, 2016, in-person. 
602 Commando Invisibles, group discussion with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, October 10, 2016, in-person. 
603 Commando Invisibles, group discussion with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, October 10, 2016, in-person; Ivoirian 
Former ADDR staff, interview with the author in Abidjan, September 30, 2016, in-person. This thesis does not 
disregard the possibility of other sources of weapons. The tactic of ambush as stock replenishment is the one cited 
by local observers and the group itself. 
604 The FN combatants had changed their official name to the Forces Armées de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) slightly before 
they began their push south into Abidjan. 
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of the crisis, the Commando Invisibles` efforts were critical to the FN/FRCI`s 
entry into Abidjan. On The 11th of April 2011, FRCI forces captured Laurent 
Gbagbo, with the transfer of power being largely assisted by France and UN 
forces.605 A little over two weeks later, on the 27th of April 2011, IB was 
assassinated by the FRCI, resulting in the immediate dissolution of his original 
Commando Invisibles armed group. Following IB’s assassination, remaining 
commanders of the Commando Invisibles took refuge in the UN peacekeeping 
mission for a month before going into exile in Ghana; in the meantime, their 
fighters are widely acknowledged to have either been jailed or to have gone 
underground.606 What is essential to retain is that the urban war waged in 
Abobo by the Commando Invisibles against the FDS forces of Gbagbo makes 
the Commando Invisibles the group with, arguably, the most battle experience. 
As they are the most battle-hardened fighters, they should also be the most 
likely spoilers of peace, should standing assumptions of ex-combatant 
behavioural risks be applied. IB’s assassination, however, changed the 
trajectory of this group, subsequently rendering them side-lined and repressed. 
The reasons for IB`s assassination have varied from source to source. 
The following explanations are both normative opinions about whether his 
death was justified, and impressions about why the FRCI felt it necessary to kill 
him. For some, IB was assassinated for his alleged unwillingness to order his 
combatants to disarm, despite making the necessary calls to the national 
authorities to initiate the process.607 For others, IB’s assassination was justified 
on account of his allegedly conspiring with pro-Gbagbo militias, rendering him 
untrustworthy.608 For others still, his assassination was necessary because of 
his personal political ambitions. In accounts frequently told by FN supporters 
who were integrated into the government and security forces, IB was 
                                                          
605 Richard Banégas, “Post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire: The gbonhi war,” African Affairs 110, no. 440 (2011): 465. 
606 Commando Invisibles, interview with the author in Abidjan-Abobo, October 1, 2016, in-person; Haby Niakate, 
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608 Gbagbo-supporter, Interview with the author in Edinburgh, October 31, 2015, in-person. 
234 
 
considered a threat to post-conflict stability. These informants also say he 
allegedly took over the national radio and television tower, RTI, to announce 
another coup before he was apprehended and neutralised.609 The general 
consensus within the larger society, however, is that his assassination was the 
result of an unresolved dispute with Soro, who went on to consolidate his power 
within the regime and whose loyal forces went on to be integrated into the 
official state security forces under the post-conflict government of Alassane 
Ouattara.610  
Stories surrounding IB and the Commando Invisibles remain, to this day 
unconfirmed. Little is known about the identity or number of the group’s 
combatants beyond a few key commanders. What is acknowledged, however, 
amongst the majority of Ivoirians, regardless of their political convictions, is that 
IB is Côte d’Ivoire’s most famous putschiste.  The unofficial title stems from the 
alleged key roles that IB played in the coup of 1999 against Henri Konan Bédié, 
the 2000-coup attempt against Robert Guéï (“Cheval Blanc”), the second coup 
attempt in 2001 against Laurent Gbagbo (“Mercedes Noir”), and most 
prominently, in coordinating the FN rebellion in 2002.611 As a result, the lack of 
concrete information about the attacks and the identities of Commando 
Invisibles have created opportunities for individuals with similar political 
affinities and ethnic profiles to claim Commando Invisibles membership to 
obtain material compensation for the crisis-related activities of the original 
group. The mention of ethnic profile is important as it refers to the shared 
northern identities of those who supported the northern cause of the FN. The 
shared ethnic identity is the same as the core group of claims-makers and is 
possibly one of the reasons that Gbagbo supporters, of southern ethnic 
descents, have refrained from claiming Commando Invisibles membership to 
advance their interests. 
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communes, 2016. 




Post-Conflict Political Engagement: Active Disengagement 
 
In the initial years of the post-conflict period, the combatants of the 
Commando Invisibles who remained in Abidjan made an effort to blend into 
society with little trace of their wartime identities or experiences.612 Following 
the assassination of IB and the exile of top commanders, the remaining 
combatants were leaderless and fearful of reprisals from both the Gbagbo 
supporters and the new national authorities, largely derived from the ranks of 
the Soro-aligned FN. That said, the original Commando Invisibles were absent 
from most post-conflict programmes such as armed forces integration- an 
absence that was due, in part, to their own perceptions of a post-crisis context 
that favoured the ComZones and Guillaume Soro’s camp of the rebellion. Like 
previous chapters, it was the expectations of ‘victor’s justice’ that influenced the 
decision to be politically active or inactive, regardless of empirical truths about 
who fought, for how long, and how equitable compensation should look. 
As previous chapters demonstrated, from 2011-2017, the FN supporters 
were the most politically active group, frequently using the label of ‘ex-
combatant’ to make claims for further conflict-related compensation. Alongside 
the FN supporters, the Gbagbo supporters remained mobilised through political 
party engagement activities. The Gbagbo supporters, however, did not 
leverage the ‘ex-combatant’ label to advance their interests. Because no 
specific event of claims-making or other broader political engagement activities 
were carried out by the Commando Invisibles during the post-conflict period 
from 2011 to 2017, the next question was whether they had participated 
alongside either of the other groups, either within the FPI political activities or 
through similar claims-making activities of the Integrated or Demobilised FN.  
Since 2015, when the remaining leaders of the Commando Invisibles 
came out of exile and back to Côte d’Ivoire, there were no mentions in the local 
media of political engagement by this group. Additional research from 2011 
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onwards, revealed that the lack of engagement traced back to the beginning of 
the post-conflict period since the fall of Gbagbo and the transfer of political 
power to Ouattara in April 2011. The constitutional referendum of the 30th of 
October 2016 was effectively leveraged by Gbagbo supporters to denounce the 
state and had no traces of involvement by Commando Invisibles combatants. 
Similarly, the Commando Invisibles combatants were absent during the 
mutinies of 2017, and were not overtly proclaiming their Commando Invisibles 
membership alongside the demobilised FN demonstrating on alongside the 
mutinies. After notable periods of political engagement, discussions held with 
one of the remaining commanders, as well as a handful of Demobilised FN 
claims-makers present at the sites, confirmed their absence at these notable 
events. This finding, then, led to additional questions: Was their absence 
deliberate? Did ex-combatants from the Commando Invisibles share the same 
expectations of “victor’s justice” as the other groups? For the greater Ivoirian 
society, claims-making by former FN fighters seemed natural as they supported 
the current regime and were now assumed to be facing a more sympathetic 
government. As the following sections will demonstrate, the sentiment of 
victor’s justice is nuanced and does not extend to dissident factions within the 
broader FN rebellion. The choice of the Commando Invisibles fighters to remain 
loyal to their fallen leader than to the more mainstream FN group reinforces the 
importance of personal loyalties to those in power, rather than merely being of 
similar political convictions. 
 
Choosing Active Disengagement 
 
Guided by the questions above, this section presents the fourth category 
of political engagement used by ex-combatants in post-crisis Côte d`Ivoire: 
active disengagement. Active disengagement refers to actions to deliberately 
refrain from any political engagement activity that seeks to advance one’s 
interests vis-à-vis the structures of the post-crisis State. It entails refraining from 
traditional political engagement methods such as political party activities, as 
well as from those of claims-making including writing letters, forming 
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associations, protesting, and armed mutiny. Understanding that the choice to 
participate politically is generally understood to be the product of free will, 
political equality, and agency,613 the choice to actively disengage demonstrates 
people exercising those same factors to deliberately disengage from political 
life. Upon first glance, the choice of active disengagement resonates with Albert 
Hirschman’s well-known work Exit, Voice and Loyalty.614 As conceived by 
Hirschman, ‘exit’, in the context of a failing organisation, implies “inflicting 
revenue losses on delinquent management”615 The losses incurred, when large 
enough, would then prompt management to reconsider its strategies and would 
eventually lead to change.616 Applied to a case like Côte d’Ivoire’s Commando 
Invisible, the act of ‘exit’ could be demonstrated by their unwillingness to 
engage politically, both in public and in private forums. The concept, however, 
assumes that the choice of withdrawing from the political sphere was done 
independent of external factors and was a product of free will—an uninhibited 
decision to withdraw support from, and participation in, the polity. The concept 
of ‘exit’ is compelling as it seems to explain this absence from the polity on the 
surface. Where the concept of ‘exit’ fits less well, in the case of the Commando 
Invisibles, is that it does not account for the persecution, real or imagined that 
the actors perceive. The explanations given by the original Commando 
Invisibles reveal that their choice of active disengagement was more out of fear 
of reprisals, than it was an act of freewill seeking to undermine those in power 
in the hopes of triggering change. 
Disengagement from political action has been noted in several cases 
outside of Côte d’Ivoire. Where authoritarian rule prevails, for instance, political 
participation may be a way for citizens to demonstrate allegiance to the State, 
rather than their individual will. In Zambia, under the previous one-party state, 
withdrawal from participating in elections was locally equated to opposing to the 
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State.617 Research from Zimbabwe demonstrated that educated segments of 
the population were more likely to disengage from political action in contexts of 
economic decline, when they perceived that providing input would be futile. Not 
only did they disengage from elections, but also from contacting their local 
politicians and attending community meetings. Education, as elaborated in the 
article, increased citizen’s access to resources, and thus increased their ability 
to follow politics and offer critical examinations of it. Conversely, their increased 
awareness also made them more cynical of their power to shape domestic 
politics.618 Whereas citizens from these cases may have disengaged due to 
futility or apathy, the case of disengagement in Côte d’Ivoire was more tied to 
the fear of persecution than to any other political strategy. 
Similar to the cases listed above, the choice of active disengagement, 
as it was explained by the remaining original members of the Commando 
Invisibles, was an active political choice. Over the course of two separate group 
discussions, and a small number of phone interviews, notable events of political 
engagement were raised with the original members in the hopes of eliciting 
responses and positions specific to the Commando Invisibles. The topics 
brought up included the Constitution amendments of October 2016, the 
numerous ex-combatant protests, and the mutinies of 2017. When inquiring 
about the official stance and presence of original Commando Invisibles ex-
combatants, the commander explained that he, as well as the remaining 
leadership, had given strict orders to their affiliated ex-combatants to refrain 
from participation. The order, he explained, went beyond these specific events 
and was to be applied to any public or private attempts of the ex-combatants to 
make claims to the state.619 Furthermore, throughout these conversations, the 
commander prioritised a strategy of disassociating the group’s name from 
public events of political engagement. The primary motivation, he explained, 
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was to ensure that the original members would not be associated with any 
events of public disturbance. Additionally, the prioritisation of refraining from 
any negative public image appeared to extend beyond these notable public 
events, including occasional personal provocations that the original members 
might face from their rivals. The commander specifically brought up 
provocations such as those carried out by individuals outside the group placing 
blame on the Commando Invisibles for past or present political unrest. The 
original members explained how many Ivoirians often placed blame on 
Commando Invisibles in times of instability, angering the youth of the original 
group who then felt the urge to respond defensively, which could possibly result 
in heightened tensions. The group knew it was important to remain steadfast 
regardless of provocation and considered it essential to remain calm and refrain 
from public demonstrations of might. Remaining calm would not only contribute 
to reducing tensions between the parties, but, more importantly, would ensure 
that negative attention from the authorities would not follow.620 In a context that 
continues to be perceived as insecure for the original members, drawing any 
negative attention their way might bolster the regime’s ability to persecute the 
remaining original Commando Invisibles beyond what was done in the initial 
post-crisis years. 
Based on the information gathered during the discussions, the original 
Commando Invisibles maintained a core group of loyal supporters. The 
population of the Commando Invisibles, at its peak in 2011, is difficult to trace, 
due to the hidden and ‘invisible’ nature of the group. Leading into the post-
electoral crisis, and while fighting it, membership was deliberately kept secret, 
out of necessity as they inhabited the very communities of Abidjan that were 
under the scrutiny and heightened suspicion of Gbagbo’s FDS forces and other 
Gbagbo supporters. Different individuals consulted within the group provided 
reassurance that the core members of the original group remained in close 
contact, and that there was still a strong sense of allegiance to its remaining 
leaders, as well as to their unique history. The orders they received about 
individual and group behaviour in the face of provocations were given in a top-
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down manner, a characteristic of a cohesive group.621 The remaining 
leadership, as well as the closest supporters, considered keeping a low profile 
to be in the interest of the group from a strategic point of view, with the aim of 
reducing the risk of potentially on-going persecution. The original Commando 
Invisibles’ perception of possible persecution was significantly influenced by 
their immediate post-conflict experiences, some of which are explained below. 
Moreover, as the following sections demonstrate, the absence of the original 
Commando Invisibles from the public political scene has opened opportunities 
for other FN supporters to lay claims to the wartime experiences of the original 
Commando Invisibles, in the hopes of advancing their own personal interests 
in the post-conflict period. 
 
Downfall and Persecution in the Post-Conflict Period 
 
To better understand the original group`s reluctance to engage politically 
or make claim on the same sorts of entitlements as their FN peers, it is essential 
to understand their downfall by their own account. Moreover, it is essential to 
understand the consequences of their absence in the immediate post-conflict 
period: the appropriation of their identities and wartime experiences by other 
actors. 
From the early days of the northern rebellion, IB and his closest allies 
formed an integral part of the FN. In an interview with Jeune Afrique, IB and his 
loyal supporters stressed that regardless of disputes between the various rebel 
factions, they all had a shared goal of removing Gbagbo from power and 
obtaining equal rights and treatment for Ivoirians of northern descent. As 
explained by the original Commando Invisibles in this newspaper interview, 
despite the different loyalties to either Soro (“FN”), or IB (former “FN” and now 
Commando Invisibles), those who supported the northern rebellion and its 
presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara, were still brothers.622 Members of 
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the FN who were loyal to Soro, however, evidently did not reciprocate the 
feeling of brotherhood. 
By their own account, the original Commando Invisibles told a narrative 
of infiltration and deception- a story that ultimately led to the assassination of 
their leader, IB. The account commences roughly a week before one of the 
battles of the post-electoral crisis,623 when one of the rank-and-file of the 
original Commando Invisibles, “un petit”, informed the leadership that he had 
some friends who wanted to fight alongside the Commando Invisibles. The 
proposed recruits were affiliated with one of the ComZones, Koné Zakaria, who, 
at some point, had also allegedly fallen out with the FN.624 Trusting the 
intentions of the newcomers and the word of le petit, the group integrated a 
handful of the newly-arrived combatants. Many of the new recruits held support 
roles to the original combatants, supplying water, cleaning-up temporary 
premises, and doing small-scale maintenance work. Additionally, some were 
tasked with maintaining an active presence within the Abobo territory. Amongst 
those who joined to fight was an individual named Féré. From the data 
gathered, Féré was an individual who did not fight with the Commando 
Invisibles, but who later went on to make claims of leading the group on public 
forums, likely in an effort to reap financial benefits that were expected to be paid 
equitably to all ex-combatants. The example of Féré is important to understand 
as it is reflective of a larger trend of identity appropriation in the immediate years 
following the post-electoral crisis. This trend, as well as more on Féré, is 
discussed in the following section. The account provided by the original 
Commando Invisibles recalls many of the new recruits, Féré amongst them, 
fleeing the sites of battle at the onset of armed exchange with the Gbagbo-
supporting state forces. Before and after violent battle, however, the new 
recruits boasted the name of the Commando Invisibles group and their 
membership within it, despite never engaging in the armed struggle at any 
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point.625 Near the end of the post-electoral crisis, as the FN/FRCI arrived in 
Abidjan, the original Commando Invisibles described the start and increase of 
“conneries” (“bullshit”) committed by the new arrivals, likening their latest 
recruits to internal spies feeding information to the pro-Soro FN leadership.626  
As previously mentioned, immediately following the death of IB, several 
of the original commanders took refuge in the UN peacekeeping mission.627 
Once the remaining leadership left the streets of Abobo and their combatants 
went underground, the recently recruited petits, are understood to have 
collected the remaining military attire and equipment that they found on the 
streets- a common practice amongst both Gbagbo and FN supporters to 
increase their chances of integration into the armed forces.628 Such remnants 
likely belonged to the official state forces, the FRCI, or the original Commando 
Invisibles. With the original combatants no longer present, many of the last 
recruits and possibly other remnant-collectors proclaimed themselves as the 
original Commando Invisibles.629 Joining in on the identity-borrowing were 
individuals with similar ethnic profiles from neighbouring communes. While 
recounting the month spent in the UN peacekeeping mission, the original 
Commando Invisibles commander described with amused astonishment that it 
was only there, within the walls of the UN mission, that he first heard that there 
were “Commando Invisibles” in the neighbouring commune of Adjamé, a 
northern-dominated commune with a similar ethnic composition to Abobo.630 
Adjamé, while undoubtedly a target of Gbagbo’s state forces, was 
characterised more by mob-style violence than by armed combat. By their own 
account, the original commander and his entourage emphasised how they 
never had the capacity to conduct their armed attacks outside of Abobo, thereby 
rendering any claims of Commando Invisibles in other communes false.631 
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The personal accounts of the original Commando Invisibles’ downfall, 
the killing of IB, offers an explanation for the group’s reluctance to be politically 
engaged in the post-conflict period. IB was known as the mastermind of Ivoirian 
coups, making his assassination all the more powerful for members of his group 
with less skill and strategy. Moreover, he was a charismatic leader, with his 
followers likely pledging as much allegiance to him, personally, as they did to 
the broader cause. Following his downfall, there was no clear succession, 
which at least in part, explains why the group disbanded. The allegations of 
infiltration and the subsequent dissipation of the group demonstrate that there 
is little trust between remaining Commando Invisibles and FN-supporter 
groups. This lack of trust, placed within a context largely understood to favour 
the FN victors, offers little incentive for the ex-combatants to raise their voice 
publicly in a secure manner without a perceived threat of persecution. The 
group’s account of continued persecution helps explain why the group chose to 
deliberately refrain from political engagement activities exercised by their peers 
of the FN and counterpart Gbagbo supporters. Their absence on the post-
conflict scene, however, provided opportunities for other individuals to make 
claims about the group’s experiences and has led to a proliferation of alternative 
narratives purported by both individuals and newly integrated state authorities. 
  
Alternative Narratives for Claims-Making 
 
The swapping of wartime stories and identities was one of the most 
pervasive trends observed amongst former FN affiliates sitting at the margins 
of power. As previously discussed in Chapter 7, it was common for Demobilised 
FN to position themselves as a Jeunes Associés one day, a true FN fighter the 
next, and an EFA fighter at a later date. This trend equally encompassed the 
Commando Invisibles. This section outlines some of the different narratives that 
Demobilised FN used when claiming Commando Invisibles status. In the initial 
years after the post-electoral crisis, claims of Commando Invisibles status were 
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very public, most evident from the creation of YouTube videos to ‘set the record 
straight’. As individuals recognised that the label of Commando Invisibles was 
not as lucrative as expected, public declarations of status became less frequent 
and were reserved more for one-on-one interviews with foreigners. This 
doctoral research captured the last phase of label-borrowing, which presumably 
was a final effort to convince foreigners of their important wartime status. It was 
hoped, that by participating, additional lobbying would be done on their behalf 
within international circles. This last trend of identity-borrowing sheds important 
methodological light on processes of interviewing self-proclaimed ex-
combatants by showing how, and under what circumstances, it might prevail. 
One of the most publicly accessible cases of alternative Commando 
Invisibles claims has been put forth by the aforementioned Féré, now 
immortalized on YouTube as “Commander Féré”.632 In the video, commander 
Féré and his entourage describe the origins of the Commando Invisibles, as 
well as the tactics used against Gbagbo`s state forces (slaughter with a knife 
for Féré, specifically). In a separate YouTube video that is over an hour in 
length, the same entourage describes in detail the ways in which they, the 
Commando Invisibles, waged battle by walking the audience watching the video 
to the locations of their attacks. To legitimise their story, they re-enact 
demonstrations of ritualistic objects that ensured victory over Gbagbo’s forces. 
The video complements these accounts with community testimonies assuring 
that Féré and his entourage were the genuine actors of the conflict.633 In both 
videos, Féré and his entourage make explicit claims that they are the original 
actors, that they were present and waged every battle, and most importantly, 
that IB imposed himself on their group towards the end of the crisis, in an 
attempt to take credit for their victory. 
 
                                                          
632 “Commandant Féré, l`égorgeur des pro-Gbagbo a Abobo témoigne” (roughly translated as “Commander Féré, 
slaughterer of pro-Gbabgos speaks”), Youtube, accessed May 2, 2018,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HPIs-
oI1jaI 
633 “Commando Invisibles”, YouTube, accessed May 2, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YUXJvs6QEzo  
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Alternative narratives where individuals claim membership in the 
Commando Invisibles went beyond the initial group of “petits,” now considered 
to be traitors by the original Commando Invisibles. Over the course of this 
project’s research, several respondents from the Demobilised FN sub-groups 
of Jeunes Associés and EFA ex-combatants insinuated that they held 
membership in the Commando Invisibles. In these narratives, the individuals 
began the interviews by proclaiming membership in the Commando Invisibles 
and then would develop a narrative of being forgotten and left behind when it 
came to post-crisis financial compensation. As the discussions developed, 
these respondents later revealed that they considered themselves to be EFA 
fighters or Jeunes Associés, morally denouncing IB and his alleged malicious 
motives for Côte d’Ivoire. Reinforcing these narratives were other individuals 
from the same social networks, claiming to have been members of both the 
Commando Invisibles, and later, upon failing a basic questioning of facts, the 
demobilised Jeunes Associés. These individuals explained that because the 
original Commando Invisibles had been disarmed and the group ceased to 
exist, these individuals were amongst the last remaining ex-combatants to be 
neglected by the state and deprived of their wartime compensation.634  
Additional discussions held with self-proclaimed EFA ex-combatants, 
individuals sometimes began their interviews suggesting, and sometimes 
overtly declaring, that they were part of the original Commando Invisibles. 
When asked about the leadership, they pledged allegiance to an individual 
named “Dosso,” who also featured in a YouTube video self-proclaiming to be 
the lead of the Commando Invisibles.635 In this alternative narrative, the 
individuals insisted that they were independent from the pro-Soro camp of the 
rebellion and confidently declared their leader as Dosso only after a question 
was asked about him in the interview. Upon hearing the name, both 
respondents nodded, agreeing that Dosso was their leader when they fought 
as the Commando Invisibles. The message that these individuals wished to 
                                                          
634 Ivoirian Former ADDR staff /Jeunes Associés representative, interview with the author in Abidjan, September 30, 
2016, in-person. 
635 Documentation of Dosso was similarly obtained on YouTube, with Dosso self-proclaiming leadership of the group. 
The link has recently been removed, as well as other YouTube traces of these claims. 
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convey most strongly was that they were forgotten hardened fighters, and that 
one day, it would take very little to remobilise themselves and to destabilise the 
country.636 The type of identity and the discourse of ruthless and volatile fighters 
that was used by these respondents is important for two reasons. First, it 
demonstrates the willingness of these individuals to position and re-position 
themselves according to where they think the biggest gaps in a narrative to be, 
and where the biggest opportunities for benefit lie. Similar actions were seen 
and discussed in Chapter 7 where Demobilised FN sometimes jumped from 
one armed group identity to the next, in an attempt to make their pleas stronger. 
As these individuals come from the same ethnicity and background as those 
who traditionally supported the FN and the larger northern cause, this could be 
seen as a type of armed group appropriation. Second, as was the case of 
Demobilised FN, these individuals knew the importance of the threat of violence 
and were using the mystique of the Commando Invisibles in similar ways by 
advancing images of themselves as ruthless and volatile individuals.  
Reminders of their allegedly forgotten status and their precarious existence 
were likely used to demonstrate a sense of urgency to their audiences. The 
narratives provided by these individuals shed light on the willingness of 
respondents to mislead those who they consider to be outsiders by simply 
claiming ex-combatant status. While this thesis in unable to quantify the number 
of times that outsiders, and in particular researchers, have been misled by 
similar individuals in the field, these interviews show the length to which some 
respondents are willing go to make their claims of ex-combatant status.  
In another account, an individual contracted by the government through 
the national DDR programme declared with confidence that the original 
Commando Invisibles had ceased to exist as a group. In this alternative 
narrative, the respondent, a weapons collector, purported to have personally 
collected the weapons of IB’s original Commando Invisibles, who were 
allegedly residing amongst the Demobilised FN sub-group of Jeunes Associés. 
                                                          
636 EFA fighter 2, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person; EFA fighter 3, 
interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016 in-person. These interviews were conducted 
separately one after the other in different locations of the commune of Attécoubé. The respondents knew each other. 
Both first self-identified as members of the Commando Invisibles and later as fighters with the EFA group. 
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This individual stressed, during the first round of interviews, that he himself was 
also an original Commando Invisibles.637 The case of this particular individual 
was brought up in different discussions with other respondents, often citing the 
weapons collector as a profiteer. Speaking with the original Commando 
Invisibles, as well as with an international DDR practitioner, a popular story 
includes a description of the weapons collector and his entourage bowing their 
heads in shame and looking at the floor when the remaining members of the 
original Commando Invisibles turned up.638  
Similar to some of the interviews with the self-identified Jeunes Associés 
ex-combatants, the essence of their narratives was to demonstrate that they 
were original members of the Commando Invisibles, and that their welfare and 
reintegration had been neglected by state authorities. In all alternative 
narratives, whether from EFA or Jeunes Associés, those who originally claimed 
to be Commando Invisibles eventually led the discussion into a grey zone 
where their membership in Demobilised FN sub-groups became apparent, and 
their stance towards the Commando Invisibles became less clear. These 
alternative narratives were most prevalent in the early phases of data collection. 
Following more precise questions about names and dates, individual accounts 
drifted back to their original positions, describing membership in the original 
sub-groups of Jeunes Associés and EFA. What was common across the 
alternative narratives, whether they proclaimed membership in the Commando 
Invisibles or in other FN-affiliated groups, was the request of material 
compensation for their wartime efforts. The emphasis placed on material 
acquisition, whether in terms of pay-outs or back-pay, plus additional health and 
social service provisions suggest that these individuals deemed that claiming 
these identities were the best way to obtain these goods. In almost all 
                                                          
637 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, Interview with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, August 20, 2016, in-person. This 
individual later shifted his wartime identity multiples times in subsequent interviews, at times proclaiming to be an 
original Commando Invisibles, at others to be the head of the Jeunes Associés in a commune of Abidjan, and later to 
be an original FN-loyalist from the north, and whose only wartime identity was assistant to a ComZone who had 
neglected to provide for him in the post-crisis period. 
638 Group discussion, original Commando Invisibles, Abidjan-Abobo, October 1, 2016; International DDR practitioner, 
discussion with the author in Abidjan-II Plateaux, February 16, 2016, in-person. 
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discussions, individuals highlighted their combat experiences and how volatile 
their now precarious situations could be for lasting peace and security.  
Alternative narratives of the Commando Invisibles story go beyond 
individual claims to membership. Separate accounts presented by a handful of 
government officials provide an entirely different composition of the Commando 
Invisibles. In one version, IB was cast as an opportunist leader who arrived to 
take the lead of the group only after the FN affiliates in Abidjan had considerable 
success. In this version, IB was allowed to take the lead because he had a 
history of being a real military officer with proven strategic and tactical military 
experience.639 The Commando Invisibles, in this particular account, was made 
up of defecting security forces from the police, gendarmes, and military, who 
then trained civilians to battle Gbagbo’s regime.  
Other narratives reinforced the rise of individuals with questionable 
wartime experience during the post-conflict phases of ex-combatant integration 
into the state security forces. In a handful of informal discussions, officials of 
the regime recounted stories the Commando Invisibles with an entirely different 
set of actors. In these versions, FN supporters currently serving in public office 
described having only one supporter on-site in Abobo—the neighbourhood 
strongman “4x4”, mentioned previously in Chapter 6. Due to his prominence 
within northern-dominated communities, 4x4 was able to mobilise youth in his 
area, to launch attacks on Gbagbo`s state forces, and consequently could open 
ground for the FRCI to enter and take control of Abidjan. In this alternative 
narrative, 4x4, despite not being a ComZone, was able to wield influence in the 
post-conflict distribution of posts within the armed forces because of the key 
role he played during the post-electoral crisis. This narrative placed emphasis 
on the role of 4x4 and his networks in the post-crisis period, all the while 
reinforcing the omission of IB and his original Commando Invisibles.640 
                                                          
639 Ivoirian Former ADDR staff /Jeunes Associés representative, interview with the author in Abidjan, September 30, 
2016, in-person. 




The alternative account of the Commando Invisibles, under the 
leadership of 4x4, mirrors down to the finest detail, the experience presented 
by the original Commando Invisibles themselves. When asked about IB and his 
supporters, proponents of this alternate narrative insisted that IB emerged on 
the scene only after the Commando Invisibles of 4x4 had gained momentum. 
In this particular telling, IB and his supporters attempted to take credit for the 
battle and later claimed the group as their own.641 Additional comments from 
state officials referred to IB and his supporters as a group who thrived in times 
of chaos and instability, and who surfaced at opportunistic moments, such as 
elections, as a way of being noticed by the regime. Their attempts of being 
noticed, however, were described as producing little more than annoyance to 
the state authorities.642 When cross-checking this version with the EFA and 
Jeunes Associés ex-combatants mentioned above, the respondents largely 
rejected the claim by government officials that 4x4 was the original leader. 
When asked who 4x4 was, these respondents explained that he was an 
individual who “invented himself” on the spot to capitalise on post-conflict 
opportunities of promotion within the state security apparatus.643 
As evident by the alternative narratives above, individual respondents 
seem to have adopted the name of the Commando Invisibles as a way of 
demonstrating their war-time experiences. By proving to their audience that 
they were original members with real combat experience, these individuals 
most often highlighted how they had not yet received appropriate material 
compensation. As previously mentioned, the individuals in these versions, had 
been left behind—that is, not integrated or financially compensated by 
Ouattara’s regime—during the post-conflict period, and, therefore, failed to 
acquire their due financial and social service compensation. Moving beyond the 
individual accounts of ‘forgotten’ membership in the Commando Invisibles, the 
                                                          
641 Commissioner Ministry of Defence, informal discussion with the author in Abidjan-Plateau, October 25, 2016, in-
person. 
642 Commissioner Ministry of Defence, informal discussion with the author in Abidjan-Plateau, October 25, 2016, in-
person. 
643 EFA fighter 2, interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016, in-person; EFA fighter 3, 
interview with the author in Abidjan-Attécoubé, December 23, 2016 in-person; Jeunes Associés, interview with the 
author in Abidjan-Riviera II, November 12, 2016 in-person.  
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alternate versions presented by the state authorities demonstrated a degree of 
state complicity in blurring the narrative of the original Commando Invisibles, to 
the advantage of a new set of post-conflict actors who became active members 
when compensation was given. 
The above examples demonstrate the tensions that can arise when 
claiming the identity. The original Commando Invisibles view the label and 
dangerous and continue to refrain from claiming the identity. At the same time, 
FN supporters who sit at the margins of power and influence have resorted to 
it, as a final effort to demonstrate their wartime experience in the hopes of 
obtaining material compensation. While this section revealed how these stories 
were being presented during the fieldwork, it argues that it is likely that similar 
stories would be told to other researchers with a less solid grasp on the 
identities and intricacies of the conflicts.  
 
Personal Loyalties Reinforcing Clientelistic Expectations 
 
An examination of the Commando Invisibles in the post-conflict period 
yields two important findings. First, the choice of active disengagement 
challenges the notion that battle-hardened ex-combatants are most likely to 
disrupt post-conflict peace and security. Second, that the group’s silence, 
coupled with a proliferation of competing narratives, resulted in several 
individual claims of membership and activity amongst broader groups of FN 
supporters in order to advance their individual financial interests. These calls 
for conflict-related compensation were most often in the form of pay-outs, back-
pay, or access to medical and other social services. Perhaps the most puzzling 
aspect of these findings is to try and understand why individuals have 
deliberately sought to re-cast themselves as original Commando Invisibles, 
while the original members themselves chose to actively disengage from any 
form of claims-making or broader political engagement activity. Moreover, 
questions arise of why individuals would attempt to profess allegiance to IB 
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while fully knowing that it would not earn them any favour with the post-conflict 
regime. 
Consistent with the sentiments expressed by those from the Gbagbo 
supporter groups, members of the original Commando Invisibles voiced a 
sense of victors’ justice. Despite sharing political affinities with the common 
northern cause of the FN rebellion, the internal cleavages between pro-IB and 
pro-Soro wings eventually led to their persecution in the post-crisis state. The 
trajectories of political engagement could not be more different for the two 
groups, the “victors” of Soro being highly active in claims-making, while the 
original Commando Invisibles actively avoided any public display of dissidence 
or opposition. The emphasis placed on blending into society rather than 
proclaiming its unique status and history stands in stark contrast to the other 
FN supporters, who pushed their wartime sacrifices to the forefront of public 
debate.  
Having backed and stayed loyal to assassinated leader IB, members of 
this group explained how they feel restricted in their ability to express 
discontent. Group meetings led by their remaining leaders, employed 
vocabulary such as “même-clan” (“same clan”), when referring to decision-
makers who were aligned with Soro and who may have had an impact on their 
integration opportunities. In their view, the best and only available response 
was to resist the urge to speak out. That is, to sit silently, and ensure that none 
of their members were responsible for disturbing the post-conflict peace. While 
the FN supporters, both integrated and demobilised, took to the streets during 
the January and May 2007 mutinies, the original Commando Invisibles 
remained silent over their own grievances of military integration. The basis of 
claims-making for those mutinies was the fact that the integrated FN soldiers 
brought Ouattara to power, and, therefore, were to be financially compensated 
beyond what they had already received. What was missing in their claims-
making was any mention of the role played by the original Commando 
Invisibles. Similarly, ex-combatants from the original Commando Invisibles 
have refrained from the many demonstrations held by Gbagbo supporters 
against the new Constitution, the same way that they refrained from 
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participating in other demonstrations alongside ‘forgotten’ ex-combatants from 
the Demobilised FN group. The instructions to disengage, given by the 
remaining leadership, indicate that there was still a significant degree of 
cohesion and loyalty within the group, as they actively remove themselves from 
the public space. While these ex-combatants refrained from engaging in any 
disruptions, their cohesion and loyalty to their identities may mean a swift 
remobilisation in the event instability returns to the country. 
The second finding, that of alternative narratives and individual claims of 
Commando Invisibles membership, required a significant degree of 
triangulation and intimate knowledge of credible sources. The finding, however, 
is vital to understanding larger trends of post-conflict ex-combatant claims-
making. As presented above, individuals often self-proclaimed Commando 
Invisibles membership at the onset of discussions, only to later blur the 
narratives and reveal that they belonged to other FN sub-groups when 
questioned more specifically. The first observation is the conditions required for 
this phenomenon to happen. The absence of the original Commando Invisibles 
in the initial post-conflict years meant that many alternative narratives could 
emerge undisputed. Without the presence of the original commanders and the 
most loyal rank-and-file, a rigorous defence of the group’s history was never 
upheld. More importantly, is the backdrop of socioeconomic standing of most 
of the respondents. For those who initially claimed the Commando Invisibles 
status, only to later shift identities, the living conditions were precarious. 
Moreover, opportunities to earn a better livelihood were scarce. Taking this into 
consideration, the economic incentives, and particularly employment 
opportunities for ex-combatants, become desirable goods. As demonstrated 
above, claims making by these individuals were very public, such as the case 
of Commander Féré’s YouTube videos, and, over time, grew increasingly 
remote and secretive, as was the case with the FN supporters who self-
proclaimed Commando Invisibles status discreetly in private interviews for this 
thesis. Together, these observations align with other trends demonstrated in 
this research that individuals that are further away from people of influence in 
the victors’ camp are less likely to have their claims fulfilled, and in response, 
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have taken on varying identities in order to try to advance their claims. 
Consistent across these claims, mostly from self-identifying FN supporters, 
were allusions to their heightened capacity for violence and instability- a reality 
that they warned should not be forgotten. Although this research cannot verify 
that these alternative narratives were deliberate attempts to advance one’s 
economic standing, it does confidently suggest that the two are linked.  
In keeping with the broader findings of ex-combatants involved in the FN 
rebellion, this chapter adds nuance to the finding that political loyalty and 
proximity to influential actors strongly influence ex-combatant political 
behaviours. In the case of the original Commando Invisibles, political affinity 
was shared, as was conflict-related experience in the early years of the 
rebellion. The difference, and the point where nuance becomes crucial, is that 
loyalties to specific individuals was a critical factor in determining if a post-
conflict context was conducive for successful claims-making or not. In the case 
of the original Commando Invisibles, the break from the pro-Soro camp of the 
FN rebellion was enough to keep IB and his followers out of the distribution of 
post-conflict posts and benefits. The importance that ex-combatants give to 
personal loyalties further reinforces the argument that that ex-combatants have, 
to a certain extent, counted on the continued practices of clientelistic 
governance to reign in the post-conflict period in ways that disrupt prevailing 
expectations about spoilers coming from excluded groups. The successful 
claims-making by those with loyalty to Soro and the affiliated former ComZones 
reinforces expectations of political continuity in the post-conflict period. This, in 
turn, as argued in the previous chapters, shapes the choice of ex-combatant 
political engagement in the post-conflict period, regardless of the authenticity 
of their combat experience.  
The decreasing willingness of Demobilised FN to declare original 
Commando Invisibles identities in public ways is worthy of further analysis. This 
finding suggests that even amongst those who attempt to cast themselves as 
the original members, there was a general understanding that membership in 
the group could still be publicly denounced. The alternative versions of 
Commando Invisibles’ history recounted in private discussions by the FN 
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aligned government officials reinforces this observation, as they prioritised 
narratives that omitted entirely the role of IB and his closest allies. Of additional 
importance, as described in the previous chapter, is that amongst the FN 
supporters most active in claims-making, not once was the identity of 
Commando Invisibles proclaimed. The avoidance of eliciting Commando 
Invisibles stories in the public space indicates that it is not a lucrative story to 
be told within the country. The alternative histories of Commando Invisibles 
membership, may, therefore, be reserved as a last-ditch individual effort to 
brand oneself as a forgotten combatant without material compensation, 
especially when trying to gain the sympathies of the international community. It 
is likely that these individuals use the Commando Invisibles identity in the hopes 
of having greater success with people outside their Ivoirian communities- 
‘outsiders’ who would have less knowledge about the actors and the events. 
These observations have been facilitated by a lack of verified history around 
the key events and actors, allowing new individuals to make claim to 
compensation reserved for a specific set of actors. As one respondent, who first 
self-identified as a Commando Invisibles and later re-positioned himself as an 
EFA fighter said: 
They [FN supporters] want to re-invent themselves. They take 
things that they heard in their circles, they want to profit a bit. It 
works a lot with those who lack detailed knowledge of the crisis. 
The ones who tell the stories with pride, with passion, are 
probably not the real ones.644  
The quotation above sheds light on the most likely scenario for the case of FN 
supporters who sit at the margins of power claiming Commando Invisibles 
status: that people who are desperate and further from entitlements seem to 
take on whatever identities they can in order to see if they can get some traction. 
This thesis suggests that as they were not true members of the Commando 
Invisibles who engaged in violent combat and killings, they had little fear about 
possible repercussions. This explains, partially, the reasons why the original 
Commando Invisibles seeks anonymity and a low profile, while those with little 
                                                          
644 EFA Fighter 3, interview with the author in Abidjan, December 23, 2016, in-person. 
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experience confidently profess membership to both the broader public in the 
early years, and now to international ‘outsiders’. 
 
Conclusion: “Something that you cannot see… can you fight it?”645 
 
In closing, the enduring allure of the ‘invisible’ forces of the Commando 
Invisibles is worth special mention. Reaching out beyond the target interviews 
with self-proclaimed ex-combatants, this research further captured the ways 
that Commando Invisibles are spoken about in wider community circles. The 
enduring mystique that surrounds the group’s identity has been told many times 
in many different circles with much animation. Regardless of whether their 
history is deemed beneficial for official claims-making to the post-conflict 
regime, the mysterious nature of the armed group has become apocryphal, 
despite their relatively recent presence in 2010-2011. 
For many, the Commando Invisibles elicit images of an “invisible” force. 
When questioned about the Commando Invisibles, respondents across all three 
groups, in addition to non-combatant Ivoirians, generally held the Commando 
Invisibles as almost mystical, in awe of its secrecy, of its tactics, and of its 
efficacy.  
The Commando Invisibles, it is not an individual. There were 
maybe 15-16 people based on what I heard. It was a sort of game 
where they could disappear all of a sudden and reappear in 
another location. Not everybody had this faculté-là [capacity]. 
And then, those that saw this said “ok, this is the commando 
invisibles that disappears”. In fact, they had an advantage when 
dealing with police and gendarmes that came to Abobo en cargo 
[explains ambush as a tactic]. That’s how they killed them. And 
then they [state forces] said to each other “we didn’t even see 
them!”646 
Adding to the allure is a common story that describes how police officers 
allegedly said that they would stop and see shots going off all around them, yet 
                                                          
645 Ivoirian Former ADDR staff /Jeunes Associés representative, interview with the author in Abidjan, September 30, 
2016, in-person. 




not seeing a single person firing them. The assailants, the story goes, were 
“invisible” to them.647 For others, descriptions of the Commando Invisibles 
involve individuals disguised as crazy and homeless people, locally referred to 
as “des fous”. During the day, they would be in costume, blending into society 
as the homeless, re-surfacing in their military identities at night to launch their 
offensives. In this telling, the Commando Invisibles, as a movement, started 
after the wave of coup attempts, resulting in a government crack-down on 
precarious neighbourhoods housing many fous.648 For others yet, in a version 
held to be true by hard-line Gbagbo supporters, the Commando Invisibles was 
an armed group created by the UN peacekeeping mission and the French 
forces to bring the FN rebels into Abidjan.649 Regardless of their origins, many 
of these respondents cared little about obtaining the truth on the group, 
choosing rather to shape the group into their desired reading of the 11-year 
crisis. The only time when the empirical truth about the group seemed to matter 
was when issues of war-related compensation were brought up.  
The silence and absence of the original Commando Invisibles allowed 
for alternative narratives to arise, some of which could have serious implications 
for the original members of the group itself. As one international analyst put it, 
the pressure by the Ivoirian public650 and the international observers651 put on 
the Ivoirian government to equally persecute members of their own camp may 
work against the Commando Invisibles. It is well known that the FN fighters 
committed human rights abuses as they descended into the south to take 
control of Abidjan. In light of the proliferation of alternative versions of 
Commando Invisibles history, however, one observer suggested that the 
Ouattara government may seek to thrust the Commando Invisibles, rather than 
the former ComZones towards the ICC.652 These recent attempts to achieve 
                                                          
647 FN ex-combatant gatekeeper, discussion with the author in Abidjan-Yopougon, November 10, 2016, in-person. 
648 Gbagbo-supporter, Interview with the author in Edinburgh, October 31, 2015, in-person. 
649 Gbagbo-supporter, interview with the author in Abidjan, November 30, 2016, in-person. 
650 Multiple informal discussions with the broader public, including taxi-drivers, professors, Ivoirian colleagues of 
southwestern descent, Abidjan-multiple, August 2016-July 2017. 
651 “Côte d’Ivoire: UN peacekeeping mission ends. Impunity, security sector reforms threaten stability,” Human Rights 
Watch, 30 June 30, 2017, http://www.hrw.org/print/305979. 
652 International Information Analyst, discussion with the author in Abidjan, October 13, 2016, in-person. 
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balanced justice might shed light on the reasons why the original members 
remain quiet while other groups appropriate their stories: because the original 
members actually did engage in violent urban warfare. At the same time, those 
appropriating the stories know that there is nothing linking them to the crimes 
committed by the FN and the Commando Invisibles. Although this thesis is 
unbale to empirically reinforce this statement, it advances the likelihood that 
those who are willing to use the name do not fear reprisals in the same way as 
the original Commando Invisibles do. 
The lack of fear of reprisals for the violent acts committed by the 
Commando Invisibles and the larger FN group, this chapter argues, opens an 
opportunity for individuals to borrow armed group identities to engage in claims-
making. The people using the identities for material gain seem less concerned 
about the implications of their actions. With such high levels of ambiguity in the 
history and identities of the original Commando Invisibles, these individuals 
have a facilitated path to claiming identities of true battle-hardened Ivoirian 
fighters. The high levels of ambiguity also mean that there might be some 
chance that they can convince someone to compensate them somehow, or at 
the very least, to lobby on their behalf. In this case, as previously mentioned by 
the EFA ex-combatant above, outsiders who might have heard about the 
Commando Invisibles but are unable to discern who is actually who are 
vulnerable. This point is important to raise as it is proof of identity borrowing 
amongst individuals wanting ex-combatant status. Combined with the claims-
making efforts of demobilised FN, as presented in Chapter 7, it reveals a trend 
in behaviour amongst extended circles of ‘victors’ that are key to understanding 
Côte d’Ivoire’s post-conflict context. 
Regardless of what the future holds for the original members of the 
Commando Invisibles, what is certain is that the original members have chosen 
to actively disengage from the political sphere. Disengagement, as far as the 
original Commando Invisibles are concerned, it a preferable strategy that 
prioritises the sustainability and security of the group, rather than the acquisition 
of material or financial conflict-related compensation. Perhaps the best way to 
describe the phenomenon of the Commando Invisibles in the post-conflict 
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period is best said by the Commando Invisibles themselves, in an interview with 
Jeune Afrique. 
Those who appear in the media today have reached individual 
agreements and cannot express themselves in our name at all. 
The characteristic of the Commando Invisibles, the original, is 




                                                          
653 Niakate, “Côte d’Ivoire.“ 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined the topic of political engagement across groups of 
ex-combatants in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. It asked why some ex-combatants 
mobilised to make financial and material gain and other did not. It demonstrated 
that in post-conflict periods, ex-combatants are ultimately political actors, 
making use of the label ‘ex-combatant’ when their political patrons come into 
power and shelving it when their patrons lose. Substantial analysis has gone 
into the reintegration successes and failures of ex-combatants after war, as well 
as when their movements turn into political parties. This thesis builds from these 
issues by exploring how ex-combatants engage more broadly with politics in 
the post-conflict period. This thesis argued for a shift in the way ex-combatants 
are viewed, moving away from the treatment of ex-combatants as a 
homogenous group ‘to be dealt with’ to one where the label ‘ex-combatant’ 
becomes a political tool for individuals to leverage. This in in line with Jaremey 
McMullin654 and Johanna Söderström’s655 calls for a more nuanced view of ex-
combatant interactions in the post-conflict period, and draws inspiration from 
the work of Norma Kriger,656 who, through her examination of post-
independence Zimbabwe, documented and analysed the importance of history 
and politics on ex-combatant behaviour. Despite the political rupture and 
supposed opportunities for social transformation arising from violent conflict, 
ex-combatant participants in this research still behave as though they expect 
continuities from the past, even when there is a significant change in 
government. This thesis reaffirms that historical patterns of governance matter 
when seeking to understand ex-combatant behaviours and the larger 
likelihoods of enduring peace and stability. 
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Prevailing research suggests ex-combatant is a category unto itself. In 
cases of decisive – or apparent – political victory after conflict, however, the 
label of ‘ex-combatant’ becomes a fragmented category with significant political 
weight. Why do some fighters become vocal advocates of their ‘ex-combatant’ 
entitlements, while others slip into political silence? And, more puzzlingly, why 
did the victors and their fighters in Côte d’Ivoire become those most likely to 
create ongoing instability? This thesis argued that clientelism set the stage for 
highly personalistic identification between fighters and their former armed group 
leaders, many of which went on to occupy powerful political posts in the post-
conflict period. The distinct political history of Côte d’Ivoire, from the time of 
Independence in 1960 to the start of political instability in December 1999 has 
unquestionably shaped Ivoirian understandings and expectations of politics. 
Chapter 4 traced the history of governance under Félix Houphouët-Boigny from 
1960 to his death in 1993. Houphouët-Boigny’s rule was characterised as a 
strong charismatic leadership style, with a top-down control of virtually every 
aspect of political life. Elite appointments to public office, as well as the 
distribution of goods such as land and integration opportunities into the armed 
forces were carried out along ethnic lines and in a way that ensured unwavering 
loyalty to, and dependence on, Houphouët-Boigny. Chapter 4 further traced 
how appointments to public office and the reception of state resources were 
often tools of co-optation for political dissidents who posed a threat, real or 
imagined, to the one-party state of the PDCI and the personal rule of 
Houphouët-Boigny.657 Precedence was set, and, therefore, engrained in 
Ivoirian minds that political loyalty to those in power would likely increase 
opportunities for socioeconomic and political advancement. The data presented 
in Chapter 4 uncovered how, following Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, 
successive governments continued to award positions in the armed forces to 
their loyalists. An area of future research could involve a more systematic 
tracing of how military recruitment was conducted across time under different 
governments.  
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The explanations given by ex-combatants and presented throughout this 
thesis revealed their expectations that similar practices be continued in the 
post-conflict period. This expectation, predictably, reinforced local expectations 
of who could successfully make claims for economic advancement and who 
could not, based on political loyalties during, and after, the conflict. In this 
sense, participation in the 11-year political conflict arguably opened 
opportunities for political supporters to position themselves as ‘insiders’, 
seeking their share of benefits. Loyalties to the politically defeated leaders, both 
Laurent Gbagbo and Ibrahim Coulibaly (“IB”), were also prevalent amongst ex-
combatants, as they considered that the conflict was not yet over and were 
rather maintaining their loyalties for when their side reigns victorious. 
This thesis broadly argued that the legacies of post-independence 
governance shaped post-conflict political behaviours. This finding builds on 
works from Bratton and De Walle and brings them into the post-conflict 
literature by demonstrating that the political spheres created beforehand may 
have residual impact on contemporary political behaviours, both constraining 
and enabling.658 Despite social change and political ruptures, the political 
history mattered in shaping the contemporary expectations of Ivoirians. This 
finding resonates with ideas of historical institutionalism involving the “formal 
rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure 
the relationship between individuals in the various units of the polity and 
economy.”659  To make its case, this thesis showed that political affinities and 
proximity to influential political actors significantly influenced the political 
behaviours of ex-combatants. Ex-combatants across armed group factions 
identified when opportunities to advance their personal, financial, and political 
interests were there or not. Those who felt they had won the war considered 
that they had the most solid grounds for claims-making and ties through which 
to make their claims. Those with feelings of defeat, considered themselves to 
be excluded from opportunities. Given the prevalence of clientelistic exchanges 
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in the history of Ivoirian governance, clientelistic ties inevitably become seen as 
a necessary pre-requisite for claims-making in the post-conflict period.  
This division was further compounded by their proximity to influential 
political figures. Those in proximity tended to engage in the most disruptive 
forms of claims-making with much success, while those on the margins used 
less disruptive tactics and achieved little to no success or bided their time and 
disengaged more or less completely. Given the historical patterns of 
governance in Côte d’Ivoire- governance that frequently co-opted individuals 
for their political loyalty- ex-combatant political behaviours demonstrate an 
expected continuity of this type of governance. The importance of political 
affinity was most obvious in Chapters 5 (Gbagbo-supporters) and 8 
(Commando Invisibles). These two chapters demonstrated that ex-combatants 
with political loyalties to the defeated, Laurent Gbagbo and Ibrahim Coulibaly, 
did not engage in political demonstrations that disturbed the peace. Ex-
combatants from these groups equally did not seek opportunities to make 
claims for greater financial or employment benefits. The reluctance of these 
groups to leverage their status as ex-combatants to advance their financial and 
livelihood interests vis-à-vis the post-conflict regime of Ouattara was due, in 
their words, to their status as the defeated and that it was not their time to make 
gains. In light of these findings, Chapters 5 and 8 demonstrated that political 
affiliation mattered in determining who was likely to make claims and 
demonstrated little evidence of battle experience alone as an enabling feature 
of disturbing political behaviour.  
Contrary to ex-combatants who remained loyal to Gbagbo and to Ibrahim 
Coulibaly, those who positioned themselves as political victors following the 
2010-11 post-electoral crisis, the FN supporters, were highly engaged in 
claims-making activities. These individuals unabashedly leveraged their status 
as FN-affiliated ex-combatants to make claims to Ouattara’s post-conflict 
regime for greater financial compensation and additional positions in the 
Ivoirian armed forces and the civil service. Closer examinations in Chapters 6 
(Integrated FN) and 7 (Demobilised FN), demonstrated that proximity also 
influenced the success and disruptive potential of claims-makers. Amongst the 
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victors with the closest proximity to powerful political elites, those who 
supported Ouattara and were integrated into the armed forces, political 
engagement took the form of armed mutiny as a way of claims-making. Over 
the course of two mutinies carried out in January and April 2017, the integrated 
FN-affiliates effectively paralysed economic activity in all major cities and 
threatened the stability of the country. In both instances, their efforts were 
successful, drawing a swift response from FN-affiliated Ministers, former 
ComZone warlords of the FN insurgency, and the President himself. The FN-
affiliated mutineers left the negotiating table with a number of their demands 
met. Chapter 6 (Integrated FN) showed that ex-combatants who were 
integrated into the armed forces and where, therefore, in closer proximity to 
individuals of influence, were more likely to vocalise their claims in highly 
disruptive and public ways. Such tactics were frequently repeated in the past, 
each of which was met with greater concessions from each government.  
The success of the Integrated FN in making claims, however, did not 
carry through to Demobilised FN ex-combatants. For ex-combatants who were 
affiliated with the victorious insurgency but who were demobilised through the 
national DDR programme or by themselves, staked claims to the regime by 
writing letters, forming associations, and participating in public protests. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated how groups of Demobilised FN ex-combatants 
appropriated the discourses of the mutiny and attempted to emulate the 
successes of the integrated soldiers. When they took to the streets, the most 
vocal among them were arrested and detained for several days until momentum 
for their movements dwindled. The most successful demonstration carried-out 
was one that occurred alongside their peers from the Integrated FN group, 
during the time of the mutinies. Their claims-making activities, however, yielded 
only marginal success in the form of blanket promises by the government for 
more community projects. This success paled in comparison to their integrated 
FN peers who received well over 12 million F CFA (approximately £16,000) 
each during the same time period. This thesis posits that these ex-combatants 
were demobilised, willingly or forcefully into civilian life, and, therefore, did not 
have the same degrees of proximity to individuals of political influence. 
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Consequently, their claims were not regarded with the same sense of urgency. 
While it could be argued that the Integrated FN’s access to weapons created 
the sense of urgency, such an observation neglects that other uniformed 
personnel, most notably from the former FDS structures under Gbagbo, did not 
participate in the mutiny. Taking up arms was, therefore, contingent on political 
loyalties. Moreover, the need for former ComZones to mitigate the mutiny 
alongside the Minister of Defence and military hierarchy reinforces the extent 
to which personal loyalties are important in the post-conflict state. As the 
Demobilised FN shared the same political loyalties but sat on the margins of 
political and military might, their claims were slightly less disruptive but 
significantly less successful. Other attempts at claims-making from this group 
frequently employed a discourse of political loyalty during the conflict and a 
reminder of the sacrifices made on behalf of the post-conflict regime. Although 
both groups of FN supporters vocalised many of the same grievances, only 
those who were integrated were accorded additional concessions because of 
their actions. The outcome suggests that there was a degree of in-fighting over 
state resources amongst those who supported the Ouattara regime. Together, 
Chapters 4 and 5 showed that proximity mattered and that those who were 
closer to political power, even if only because of integration into the state 
apparatus, were more likely to engage in disruptive behaviours and to make 
financial and livelihood gains.  
Conceptually, this thesis drew from Allen Hicken’s work on clientelism, 
in which clientelistic exchanges consist of four key elements: dyadic 
relationships, contingency and reciprocity, hierarchy, and iteration.660 Applied 
to the case of Côte d’Ivoire, clientelistic expectations were voiced repeatedly by 
the participants in this research, each accounting for their actions through this 
framework. In Chapter 5, Gbagbo supporters maintained a strong loyalty to the 
central figure of Laurent Gbagbo, despite his on-going trial in the ICC. In 
addition to the symbolism that Gbagbo represented, socialist leanings and a 
break from foreign dependence, ex-combatants loyal to Gbagbo were 
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committed to a long-term battle, with expectations of returns.661 Loyalty to 
Gbagbo and his party was seen as a long-term investment that will bring 
benefits once the FPI regains power. Chapters 6 and 7 (FN-supporters) equally 
demonstrated the prevalence of clientelistic thinking amongst ex-combatants. 
Repeatedly (both in this research and in media), ex-combatants voiced their 
grievances and expectations of financial returns for their political loyalty and 
support to the FN rebellion. The ex-combatants in these chapters argued that 
the promises made to them during the rebellion had not been upheld, but that 
their political loyalty to the leaders of the FN rebellion and to President Alassane 
Ouattara would continue to be honoured. This finding is similar to Kriger’s 
observations of veterans in Zimbabwe pledging allegiance to the state at the 
same time as they exerted pressure on the regime to provide additional 
compensation.662 Despite being characterised as a liberation struggle, the case 
of Zimbabwe drew remarkable similarities with ex-combatant political 
behaviours in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. Chapter 8, in turn, presented similar 
findings, this time from two different angles. Ex-combatants from the 
Commando Invisibles group refrained entirely from all forms of political 
engagement on account of their unfavourable position with the post-conflict 
regime. They explained in Chapter 8 that as their ‘clan’ was not in power, they 
did not feel secure enough to create any public disturbances, let alone engage 
in claims-making, despite the importance of their urban insurgency in bringing 
Ouattara to power. Chapter 8 also documented how individuals from similar 
ethnic backgrounds as the FN supporters, yet who had not benefitted from any 
post-conflict incentives, often attempted to present themselves as Commando 
Invisibles as a final effort to prove ex-combatant status. Initial declarations of 
Commando Invisibles identity were prevalent in the immediate post-conflict 
phases through social media channels such as YouTube. Over time, however, 
as it became clear that the Commando Invisibles were less likely to benefit from 
post-conflict opportunities, these individuals gradually withdrew from public 
forums and reserved their claims for private discussions with those who they 
                                                          
661 Hicken, “Clientelism,” 291. The contingency/reciprocity element of clientelism additionally includes promises of 
benefits in the future, and does not have to be immediately received. 
662 Kriger, Guerilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe, 1, 10. 
266 
 
considered to be outsiders with little knowledge of the conflict and its original 
actors. It is likely that this was done as a near final and desperate measure to 
encourage international outsiders to lobby on their behalf. 
The findings of this thesis prompt questions of whether clientelistic ties 
are a structural constraint or a catalyst of disruptive political mobilisation. The 
evidence collected for this research indirectly suggests that for those at the 
margins, it is a constraint, while for those in close proximity to political power it 
is a catalyst. Those who described themselves as having no ties to political 
patrons kept low profiles and, if they did mobilise, did so within legally accepted 
and negotiated terms with the regime. This finding suggests that the perceived 
prevalence of clientelistic ties are an inhibitor to disruptive political behaviour 
by those that feel disenfranchised. On the other hand, the lower success rate 
of victors on the fringes of political power, compared to the victors with closer 
proximity to individuals of influence, suggests that strong clientelistic ties are a 
catalyst for disruptive political mobilisation. As both a constraint and a catalyst 
for disruptive political mobilisation, these observations have significant 
implications on post-conflict peace and security and should be taken into 
account when forecasting where post-conflict instability may lay. Academically, 
the significance of clientelistic ties to ex-combatant choices of political 
engagement further makes the case for the analytical integration of political 
dynamics into ex-combatant and post-conflict studies. One of the questions 
worth pursuing in the future is what the shelf life is of “ex-combatant” status in 
post-conflict states. Is the mobilisation that stems from it recurring, or does it 
die out in time?  
This analysis, across armed group identities which correlate with political 
identities, showed that political affinities determine who feels entitled to make 
financial and employment claims, and proximity impacts who has success and 
who does not. Because the claims were made through a discourse of wartime 
service and political loyalty, this thesis classified them as political claims-
making. Their political nature is clear when considering the counterfactual; if 
the claims were devoid of any political inclination, they would likely be made by 
all ex-combatants regardless of political affinity. The findings of this thesis prove 
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that this is not the case. Cases such as Côte d’Ivoire, where much of the armed 
group affiliation mirrored clean and distinct political lines, further demonstrates 
the necessity of research on ex-combatants to incorporate separate analysis 
along lines of political affinity.  
Counterintuitively, this thesis also showed that the biggest threats to 
security and stability in Côte d’Ivoire came from those ex-combatants that had 
benefitted the most in the post-conflict period. The spoilers were not those that 
were disgruntled and side-lined but were those that took the lion’s share of 
benefits available in the post-conflict period. Integrated FN ex-combatants had 
not only been integrated into stable employment but had also benefitted from 
repeated pay-outs for successive mutinies and armed protests. Since 2011, 
they made use of the most disruptive tactics economically, politically, and 
socially as there was often small-scale violence and occasional fatalities. The 
standing assumption of ex-combatant behaviour is that the greatest 
disturbances to peace and stability would come from ex-combatants who feel 
the most dissatisfied, the most marginalised, and the most idle.663 In Côte 
d’Ivoire, however, the opposite was true. The victors were the most disruptive, 
effectively blending a discourse of political loyalty, unfulfilled promises, and 
dangerous individuals made that was directed at those who came to power with 
their support. The defeated, who generally felt neglected, were remarkably 
compliant and law-abiding, seldom voicing their grievances in public ways. 
While this result is less surprising to historians of African politics, it is a break in 
the way ex-combatant research has been approached. 
 
On-Going Issues in Côte d’Ivoire 
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Despite a return to peace and an impressive return to increased foreign 
investment in the country,664 Côte d’Ivoire is still faced with a series of 
unresolved issues. Issues surrounding the system of land tenure as well as 
lopsided justice continue trigger localised interethnic disputes. Additionally, the 
political alliances and reconfigurations of Côte d’Ivoire’s major political parties 
are drumming up fears of instability leading into the 2020 presidential elections. 
Finally, there is also the remobilisation potential of the combatants, mostly FN-
affiliated who did not receive any benefit. The continuation of these issues is 
important to mention because they may result in continued tensions, that if 
heightened, could result in a lapse in the current state of peace.  
 In regards to land tenure, tensions between migrant populations and 
Ivoirians indigenous to the southwest continue in Côte d’Ivoire’s southwestern 
cocoa regions, perpetuating a situation of slightly less intensified “neither war 
nor peace”.665 Many of the tensions involve land disputes dating as far back as 
the 1960s, resulting in violent attacks later during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Two months after the fall of Gbagbo in April 2011, UNHCR reported that there 
were 320,000 IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire, and 200,000 in refugee camps in 
neighbouring countries.666 Most of the displaced were indigenous populations 
from the southwest cocoa regions afraid of violent attacks from migrant 
workers, FRCI, Dozo traditional hunters (who have similar ethnic origins as the 
FN and who sometimes shared security responsibilities under the FN rebel-held 
northern territories)- all of which were perceived to have come to ‘power’ 
through the victory of Ouattara.667 Under the violent attacks lies the essence of 
the land issue: the majority of migrant populations repeatedly state that the land 
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was sold or transferred to them, making them the rightful owners. The majority 
of indigenous, however, draw from the 1998 Rural Land Law No. 98-750668 to 
argue that they maintain customary rights to the land. Ouattara, in turn, cannot 
easily develop a new law of land tenure that risks undermining and damaging 
the economic interests of his primary support base. Without a thorough solution 
to the land issue, it is highly likely that the very grievances that sparked the 11-
year Ivoirian conflict remain in-tact, facilitating the re-emergence of inter-
communal violence in the southwest and the possible remobilisation of those 
with strong perceptions of injustice. Matthew Mitchell best summarised the 
current dilemma of the post-conflict government, whose primary support base 
has important ties to these lands as migrant workers. 
While the new regime has publicly acknowledged the need to 
address the land question, the Ivoirian government and many in 
the international community have been slow to fully recognise 
the urgent need for land reform.669 
 
Additionally, post-conflict justice remains, at the time of writing, lopsided. 
On the eve of Côte d’Ivoire’s national Independence Day, celebrated the 7th of 
August 2018, Alassane Ouattara announced that he would grant amnesty and 
release approximately 800 prisoners tied to the post-electoral violence of 
2011.670 Amongst those to be released was Simone Gbagbo, Laurent Gbagbo’s 
controversial and politically active wife. Simone Gbagbo was released on the 
8th of August, surrounded by journalists and awaited by her closest supporters. 
Aside from the media coverage, the event cause little public disturbance, with 
members of the Ministry of Defence and the FPI political party attesting that no 
public demonstrations took place.671 Over a handful of informal discussions with 
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Ivoirian Gendarme officers and FPI representatives, this move was taken within 
the Gbagbo-supporting camp to signify a weakening of Ouattara and the RHDP 
coalition that defeated Gbagbo in 2010 and won re-election in 2015. The 2017 
mutinies revealed to Ivoirians that the former ComZones integrated into high-
ranking military posts continued to wield significant power. The discovery of the 
weapons cache in a close collaborator of Guillaume Soro’s house further 
signalled that Ouattara may not have total control over those who helped him 
come to power. It is against this backdrop that those FPI supporters consulted 
through the informal discussions believed signified a weakening of Ouattara’s 
political position. The amnesty and liberation provided to approximately 800 
prisoners, 500 of which are believed to be either in provisional liberty or in 
exile,672 was, at the time of writing, met unenthusiastically. Of course, it is 
possible that Ouattara’s recent political moves signal that he is strong and is 
unthreatened by the political opposition. This thesis advises caution with such 
an observation. Without the full understanding of various streams of 
international political pressure that Ouattara must manage, it is difficult to tell 
who truly lead the initiative to level to political playing field and reverse some of 
the one-sided persecutions. A peaceful 2020 presidential elections is in the 
interest of more than Ivoirians, with an increasingly invested European and 
American presence in the Sahel region to which Côte d’Ivoire shares borders. 
With booming anti- and counter-terrorism operations north of the Ivoirian 
border, it is important to consider whether the risk of opening another conflict in 
Côte d’Ivoire is in the best interests of the regional actors. In the same 
discussion, the representative from the FPI took the opportunity to also state 
than the ICC had arrived about a month prior (June/July 2018) to begin 
preliminary investigations into the Duékoué massacres- one of the most bloody 
and significant face-offs between the FN forces (then called the FRCI), and 
Gbagbo supporters. This investigation is expected to lead to the summoning of 
three former ComZones to the ICC, although the information has not yet been 
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made public.673 The political implications of this would be positive. It would 
signal to Gbagbo supporters that justice is truly being carried out evenly. At the 
same time, although Simone Gbagbo was liberated in Côte d’Ivoire, she is still 
being summoned the ICC. In a recent interview with Jeune Afrique, Crown 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda explained that the call for Simone Gbagbo holds 
as the ICC does not believe that she was tried according to the same standards 
as the international court.674 Time will tell if the Gbagbo supporters soften to 
Ouattara’s most recent actions and begin to believe that justice is being 
pursued in a fair manner. Whether it reduces the perceptions of victor’s justice 
and the importance of clientelistic relationships with the regime is questionable. 
That the Integrated FN have been paid-out multiples times and have amassed 
sizeable personal wealth, combined with the time that has elapsed, Gbagbo 
supporters are likely to still argue that the FN’s political patrons gave the best 
spoils to their own. Equitable justice, after years of perceived inequality, is likely 
to do little to reverse the current understanding of ‘politics as usual’. 
Of equally important note is that political divisions remain strong, even if 
alliances continue to shift. From the beginning of 2018 onwards, the RHDP 
coalition that brought Ouattara to power against the 46% obtained by Gbagbo 
in the 2011 elections, is unstable, with contestation for the future leadership of 
the party between the RDR and the PDCI.675 On the 17th of June 2018, the 
PDCI, under the presidency of Henry Konan Bédié, declined to continue the 
alliance with the RDR to form the RHDP in the 2020 presidential elections. 
Since then, tensions within the PDCI erupted, with loyalists to Bédié maintaining 
their solidarity, and a small group of PDCI members currently holding public 
office in Ouattara’s government forming an alliance with the RDR to continue 
the RHDP on the 16th of July 2018. Six days later, the PDCI of Bédié announced 
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that the dissident members were excluded, as they could not legally belong to 
two parties at once.676 Equally shaking the political terrain was a recent 
statement by former FN leader, Guillaume Soro, that he would consider placing 
his candidacy for the 2020 presidential elections.677 Over the past year Soro 
has had public tensions with Ouattara, the most recent being his absence at 
Constituative Assembly of the RHDP.678 At this time, it is unclear if he would 
run as an independent, with an established party, or in alliance with the RHDP 
or even the FPI, as one observer suggested.679 Recalling that in 2010 Gbagbo 
and the FPI party alone received 46% of the national vote, while contentious 
elections, it will be of vital importance for Ouattara’s RDR to maintain the RHDP 
alliance. This further demonstrates that there is persistent clientelism with the 
same political patrons mobilising their supporters. Over the next year it will be 
interesting to see if if Bédié maintains his separation, and if so, who the support 
base of the PDCI will back. Similarly, if Soro decides to run, significant shifts of 
vocalised loyalty may occur amongst the former ComZones, who clearly 
demonstrated during the mutinies of 2017, that they retain significant power 
over the integrated FN FACI soldiers. At the same time, given that the FPI is 
currently fragmented under two different leaders suggests that there is currently 
no strong opposition on the part of the FPI. In such a climate, where it seems 
that Soro wields the most military might, political alliances and their bases of 
loyalty again become of vital importance to maintaining the post-conflict peace 
and the economic growth that it ushered in. 
 Finally, there is also the fate of those ex-combatants with legitimate 
claims of participation who did not benefit from any post-conflict dividend, or 
those that would leave the FACI structures. On the 18th of December 2017, a 
young integrated FN soldier disclosed news, in a private messenger 
conversation, of his upcoming retirement from the FACI. His retirement was, he 
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explained, part of a group offer for soldiers to retire voluntarily from the armed 
forces. This individual stated that he was one of 9991 soldiers who would retire 
and who would receive an additional payment of 15 million F CFA to do so.680 
Five months later, an article appeared by Reuters explaining that the Ivoirian 
army was to be reduced by 2,000 soldiers. The cuts would reduce costs and 
“bring under control a force that last year launched two mutinies.”681 In the 
article, government spokesperson Bruno Koné announced that 2,168 soldiers 
had accepted the voluntary retirement. No mention of a final pay-out appeared 
in the article. What is unknown is whether the majority of those who left were 
FN-affiliated or came from former FDS structures. 
For those that chose to remain in the army, mutinous remobilisation for 
the final alleged promises remains a prospect. On the 3rd of May 2018, a follow-
up investigation was carried out by Jeune Afrique on the status of the Bouaké-
based mutineers. The article described how Minister of Defence, Hamed 
Bakayogo has since attempted to engage with those identified as the leaders 
of the mutinies with little success. “With each rising, new [heads] emerge”, 
explained a high-ranking officer to the investigation team. Since the pay-outs of 
2017, the mutinous leaders have attempted to remobilise support for another 
mutiny. Should another mutiny occur, the claims would focus on the acquisition 
of the alleged villas promised to FN fighters during the rebellion.682 The villas, 
which were originally presented in the 2017 mutinies, was and discreetly 
dropped within the first 2 days of the 2017 mutiny. The investigation also 
revealed how frustration was mounting amongst officers and soldiers who 
served in the FDS before the integration of FN fighters into the FACI. Their 
frustrations stemmed from “indiscipline becoming the norm”683 since 2011. 
Finally, a new biometric registration process started in 2017, with the aim of 
identifying any double names as well as any soldiers who are not of Ivoirian 
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descent, particularly amongst those derived from the FN rebellion. As described 
by a high-ranking officer, the non-Ivoirians that came from the FN rebellion are 
“the more virulent and the most manipulable”.684  
 Since the end of the 2017 mutinies, Demobilised FN claims-making also 
decreased, with no public demonstrations appearing in the media. The mutinies 
sparked waves of reforms within the armed forces, including a re-shuffling of 
high-ranking positions, promotions for a handful of the former ComZones, and 
the ‘voluntary’ retirement of over 2,000 soldiers, as mentioned above. Following 
the alleged arrests of some demobilised FN, it is likely that the firm response to 
the mutinies after they received their pay-outs sent a clear signal to others 
thinking of continuing to destabilise the peace. The decrease in political 
mobilisation, however, does not necessarily mean that the Demobilised FN 
have given up their plight. In a recent article appearing in Jane’s Terrorism and 
Insurgency Monitor, links were made between disgruntled ex-combatants and 
possible remobilisation in radical Islamist violence.685 While Ivoirians 
interviewed showed a strong disapproval of the Islamist strategies of groups 
like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), found in northern Mali, the article 
did not rule out the possibility of violent Islamic ideas seeping into Ivoirian 
culture, to the point where their tactics are almost normalised and no longer 
elicit strong reactions. The post-conflict regime under Ouattara has already 
taken measures to reduce the spread of Islamist extremism within its territory. 
In 2015, a moratorium on the construction of mosques was issued, along with 
a ban on the preaching of foreign Imams. Additionally, a counter-terrorism 
school opened in Abidjan, with French support, in July 2018. Despite these 
measures, however, violent extremism has taken root over the past ten years 
and has been particularly noticeable in the central western city of Man, as well 
as in the Abidjan neighbourhood of Abobo- the same neighbourhood dominated 
with northern Ivoirians who supported Ouattara and were the target of many 
attacks by Gbagbo supporters. In contexts where youth unemployment remains 
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high, and where poverty persists, ideas of violent extremism can become 
appealing, particularly if its ideas are becoming normalised in daily life. As 
explained in by Jessica Moody, the spread of the ideas can eventually change 
the dynamic in Côte d’Ivoire. 
Ex-combatants would be much more interested in militant 
Islamist groups if there was more militarized Islamist violence 
going on around them and the idea more established.686 
 
This chapter supports this statement but highlights the necessity for 
nuance. Given that the Demobilised FN ex-combatants who currently voice 
discontent are mixed between actual fighters and opportunists, this thesis calls 
for a more careful application of the term ‘ex-combatant’. Rather than apply a 
blanket designation that “ex-combatants would be much more interested […]”, 
it would rather read “Ivoirians would be much more interested […]”. Youth in 
extreme poverty, who might find such messages appealing, might use the ex-
combatant narrative as a form of justification for such actions, whether accurate 
to their personal situation or not. The choice of an ‘ex-combatant’ narrative to 
justify a pull to violent extremism, in scenarios like this, acts as a way of shifting 
blame away from their personal preferences and agency. This is not to say that 
veritable FN fighters are not without grievances, especially given the 
widespread accusations of corruption in the integration process. Rather, it 
serves as a reminder, that FN experiences, like those of Gbagbo supporters 
are highly variable, and the risk of ex-combatants remobilising should not be 
conceptualised apart from the wider context and characteristics of the conflict 
itself. It is also important to note that across several discussions, with the 
aforementioned Ivoirian jurist, professor, and most recently, an Ivoirian who 
works in the area of immigration and security analysis, that Ivoirians are 
hedging bets on a reluctance of youth to abandon their lifestyle of “bon vivant” 
for one of strict conservatism.687 
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This research was carried out in a time of transition from heavy 
international presence and tutelage to one in which the post-conflict regime 
consolidated its hold on political and economic power. This specific period was, 
therefore, ideal to analyse how the label of ex-combatant was used, how it 
evolved, and how it ultimately became a political tool of clientelism. While this 
thesis effectively traced the political engagement of ex-combatants under fixed 
political divisions, there needs to be on-going investigation into how, and 
whether, these forms of engagement change as political parties mutate and 
form new alliances. If the RHDP claims victory in 2020 and the label of ex-
combatant continues to be leveraged by only one side, then we learn that it 
ultimately takes on lasting political use. If the opposition claims victory, and 
Gbagbo supporting ex-combatants begin to leverage the label, then again, it 
demonstrates the political nature of post-conflict dividends.  
 
Extending the Argument beyond Côte d’Ivoire: Limitations and 
Opportunities 
 
The Ivoirian case is distinct because of its political and economic history. 
Following independence, Côte d’Ivoire thrived economically for nearly two 
decades uninterrupted. It also was ruled by a single ruler, under a one-party 
state that remained largely uncontested until the final years before a shift to 
multiparty elections. Under this political stability, Ivoirians were able to condition 
themselves to a certain set of expectations of governance. While it is also 
possible that constituents adapt to unstable and inconsistent practices of 
governance, the long and ultimately prosperous reign of Houphouët-Boigny 
arguably instilled a sense of possibility to join the ‘inside tract’ amongst wider 
populations, rather than within regimes where only a handful of political elites 
can prosper.  
As presented in Chapter 2, patron-client dynamics are prevalent across 
many Sub-Saharan African cases. Moreover, claims-making behaviours 
amongst ex-combatants to ‘their own’ were proven to exist following liberation 
struggles such as Zimbabwe’s. While veteran politics were frequently observed 
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in post-liberation societies, this thesis posits that they are also applicable to 
intrastate civil wars as well. The similarities between ZANU-PF aligned veterans 
in Zimbabwe with FN-affiliated claims-making in Côte d’Ivoire demonstrate that 
ex-combatant politics is prevalent in a variety of wartime contexts. One avenue 
of possible research could be to examine if this trend extends to the most recent 
form of armed conflict on African soil- that of violent extremism and 
transnational security threats. In Mali, for instance, claims-making by various 
splinter armed groups seeking stakes in the peace agreement has already 
begun. Following a separatist rebellion in 2012 by Mali’s northern Tuareg 
groups, the United Nations Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 
deployed following the 18 June Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement. Two 
years later, in May-June 2015, the Algiers Agreement was signed between the 
Government of Mali and the two armed group coalitions (Plateforme and 
Coordination de Movements d’Azawad), including in it provisions for an 
integrated armed forces and a national DDR programme. To date, the progress 
implementing the peace agreement has been slow. Where this thesis becomes 
salient is with the recent occurrence of splinter armed groups emerging, 
increases in armed banditry, and inter-communal tensions that have seeped 
into the central and southern parts of the country. On a number of occasions, 
Malian nationals have lamented the progress, attributing the rise in crime and 
armed violence to youth taking up banditry in an effort to benefit from any 
programs that might occur. While it is still premature to determine whether this 
is the actual case, especially in light of the shifting security dynamics in the 
country, it raises an important question: are post-conflict benefits such as 
integration simply seen as goods of redistribution worth engaging in violent 
behaviour to obtain? 
 This thesis has added to a nascent academic body of research calling 
for a more nuanced view of ex-combatant political behaviour in the post-conflict 
periods. To understand how to most effectively implement policies and 
programmes that promote peace and stability in the post-conflict period, it is 
essential to understand the motives and behaviours of ex-combatants, not as 
singular, but as multifaceted and somewhat contradictory to conclusions 
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previous research has drawn. A further exploration that questions how common 
the experiences of ex-combatants in Côte d’Ivoire are with ex-combatants in 
other countries could provide vital information for the effectiveness of national 
and international interventions in the post-conflict period. Taking into 
consideration the political trajectories of different groups of ex-combatants can 
trigger interventions geared towards pluralistic polities, in which all sides feel 
represented, and, can consequently, reduce the chances of relapsing into 
conflict.  
 In closing, it is crucial to reiterate that the case of post-conflict Côte 
d’Ivoire is highly complex and is characterised by powerful political elites, 
enduring secrecy around key events, and long-standing grievances amongst 
local populations. More importantly, many of its current issues stem from a long 
history of elite politics and foreign influence- both of which pre-date the 11-year 
political crisis and ignite passionate debate. As with many countries, but 
especially true in Côte d’Ivoire, the more one enters into the details, the more 
convoluted the story becomes, and the more historical links come into play. 
Many of the facts, names, and numbers crucial to draw any firm conclusions on 
the events of the 11-year political crisis remain undisclosed, to both locals and 
foreigners alike. This enduring secrecy makes the task of drawing firm and 
generalisable conclusions an elusive task. While the arguments presented in 
this thesis were informed by local perceptions and narratives of events, it is only 
fitting to close the thesis in the same way. The complexity of the country and its 
politics is best summarised by Ivoirians themselves, in an expression that was 
frequently repeated and holds just as much truth today as it did in leading into 
the 11-year political crisis. 
Si on t’a expliqué la politique de la Côte d’Ivoire et tu as 
compris, c’est qu’on t’a mal expliqué.688 
If somebody explained to you the politics of Côte d’Ivoire and 
you understood it, it means that they did not explain it correctly. 
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Appendix A: Sample of Questions Used 
 
Introductions 
To begin, can you tell me a little bit about yourself? 
Where are you from? Where is your family from? 
 
Wartime Experience 
Based on what they answered above, I tried to situate them in the larger 
Ivoirian conflict context.  
1) Where you in (city/region) when (conflict event) happened? I heard that 
(x,y,z) happened, but am not sure if this is true, do you know anything 
about this? 
2) What were you doing at this time? 
3) What impact did this have on your daily life/ family life? 
 
Post-Conflict Period 
1) So after ‘la chute’, what did you think? Did you feel like it was a good 
time to voice your concerns? 
2) Have things gotten easier for you since 2011 (financially, stability, 
security, etc…)? 
3) What way do you think is best to tell the government your concerns? 
 
Claims-Making 
1) Did you hear about (x,y,z claims-making by ex-combatants)? 
2) Who do you think might be participating? 
3) Would you consider doing it?  
4) If you did, why did you consider it? 
5) I’ve noticed that only some ex-combatants are making claims, do you 
know why this might be? 
 
General 




Appendix B- Feuille de Route “Le Collectif”
 
 
